

THE AESTHETIC OBJECT

*An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Value*

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IT IS
MY FATHER
AND
MY MOTHER
THAT SPEAK
HERE

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PREFACE

WITH respect to the facts and reflections usually connoted by the term aesthetic, two problems begin to be distinguishable with some degree of clearness. And the fact that these reflections, and the two emerging problems, appear to be taking a form dictated by considerations of general philosophical method, seems to indicate that an attempt to formulate those problems and to develop the method in terms of a system of elementary aesthetic concepts might pass for an aesthetic theory, and might at the same time place that theory upon a solidier basis than it has had hitherto. The chapters which follow represent such an attempt.

The problems within this field are, it is assumed, so far as they are fundamental, of the same kind as the problems within other regions of the general domain of philosophy. Hence they seem to call for the same kind of treatment. One of the basic problems of aesthetic reflection is the question of the nature of the aesthetic experience, especially as that nature is determined by the status of the experience within the total structure of knowledge. The other problem concerns the logical structure of the aesthetic object, and its status within the total structure of reality. Behind these two problems there lies the ground problem of all philosophy, that, namely, which asks what is the nature of the knowledge system objectively regarded, and what is the nature of the reality system, regarded as having the conditions of its objectivity formulated in principles which are also and at the same time the basic assumptions of the knowledge system. It will be observed that these are fundamental problems of general philosophy at the point where logic goes over into metaphysics, and when logic is considered as having the task of tracing out the ground conditions of intelligibility for the aspect of reality with which, in a given case, it is directly dealing.

With respect therefore to the special aspect of reality treated of in aesthetics, it would appear that if there is a body of knowledge relative to the aesthetic experience there is also a possible system of logical order to which it can be made to conform. And the extent and the validity of our purported

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knowledge will be determinable by and within the degree of orderly fitness with which it accepts a systematic form. Also, if there exists a knowledge of aesthetics which is capable of order, there exists also an object as the ground of its truth, an object whose structural design is identical with the intentional design of the knowledge through which the object is made intelligible as an element of the total cosmos. Also, if there is an aesthetic object whose reality is logically verified, then the logic of its structure is capable of formulation as and within a system of mutually sustaining concepts, and the system of concepts can be an organon of dynamic categories if the system of their interreference relations determines their object an individual. Also, if there is to be an aesthetic "science" and if our aesthetic knowledge is to have a determinable meaning, the form and the design of that meaning will have to be discovered as basic elements within the objective logic we have suggested. No one, I suppose, will presume to say what in detail are the facts from which we are to get our first suggestions of that form and design; just as no one will risk dogmatism in the matter of the detail of the logic. But some such system of outline is necessary if a "science" of aesthetics is to take a secure place in the system of human knowledge.

If one were impressed with the volume of good writing, or intrigued with the finish of its form, it would be easily possible to assume that the first of these problems has been adequately formulated, and that the results reached with regard to it are on a par, as respects conclusiveness, with results reached in other fields of philosophy. But a closer inspection, one influenced by weight rather than by volume, and by closely articulated inner structure rather than by an attractive exterior finish, will perceive that the question of the nature of the aesthetic experience has hardly as yet been competently put, and this for the reason that the basis on which the adequacy of the formulation must rest has not been determined. This basis lies in the prior assent to the reality which alone can give cogency to any experience, and in the aesthetic problem will lie in the assumption that the key to the nature of the aesthetic experience is found only in a knowledge of the nature and structure of the aesthetic object. The psychological analysis and scientific description and classification of which, for the

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most part, aesthetic theory has consisted is, as it seems to me, of extremely limited depth; and there will be no bottom for theory until an aesthetic object is determined by and within a system of logical categories which in their essential unity and system constitute the framework of assumptions for a thoroughgoing metaphysic.

The major problem of aesthetic theory is therefore that of the nature of the aesthetic object. And this is a question, first, of the determination of the aesthetic object through a "deduction" of the concepts which in the congeries of their categorial relations constitute the design of that object. But it also involves a representation, in the form of a system of metaphysical assumptions, of the ontological conditions of the possibility of the object, in the principles which give that solidity and permanence and exteriority which alone can rescue the mere psychological and epistemological object, as well as the object of pure logical form, from vanishing away in the subjective limbo in which they are habitually conceived. It is within and through these speculative assumptions, it is hoped, that a metaphysical substance is to be found for the aesthetic object, for it is upon a basis of this substance alone that depend those qualities and relational attributes that distinguish the aesthetic object from other types of objects. How the constructive logical concepts are to conspire with the system of metaphysical postulates to give individuality to the aesthetic object and thus construe the system within which the aesthetic object, along with other types of objects, sets up the ideal structure of the objective world, is expressed in a system of concepts of method.

If even a partial success has been attained in making the aesthetic object intelligible, it would appear that our results may be at least suggestive in the approach to the general problem of the spiritual and cultural interpretation of the world. Possibly this is the aim of what is currently called "axiology" or "theory of value," but as regards these I have not been able to learn with satisfaction. But I believe that our culture and our values are confused most unfortunately because of lack of insight or interest in the question of the nature and the significance of the principles upon which a knowledge of that culture should rest. I could wish that I

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might contribute something to the clearing up of that confusion; and, while I would be willing to concede that this book perhaps does not appear in answer to the famous prayer for a Newton of the spirit, yet I should be not altogether disappointed or wholly surprised if it should be found to be useful in the approach to some fundamental problems within the indefinite field of values. But I am on this occasion taught modesty by the fate of some previous writings of mine of which I had, and still have, a similar opinion, but which, by those interested in the great questions, have been ignored with great emphasis and overlooked with apparent enthusiasm. I have no doubt that, to many whose opinions I respect, my reflections may often appear absurd; but I offer them in the belief that some useful thinking may be involved on the part of those who undertake to show that in the case of these reflections things are what they seem.

It is with a good deal of presumption, perhaps, considering the great names that have been attached with authority to recent aesthetic thought, that this work undertakes to seek what it may be able to find of the logical concepts which will give solidity and a theoretical bottom to aesthetics. It will probably miss on every point, but it is hoped that absolution may be forthcoming for the inexperience and unfamiliarity with the ways of the learned world that are responsible for the rashness with which it has been undertaken. And if I have not mentioned many of the names of the past and the present that have become great because of their contributions to aesthetics and good writing, I here offer apology; and perhaps my apology may take the form of the excuse that if I have not mentioned many of the great it is because I did not see any reason why I should, and the fact that I did not see such reasons will doubtless take away any sting of offence that might be premised on the oversight.

E. JORDAN

Indianapolis,
October, 1937

CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

THE AESTHETIC experience is extremely complex, and a discussion of its nature involves the consideration of several perplexing problems. What these problems are we shall indicate in later chapters, and shall show that they are of extraordinary difficulty. There is first the logical problem of the distinction of form and matter in the aesthetic experience. There is the question of the nature and structure of the aesthetic object as that object is determined within experience. This necessitates the logical derivation of the aesthetic judgment as the act of cumulative synthesis in which the formal and material elements of aesthetic experience are erected into an object whose character must be carefully differentiated from that of the object of the reflective intellect; that is, there must be a careful deduction of the cultural object. Finally, all these problems must be shown in their connection and continuity in a whole of aesthetic theory, in which the various forms of the aesthetic experience as a practical activity must be distinguished.

In this chapter however we are concerned to inquire whether a consistent account of the aesthetic experience can be formulated in the terms and methods of psychology. We are dealing here, that is, with the psychological theories of beauty. A mere cursory survey of the field of aesthetic discussion will show a preponderance of interest in the psychological analysis of aesthetic experience, and this seems to indicate a tacit but universal acceptance of the hypothesis that beauty, whatever else it is, is first and most fundamentally of all a form of the experience of the individual mind by which it is apprehended. As there is no doubt but that *in some sense* this hypothesis is well-founded—although we shall try to show that the sense in which it is well-founded is unimportant—we shall here take up the psychological theories for brief criticism. We shall argue that not a great deal is to be said for them for the simple reason that there is little to say, that their one point of agreement is the assumption that a unique psychological fact can be pointed out the apprehension of which *is* the reality of beauty. Whether therefore there is such a unique fact is

merely a question for experimental investigation, and the only basis for argument will lie in the assumption that the fact when found is identical with the reality of beauty. It is characteristic of all the psychological theories of beauty that they assume that beauty is always identifiable with some state of mind or some process of mind. To identify beauty is therefore merely to find this state or process, to recognize it and classify it by describing its qualities, and to enumerate the qualities by which it is distinguished from other things. The quest for an explanation of beauty is therefore to be satisfied by a description of facts which are to be found in the experience of individual minds, where the presence of the fact is supposed to constitute the reality of beauty. The theories of aesthetics are therefore purely subjectivist, and avoid altogether the logic by which the objective reality of beauty is to be established. It is therefore a relatively simple matter to discuss these theories; the trouble comes when we undertake to question the identification of a psychological (or organic) fact with the reality of beauty. This latter problem will occupy us throughout the development of our constructive theory, and we may here pass it over.

We may then be brief with the statement of the theories, disposing of them with a paragraph or two. (For a good brief statement of the psychological theories, see Max Schoen, *Art and Beauty*, N. Y. 1932, Chap. VI, pp. 133-157.) This we justify on our assumption that the existing theories do not succeed in formulating the problem of beauty, which we assume is not a mere question of fact to be settled by diligence in "research" and faithfulness in description. It is not, that is, a scientific problem at all, but a problem of speculative philosophy and is to be formulated, not in descriptive terms, but in the pure techniques of logical method. Some widely accepted theories center about the experience of interest.

If we define interest as that determination of our minds in which the significance of objects is made to depend upon a unique relation of objects to the mind that apprehends them; if the nature and value of an object depends exclusively upon some relation to the individual mind that apprehends it; then beauty is not interest. And if the reality of a fact (we assume that beauty is a fact) can be adequately represented by the symbol of the absence of that fact, then beauty might be disinterestedness. The difficulty with such a view is simply that

it does not realize the nature of the problem, that it has nothing to do with the problem of the nature of beauty. This is the conclusion we reach when we try, as we have just done, to define interest in terms objective enough to make possible an intelligent description. And when we state our account of interest in subjective and psychological terms, and attain such a degree of objectivity as to make discussion intelligible, then interest is, as Santayana has shown, nothing more than attention. So that if beauty is disinterestedness, then it would imply an experience which lacked any degree of attention, which is psychologically absurd. But attention, as interest, is assumed to be a character uniformly of all experience, hence it can not be made unique and specific in any way to any particular type of object, so that as a characterizer of a type of object it simply will not do. And if we can assume that interest means attention, then disinterestedness cannot characterize any kind of experience whatsoever. Beauty, as an interest, or in the negative terms of the absence of an interest, would not be the quality of any object in any peculiar or characterizing way; and, regarded as a state or process of mind, cannot be individuated out of the general substance of mind and must be taken as a universal quality of mind. But in this case it specifies nothing, so it is not the peculiar essence of beauty.

We do not care to venture here upon the generalities of the "theory of value," but it may perhaps not be out of place to remark that what the interest theory of value appears to be driving at is to establish the universality of value; in our terms the theory would imply the universality or final reality and ultimateness of beauty. But it would seem more promising to undertake to accomplish this by the regular methods of logical objectification than by the scientific and empirical method of mere universalization in abstract extension. It will never be possible to attain to objectivity in value nor in anything else by such one dimensional procedure; you cannot universalize interest merely by abstracting it from objective continuity, however much you attempt to individualize it as "any object of any interest," since the "object" of the interest is in this case itself individuated by its relation to the interest, and the interest is still left to get whatever pseudo objectification it can by being found as a present factor in every state of mind. What is wrong with this interest theory is that it is

afflicted with the philosophical innocence of the traditional empiricism. Value, it assumes, must be found as a constituent of every state or process of mind; its universality (reality) is thus guaranteed by the fact that it can always be found as fact. But this is childish; it is the last stand of the subjectivist individualism and atomism of the empirical tradition. (For a general criticism of interest as a practical concept, see my *Forms of Individuality*, Ch. I).

But the feeling behind this attempt at the universalization of beauty and value is sound. What is real is universal, and this implies that value is to be an objective fact in the sense that it in some way characterizes the whole; also, that it is to be experienceable in some form in every individuate instance of what is real. But it satisfies neither of these conditions to try to find value in the mere "any" of scientific method; it must be sought and found in the "whole" of logical method and there demonstrated as a universal determination of the object. That is to say, beauty, as is true of any and all forms of value, is individual.

Intrinsicality, Psychical Distance, Intuition, Empathy, Aesthetic Repose, Catharsis, all these seem to be logically of the same sort as the theory of disinterestedness, all are attempts to find beauty as identical with some rare state or process of mind. All of them are disposed of by pointing out that if beauty is real at all its reality must be demonstrated through its objectivity, and this means, as the constructive part of our theory will attempt to show, that beauty, considered as an experience, is the representation of a unique object, which we shall attempt to prove real by deducing the logical grounds of its necessity in and through a system of value categories. Thus we shall have to set the theory of beauty upon a plane a little higher, or at least outside, that now universally recognized. If beauty is real we must find its object, or find it as object; and while it may be necessary to find the object through or by means of states of mind, this will be true of all objects, but the object itself will not be in any sense a state of mind. This is carrying "idealism" too far; only realists, who are gouty idealists, can make objects out of whole cloth. The empirical attitude is no doubt sound, but in this case, at least, it has no competent method. A genuine empiricism must be rational and must divorce itself from the subjectivist and psychological method which the

empirical tradition has wished upon it. In value theory we have not learned the lesson which Hume set for us in such clear terms.

In this list of theories, which we have called psychological, it must be observed that we place the organic theories, such as empathy, repose, etc., since they all rest upon the same or similar assumptions. The organic theories, however, have the advantage in that they see that beauty must have a solidier ground substance under it than is furnished by any state or process of mind, however universal in fact this state or process may be found to be. And the reference to the organism, as an important part of the instrumentalities through which beauty is objectified, is, when placed in its proper locus and relations with the objective characters of beauty in general, an important insight and the factual ground upon which certain characters of all value categories must be seen to lie. It becomes thus a sort of middle between the pure psychological theories and those which recognize that an objective basis for beauty is a prime requisite. But this does not justify a crude naturalism, which is the consequence in a number of cases.

Such a middle position is, perhaps, occupied by the theory of significant form as formulated by Clive Bell. This seems to posit objectivity in the term form, for this term, properly used and its logical connotation adequately made out, appears to be necessary in any thorough-going aesthetic theory. So that insofar as objectivity means universal appearance or omnipresence in experience, form is certainly objective. But logical objectivity implies an object beyond experience, and it is in this sense that the category of form will be deduced by us. Any theoretical account of beauty will have to come to terms with form at some point, as will perhaps any theory of anything that is to attain a genuine logical status. But, as was stated, the concept of form has to be given not only precise determination of its content in terms of its reference to concrete experience, but must also be made to go beyond experience in that it must be shown to be a character of the "constitution of things" within which mind itself and its states get their peculiar meaning and status. Its central position in discussion of any aspect of reality is thus obvious even to common sense, and this very obviousness has resulted in its taking on the greatest variety of meanings. But this only makes it the more necessary to specify clearly just what is its sense for

aesthetic theory. And Bell fails in just that. Apparently satisfied that he has identified a prominent character of beauty with and by an interesting state of mind, a state that concededly is uniformly and always present in the apprehension of beauty, and must be acknowledged, he goes no further than to characterize the state of mind by a term whose only connotation is that it attributes to the state a reference to value in the abstract. In very much simpler language and very much reduced space he might merely have said that beauty has meaning. But this is taken for granted. What I mean here is that it is hardly enough to say that beauty is form and form is significance, as appears to be the meaning of his phrase "significant form." For, apart from the very important fact that beauty, while it *is* form, is also very many more important things than form, also in addition to form possesses some characters of a specifically different nature from those that determine form. That is to say, beauty is form, but it is also very much more than form, and what form means for beauty will depend very heavily upon the relations that form itself bears to many other factors that are also constituents of beauty. This most difficult question of the status of form in the beauty object we shall try to answer in the doctrine of the cumulative relation which is constitutive of the system of aesthetic categories.

Bell disposes of the very complex notion of form and its relation to beauty by attaching to it the adjective significant. Of course it is true that beauty is significant form; but how much more is this saying than that beauty is beautiful form? Is not significant here a question-begging value epithet in that the very term contains the meaning which by its use it is hoped to generate in the concept it modifies? It is the whole purpose of aesthetic theory, in a sense, to find and exhibit the meaning of significance; it is the general problem of value theory to find out what it means that things signify, or have meaning, or value. As a consequence we cannot answer the question, What is significance? by merely presupposing it as an adjective of an undefined substance. The substance itself requires to be known before the attribute has any meaning beyond its immediate psychological quality, and this is notoriously "subjective."

This emphasis upon form however appears to represent a stage in the development of the modern problem of beauty,

and is perhaps the aesthete's feeling anticipation of what the logician will demand in the name of objectivity. For the essence of form is that it implies a real world in some way "independent" of our states of mind, a reality which gives status and dignity to our states of mind and which is not determined by them. The "significance" of form for aesthetic theory therefore lies in its reference to something beyond mere states of mind by relation to which states of mind themselves acquire whatever meaning and validity they are capable of. But merely to dwell upon the significance of form for the beauty of things is to lapse into the subjectivism for which all explanation is mere psychological description.

Santayana sees the weakness of this position and realizes that some way must be found to break out of this psychological confusion. But he is himself obsessed with the importance of the mere immediacy of mental states, and the efforts he makes to lift himself from the confusion are themselves vitiated by that confusion. He attempts to rescue himself from psychology by lifting himself out by psychological bootstraps. Santayana, that is, has the keenest insight to be found among modern aesthetic theorists; he realizes, as a rare and true artist, that however rapturously and ecstatically you enjoy the mere immediacy and internality and intrinsicity of your own feeling, there must still be something involved more than the immediacy of the feeling and its quality if it is to have the permanence and stability and solidity which you demand of whatever is beautifully real. There must be a vision in this rapture of the great world beyond, the world to which the rapture itself must be referred for its existence and quality if not also for its meaning. Consequently, Santayana tells us that the feeling is objectified, felt as if it is the substance of some structure in the world beyond the experience in which the feeling is psychologically localized. As was remarked above this is perhaps the most significant insight to be found in modern aesthetic thought so far as the content and locus of the aesthetic experience is concerned; and it ranks with Kant's portrayal of the function of cognition in the determination of the aesthetic experience, and with Hegel's vision of the cosmic implications of the beauty object. But it is clearer than even these, because the vision flashes within the temperament of a Greek unfortunately lost in the musty confusion of modern subjectivism.

It is therefore the more painful to be obliged to point out where the theory fails. The central fact of the aesthetic experience is the fact that the feeling element of that experience is objectified in an external object. And the central problem for aesthetic theory is to explain how that objectification is possible. Santayana has discovered the profound fact, and has made it clear with masterful persuasion. But he blundered hopelessly when he faced the theoretical question as to *how* feeling is to be objectified, he fails completely to offer even a plausible theory of the psychological and logical operations by which feeling is solidified and substantiated in the structures of art objects, *where alone it can be real*, to say nothing of the ways in which, by an extension of the same operations, the system of art objects is to be incorporated within the substance of culture. And it is precisely these questions that any rational theory of beauty must find answers for. In the appropriate place we must more narrowly and precisely formulate these problems; it is sufficient for our purpose here if we see their basic importance.

For Santayana the solution of the first of these problems is simple: feeling is objectified by a psychological trick, an exhibition of mental legerdemain, a case where consciousness deceives itself. One must express full sympathy with the significance of such an explanation to the creatively poetic mind which Santayana undoubtedly has. The mere superabundance of mental imagery and the extraordinary facility of mental flight in Santayana's mind may have "tricked" him into more sheer beauty of experience and of language than is possible to the ordinary mind, and, in the one instance cited above, may have "tricked" him into the profoundest of insights, that, namely, when he saw that beauty involves the objectification of feeling. And there is no doubt that to a mind governed by beatific vision the trick is divine in origin and intent, and so final and ineffable. But to the slower-moving mind of logical method it is just the anatomy of the trick that is in question. What theory wants to know is how the trick is negotiated, how to get behind the scenes to where the wires operate which endow the apparition with life. There is no doubt as to the fact to which Santayana here refers us; the "well-known psychological phenomenon, viz., the transformation of an element of sensation into the quality of a thing" (*Sense of Beauty*, p. 44). But there are a number of

questions to be asked as to the meaning of the fact—is there any difference between the aesthetic experience and the ordinary cognition of an object on this matter of the relation of mental states to qualities of objects, and why, if logic is the solution of the mystery in the one case, is it not also the solution in the other? In any case the mere citing of a psychological fact does not constitute an explanation of either a psychological or a logical process, and it is precisely the *how* of the transformation of an element of sensation into the quality of a thing that is in question. How, that is, the *experiences* with which we associate beauty are to be related to the *objects* that are necessary to make the experiences real and valid, the question upon which turns the entire problem of beauty and all forms of value, Santayana has met by assumption based upon the fact to be explained. But this means that he leaves the *problem* of beauty where he found it, however effective he may have been in saying beautiful things beautifully about it. His theory of beauty is, in the form and substance of his language, itself a thing of rare and great beauty; but explanations do not depend essentially upon the aesthetic quality of the language in which they are expressed. I do not, however, mean to suggest that Santayana belongs in the class of beauty-salon experts in beauty theory, nor to identify him with the tribe of ubiquitous beauticians who no doubt find the business extremely pleasant and possibly also profitable.

The question thus as to how precisely we are to think of the experience of beauty taking its appropriate place as and in an object in the ontological structure of the world, Santayana leaves unanswered; apparently, as an artist, he assumes the fact of the objectivity of beauty, and accepts its attestation in consciousness as its warrant of objective validity. But this is taking states of mind too seriously; the mere presence or happening of a particular state of mind, even of the uniform recurrence of a state of mind, the mere fact that I now entertain it, is the least important fact in the world. Anything, true, false, right, wrong, real, unreal, valid, illusory, anything may be in my mind as a mere state. But the important matter is as to the connections, both inside and outside my mind, which justify its presence there; and if these connections are not evident in its factual appearance, we habitually refuse to grant it credence merely because of its appearance, and regard it as vain and fraudulent or as an intruder upon ground that

might be better occupied. Beauty theory cannot be made out of the affective qualities of the states of mind by which we represent its concepts to ourselves, nor can we construct its concepts out of the aesthetic quality of experience as material when it is just that quality we are professing to explain. There is thus no reason why the theory of beauty should resort to beautiful language, and there seems reason enough why it should be suspicious of every attempt to do so.

On the question as to how the objects of beauty, or beautiful things, are to be ordered and established in the permanent substance of culture, Santayana is equally vague. The matter is disposed of by reference to the "social," a fashion that has of late become easy and comfortable in disposing of many fundamental questions. But this dependence upon and acceptance of the social is necessitated in the subjectivist individualism with which he explains the beauty object and the experience of beauty. So long as beauty is regarded as a state of mind and its objective implications disposed of by a mere manipulation of sensations, which is also merely limiting the object of beauty to a subjective validity, there is nothing left except the "social" in terms of which the manifold of beauty objects can be brought together. The social is or becomes objective then only in the sense that it is the collection of all the subjective instances, a mere abstract generalization with none of the characters of universality. But it is not explained how the mere assemblage of subjective phenomena effects the transformation of the phenomena into genuine objects. Objectivity is not grounded in mere number or abstract plurality, in spite of the presence of number and plurality in the universality which is its ground. The "social" is itself therefore a mere abstraction, and there is no way of arguing logically from the mere togetherness of phenomena whose essence is subjective, in the sense that it implies mere status in mind or consciousness, to the corporate entity which is constituted of the union of beauty objects with other types of objects in the persisting structure of things; and until theory has implemented it with and through other states of mind, and the physical instruments which states of mind always imply, it will continue to lack that locus and station. And a real status in the world can never be found for my state of mind by merely discovering that other people also have a like state; the *consensus hominum* and universality do not mean anything like

that. It is to be very seriously questioned whether there is an important fact or idea that can be validated by a mere reference to the social; and if we will allow the pragmatists a little more time the question will be settled, for every possibility will have been tried.

Santayana, then, and we are regarding him as the sanest of all the subjectivists in beauty theory, has failed in both the fundamental problems of aesthetics. He can give us no consistent notion of the nature of that which justifies our faith in the reality of beauty. This ground of faith cannot be an experience, for experience itself requires a ground; here religion and ethics agree with aesthetics, all demand a beyond in which the present of experience is to be realized. The fact that they have all muddled the demand does not rob the demand of its justification. There is no reality in that in which there is nothing but experience, none in which there are not elements which are unintelligible by reference to experience alone. He fails, that is, to provide for the essence of beauty that character by which we can make intelligible the inescapable conviction that beauty shall endure in the world beyond its momentary presence to the mind by which it is on occasion apprehended. He fails to exhibit the true beauty object that *is*. And he fails, equally and for the same reasons, to show us a ground or meaning for the fact that beauty objects take a prominent part in the bodied structure which carries the spirit and substance of human culture.

Perhaps the most widely held and celebrated theory of beauty at the present time is that of Croce. On its cognitive side, the theory is a development of the doctrine that the aesthetic experience is a pure act, and is independent of ordinary cognition of objects. It is therefore an act of intuition, an instance of intuitive knowledge, and is to be distinguished from ordinary logical knowledge. The main thesis of the argument is to the effect that intuition is expression, and it is in the development of this idea of expression that the reality of beauty is supposed to be exhibited. Fundamentally, intuition is identical in meaning with expression, and expression with intuition. Either or both seem to refer to a pure inner act of the spirit, and it is difficult to connect the doctrine with any relations to the actual world of beautiful objects.

The doctrine of Croce appears to be, that is, an instance of pure subjectivism which refuses to take consideration of beauty

except as the pure spiritual product of an internal act. This sort of conception is hard to state and harder to understand in terms of ordinary conceptual thinking, so that any discussion of it is likely always to be charged with missing the mark completely. In fact a deliberate distinction is made between the doctrine and the conceptual process, so argument would not appear to be possible on either side. And if one takes this fact in connection with another fact that is equally obvious, viz., that the term expression is shot through with ambiguities, any intelligible discussion seems hopelessly out of the question.

In view of this situation I shall adopt the two major tenets of the doctrine, or shall adopt the terms, at least, and shall proceed to give them meanings that seem to make them intelligible to me. Each of the two will become topics for special treatment further along, and here brief statement will suffice.

In the first case the distinction between ordinary cognition, with its product the object of knowledge on the one hand, and intuitive contemplation, which has nothing directly to do with concepts and reflective objects, on the other hand, appears to me a very valuable distinction, one which offers an unusually promising starting point for the discussion of aesthetic experience and the problem of beauty. It is of course futile from the beginning to expect to make headway toward a comprehension of beauty while we are working with concepts and thought processes whose issue must necessarily be couched in terms merely of space and time and cause and matter. These terms are proper to the knowledge systems built up in science, where the interest is in an abstract knowledge acquaintance with the world. They are also appropriate in practical activity and the knowledge-scheme of such activity where the purpose is primarily the control of the facts in conformity with interest. That in these two cases the motive differs from that of the interest in beauty is quite obvious. In the latter the emphasis is often, if not universally, upon more ideal aspects of experience, those namely which we call values and which appear to be the reason for Croce's emphasis upon the spiritual, and the reference to, or implication of, space and time and causal factors is remote and indirect if present at all. So it is well to put strong emphasis upon the distinction of the two points of view in the interest of a closer adherence to the facts of experience.

But in attempting here, in the interest of spirituality, to make the distinction clear it is equally necessary not to go on to exaggeration in neglecting the fact that every object, every reality, even beauty reality, has an external and non-spiritual or physical basis in the world which, if not adequately characterized by space and time and cause, is still not made intelligible at all if construed out of relation to these factors. It is worthy, of course, to put forth every effort to avoid mere materialism and stark naturalism in the pursuit of beauty, but this avoidance is often, or can be, accomplished at the expense of all objectivity whatsoever. It is easy, since Kant, to be satisfied with a "merely subjective" validity for results in aesthetics, and we noticed above that the resort to the "social" for objectivity may be just an extreme development of the Kantian principle that objectivity is universal validity and its extension to the point where universal validity is nothing more than a psychological association of all mental phenomena that appear to be of a class. But objectivity implies a reference, ultimate or proximate, to the world of things; and the world of things that is meant here is just the world that is rendered intelligible to us through the concepts of space and time and cause and the system of existential categories generally. But it of course *means* more than time and space and cause; how much more, and what, it will be our task to try to find out in succeeding chapters.

Hence the principle of expression will be central for any aesthetic theory. But the expression that is made necessary is one which it would be very difficult to restrict in meaning to mere congruence with an abstractly spiritual act. There would be no mystery about it, and it would mean, essentially, that the aesthetic experience, as expression, or as expressed, is objectified in elements that are capable of formulation, *for knowledge purposes*, in categories which have determinable relations to the existential system. The world that is beautiful is the world that is, and the essence of its value and the essence of its existence are determined from and within the relational substance upon which both value and existence depend.

The aesthetic theory of the realists seems to me merely the confusion of the subjectivists confounded by the inanities of an abstract and hollow logic, in which I do not enjoy finding myself lost.

I think that I do not understand what is currently called

“value theory” and the “analysis of meaning.” If I do not understand it I cannot discuss it; if I do understand it, discussion by me, at least, would not be profitable. I do not believe that the discussion of meaning in terms of a mere analysis of mental states has anything to do with value in the sense in which I should like to think about it. I have no doubt I do on occasion chase my own tail, but I have no desire to do it in a game with others.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

OUR ANALYSIS of the subjective theories has hinted that aesthetic experience has the form of knowledge. Aesthetic experience is not essentially feeling or emotion, we saw, because there is in the experience quite obviously an active element which is not to be found in feeling. It appears necessary to return to the older theory from which feeling is to be interpreted as *passion*, where the meaning is that feeling is essentially a quiescent state, and in any case is not characterized by activeness in the sense that cognition is active. Feeling is the inert matter of the aesthetic experience, and seems to be a resultant of other experience functions rather than a cause or originator of experience functions; and it is hardly an arguable question whether any feeling ever operates in the capacity of a motive, if motive is to be taken in the literal sense as that which initiates motion. Recent theories would seem to justify such an interpretation, since they appear to regard feeling as a phenomenal manifestation of the elementary processes of physiological activity. An act does not arise from a feeling as originating agent, but arises from antecedent energies of which the feeling is perhaps the phenomenal character, and, as feeling, ultimately becomes, by development of its cognitive aspect, the consciousness strictly so called. But as such feeling has no dynamic power.

But if feeling is thus to be regarded as some sort of attendant circumstance to the active processes, it is not itself an active process, and so is not to be interpreted as conation. It is generally agreed that in the aesthetic experience we are dealing with feeling, and if feeling is not active then aesthetic experience is not a matter of will. The precise place that feeling has in the total economy of experience is worked out in another place. Here we are concerned to show that the aesthetic experience is, in so far as it is active or determinative of objects, a form cognition, and that in the aesthetic experience it is the peculiar nature and function of cognition which alone serves so to characterize the experience that it can be adequately distinguished from other forms of experience. We shall assume therefore that the aesthetic experience is neither

essentially emotional nor volitional, but is to be distinguished by the mode of cognition which determines the peculiar form of judgment which we find to express the aesthetic experience. Our concern here then is with the forms of knowledge in so far as their distinction will help to set out clearly the characteristics of the aesthetic judgment. And we are thinking here of knowledge in terms primarily of the functions of cognition through which it is expressed, and will assume that the general contour of the act of expression of the function of cognition will determine (or in last analysis *be*) the form of the aesthetic judgment which we are seeking.

In terms, then, of the modes of cognition involved, knowledge has two forms. It is not of great consequence what these forms should be called, but their characteristics and their fundamental differences must be pointed out. We may call the two forms of knowledge 1. the Intellective, and 2. the Contemplative. We shall assume that in order to determine the intrinsic or essential or inner nature of the function involved, we shall have to find the principle by which the function is directed in each case, as well also the principles by which the different objects of the two functions are distinguished. We shall see later that the final criterion of the aesthetic experience is the design of the object it involves, and, in this reference to the principle of its object, the aesthetic judgment will be shown to be identical in general form with the ordinary reflective judgment. The intellective judgment is this reflective or discursive or descriptive or classificatory form when considered from the viewpoint of the principle which directs its operation, and when regarded as an expression of the principle of its object it is the comprehensive judgment of existence in the large sense as including all "judgments of fact." We shall see, however, that the expression "judgment of fact" is meaninglessly vague, and rests on a false distinction between what is called "fact," on the one side, and what is called "value," on the other. This distinction, as involving any final or objective difference, we shall be obliged to ignore, and will define the existential judgment in terms of the system of concepts on which it rests and from which it derives its meaning. And we shall distinguish the "value judgment" from it by the altogether different system of concepts of which it is a synthesis and from which it derives a type of meaning that is basically different from the meaning

of the judgment of existence. Thus the judgment of existence depends upon the familiar system of scientific and philosophical categories of space, time, cause, quantity, etc., while the value categories are, in spite of the enormous amount of writing done about aesthetics, ethics, religion, etc., still awaiting their deduction and their synthesis into the system which will define and determine the value object. It will be our hypothesis that the most elementary formulation of these value categories will be the aesthetic, and that the system of aesthetic categories constitutes the elementary structure of the logic of value, and lays the foundation for that synthesis of the two systems of categories of existence and value which constitutes the basic structure of metaphysics.

Keeping these two principles in mind, then, (that is, the principle of direction of function, and the principle of discrimination and determination of objects) we may approach the distinction of intellectual and contemplative knowledge.

Intellectual knowledge is identical with contemplative knowledge so far as the elementary mental or psychological function involved in its intrinsic nature is concerned; that is, both types of function are forms and results of cognition. The elementary or primitive noesis that is at the bottom of feeling, and possession of which makes feeling an experience, is the same primordial act which makes all life processes experience on the occasion where life process becomes conscious, and is to be regarded as the ground of all the distinctions between the dual aspects of reality, existence and value, the apprehension of which makes the act of thought a judgment of metaphysics. Thus it is that all forms of experience are at bottom cognitive, and cognition becomes the ground and basis of all mental activity, even of will and feeling, which latter would never be experienced except through the element of primitive cognition which, in varying degree, is present in each. Abstractly, and in its ontological aspect, feeling, minus this elementary cognition, is the inert and inane matter of which the aesthetic object, and indeed the value object in all its forms, is composed. This doctrine of the presence of cognition in all mental phenomena does not of course require that every state of consciousness should be identical in nature with the complex *personal* consciousness of the individual. Consciousness, in so far as it is a ground of individuality, may be present where there is no individual in the ordinary sense,

or where the individual is a low or sub-personal form, which means that as primitive noesis it is common to the lowest and the highest forms of life. The conscious function in a subjective or individualized mental situation, as a function of comprehension, may not embrace the whole of the situation, or may be limited to the extent of the situation, may be restricted, that is, to a part of a personality, so that the personality as a conscious individual may not be aware of it as a function at all. This is what is meant, when anything is meant, by the subconscious, which, when so understood, becomes a useful instrument in the analysis of experience. It means that the consciousness or noetic function may be, and often is, generally, in low forms, limited in extension or abstract applicability, as well also in comprehension or concrete application, and may exist in a part without affecting the whole of the "mind" in which it occurs. "Experience" is thus not necessarily a function of the total individual, may not involve his consciousness, and is often not under the control of the individual or even in existence *for him*, and yet may still be an important constituent of the real object by which the form and significance of knowledge are determined.

The two forms of knowledge are, at their noetic basis, the same. Their differences, we have noted, lie in the direction of their functions and the differences in their objects. By direction is meant both the spontaneity which points or directs their operation and the peculiar incidence which their lines of action have in the "choice" or specification of objects. Differences of objects are qualitative, structural, organizational, etc.

(a) Direction of Functions

The elementary noetic urge or "purpose" in the intellectual intelligence is directed toward the *discrimination* and *segregation* of presentations, presentations meaning here instances of the unconscious or partly-conscious cognitive situations mentioned above, which may or may not be present in the individual consciousness. Where they are not present in the individual consciousness they still have their character as conscious, since their consciousness is a functional reference to their own structure and form and not a reference to the structure and form of the whole. The point is that each presentation has its own consciousness or noetic function, even if only latent as sub-conscious, independently of whether it is

or is not a part of the consciousness of the individual as a whole. Presentations are thus dispersed and scattered into relational schemes or networks each of which becomes the structural design of an abstract object, or constitutes the abstract relational structure of an object before discrimination has provided it with a concrete content. We shall see that this concept of an object in the abstract and possible stage becomes the value substance of the category of form, and thus becomes the basis and ground of the individuality through which a mere object of existence becomes an object of art. The basis, then, of the mere cognition or apprehension of an aesthetic object, the mere reception of its form in consciousness, is the intellectual knowledge function; but the realization of the object as a value still awaits the functioning of an act of contemplative knowledge. The primary condition of an object is then this reflective disposal over against each other, and arrangement with reference to each other, of presentations, the abstract form of the disposal constituting the structure and existential objectivity of the external object. We shall see that a different motive or directive agency is concerned in determining the structure of the value object, and that in either case the determination is effected through and presided over by an appropriate system of categories.

This dispersive tendency of the intellectual knowledge may be illustrated in the case of scientific activity, where the indefinite and formless mass of given sensations is separated and broken up into centers which are identifiable as such only by their abstract relationality, that is, they are centers of reference for the act that divides them *only* in the one fact that they are the termini of relations which connect them with each other. As a consequence the very purpose of science is to make the reality presented in sense completely abstract, to reduce it to its strict classificatory characters, to present an *object* only in the form of the structural framework of an entity which could be real on the condition that qualitative matter were furnished with which to fill out its gaunt and empty outline. This of course is the existential object.

It is due to this character of abstractness, in the sense of lacking all quality, that "objects" may be relationally shifted in any way whatever, as in the processes of mathematics. That is, it is the fact that such objects have, or rather *are*, mere existence and nothing else, that makes possible the classi-

ficatory schemes of science, the positivist logic of the symbolists and mathematicians, and in general the metaphysical entities of the realists. *Only* that can be an "entity" which has only relational attributes and no qualities nor *any* experiential features. Hence "things" can only "subsist," that is, exist for the mind that creates them and *only* within the relational system discrimination has created, and *only as* abstract postulated termini of those relations. The realist is the only pure subjectivist in captivity. But such objects can be real only when they are, as vague structures, hidden within the substances of aesthetic quality; they are the mere abstract designs of real objects, without form and void and bodiless, until aesthetic quality has invested them with genuine form and concrete design.

This abstract relational object works fairly well as the *truth* object, especially when truth is relationally defined, as in science and the formal or "positivist" logic. That is, so long as the object is nothing more than the substantiation by hypostasis of the principle of consistency or relational finality, as the truth object is for realism, then it can become the basis of a theory of "objective" truth. But its objectivity is the objectivity of abstract existence, and its objects are not yet real and will become real only when they are redetermined by value categories. Perhaps that is what both truth and object meant for Kant; they are mere abstractions of existence, and will remain so until after visitation from the Newton of the spirit, who shall breathe into them the animus of the living reality. But it should be noticed that Hegelian objectivity through contradiction (identity) is implied directly, and the realist is making strange bed-fellows.

But such an existential or "realistic" object has no meaning in a value situation. It has no meaning in ethics, e. g., where the function of will is involved. It is true that it works perfectly in the use of reflective intelligence in the forming of plans for action, i. e., the abstract schemes of method or technique which action follows as ready-made tracks; also it works in formulating the abstract "ideals" which become goals of action under these circumstances. But no such object can be pictured as real in the sense that it symbolizes a whole of experience *into* which action issues and substantiates itself. The value object in ethics is precisely the situation, complex and total, of "experiences" and existences in synthesis, which

is created by the act in the sense that it *is* the act as completed and embodied in the circumstances of nature and culture the system of which furnishes the stage and instruments and materials and occasion for the act. It is an instance of the self-creative action of the natural-cultural whole within which alone objects can be realized. This object is the moral object.

Neither has the abstract relational object nor the pure intellectual judgment any meaning when we try to think them in terms of the emotional experience. From this strictly intellectual point of view all emotional color is to be neglected as having no *meaning* or place in the scheme of reality. But precisely what meaning an object can have which can make no contact with us except through the pure forms of intellect is hard to see. As we shall see later such an object has meaning only in anticipation, only as the abstract and literal design of an object that *can be* realized when its gaunt emptiness is filled with the emotional realities of pulsing life. This reality of the object we shall find to be supplied by the sensory experience as precipitated and made homogeneous in the world-stuff of emotion, in the absence of which, as the material condition, no object whatever can be said to be real.

So a realistic or intellectualistic value theory is an impossibility. Neither action nor feeling can have any meaning in such terms, and the work of thought can be conceived in such terms only when thought is stripped of any real continuity with reality. Only in so far as experience is reduced to its barest abstract possibility can it be represented in the act of the intellectual judgment; and while this intellectual act, in the elementary form of the primitive noesis, is the subjective basis of all judgment, no judgment can have objectivity and full reality until it is clothed with a content that comes from another and different act-form of thought. This act-form is contemplation. The effort therefore to construct a theory of ethics in this intellectualistic fashion ends either in a coarse naturalism, in which the hard grinding process of a soulless nature loses itself in the infinite process of mere motion, or in a sloppy psychologism in which experience is pictured as existing in a one-way eternity of formless sentimentalism and spineless happiness. In either case the nearest approach to reality that thought can make is in the repeating to endlessness the recurrent moments of its own process, in both cases swamped in the subjectivity of self-contradiction. The only possible way of

avoiding this issue is by completing the mere act of reflective intelligence by carrying it forward into the free act of contemplation, thus creating the ultimate instrument of thought in the contemplative judgment. To this we now turn.

The elementary urge or purpose in the contemplative or apprehending intelligence is directed toward the unifying or synthesizing or *comprehending* the presentations of experience into symmetrical and complete wholes of individuality. In this form of intelligence discrimination and discernment are also at work, resulting in relations of abstract types and in the postulation of abstract termini, just as in the intellectual intelligence. But here the relational structure includes the termini as parts of itself, and both structure and termini are included within and constitute a whole or unity whose substance is not merely the abstract quantitative relational system created out of the acts of discernment, but is the experienced quality of the world as given in sense perception. This act of comprehension of the abstract forms of thought within a unity with the substance of sense perception, this identifying the creative act of thought with the substance of the external world in an individuate object, is the essence of the contemplative intellect; and it proceeds not out of the sheer awareness of cognition, as mere subjective consciousness, as in the case of the discursive intellect, but out of the cognitive act as bodied or embedded in and given real form by the substance of sense-feeling, and as activating that feeling with the referential and prognostic power to set up the object in which it is itself rendered permanent or "objectified."

This act which creates its own objectification within the substantiated matter of sense is the "knowing" or cognitive function when it makes contact with the real. And the object that is set up in external space and time (the concept of the object in space and time is that of what, while not essential to the act of objectification, is essential to the issue or completion of the act) is the ground of the reality which we experience as sense-feeling, ultimately as color-tone, at all times, time being the universality of the presence of externality in sense, or the fact that externality as space is present in sense at all times, which universality is necessary to the cognitive function in making itself aware of its own act. This means that consciousness itself may be thought of as the time (the infinite given whole) in which the contemplative act embodies

itself in externality, the infinite givenness of space. This entire question of the relation of time and space to objective sense, which we will later characterize as color-tone, and the relation as expressed in the act of thought, will get further elucidation in the discussion of the objective concepts of motion and rhythm, or matter and feeling. Here we are indicating the act of contemplation, in its basic distinction from mere intellection, by the fact of the individuation of the object which is characteristic of it.

Thus the contemplative intelligence is the "mind" that attains *objects*, not merely in space-time or bare existence or abstract substance, but in *sense*, or color-tone, or experience, or value-substance. Its peculiar and characteristic expression in attaining value-objects is the practical act, the act in which it attains reality for itself in substantial form by appropriating its environing medium as feeling substance. It differs from the discursive intellect in the fact that the latter never *ends* or completes itself, never expresses itself as real in a substantial object, but remains forever floating among the illusory forms of universality and abstraction in the unsubstantial domain of existence, where it expresses itself in the eternally tentative judgments of science. There are no real objects for science; there are for science merely the skeletal forms and unfulfilled designs of concepts which never attain or acquire the flesh of sensuous meaning. They are derived *from* sense, but the substance of sense is left behind to be apprehended in the practical or contemplative act and thus constituted objects in the real world. Thus morality, religion, art are the substance of reality. Science is its abstract form. Logic, which comprehends all of these in the speculative reason, unites this substance of the practical act and the form of the discursive mind in the real object. The object of the discursive reason is existence; of the contemplative reason, value; the object of the speculative reason in logic is the real. The three objects are cumulative in the direction indicated.

The discursive intellect and the contemplative intellect are then, when considered as distinct agencies of thought, in a manner opposing functions of cognition. And as imposing their opposition upon the real they determine that character of the real by virtue of which it asserts itself creatively in an object—the character of contradiction. This we shall have to develop later. And we shall see how the ultimate elements

of this contradiction are space-time, with their synthesis in motion, and color-tone, with their synthesis in rhythm. Thus the contradiction is within the substance of things. Both motion and rhythm are elementary presentational instances of the contradiction in its lowest terms of immediate experience. The synthesis created in and by this contradiction becomes the basis in reality of all value as value is manifest in existence, and the reduction of the various phases of the contradiction-synthesis to primary forms of thought, categories, is the formulation of value theory. This latter process we shall attempt in the "deduction" of the aesthetic categories. If the system of the categories can be deduced, their order will represent the unity of the discursive with the contemplative thought functions in the speculative reason, which is the "subjective" counterpart of the "reality of all value as value is manifest in existence." The structure of the system of the categories, as so ordered, is the objective representation of value, and is the final goal of the speculative reason. The attainment of structure in the system of the categories is the task of logic, and is the ultimate practical act in which are united the negative or discriminative method of "science," or the discursive intellect, with the positive integrative method of the "will" and "affection" in ethics and aesthetics. This practical act is identity, the obverse of contradiction, and the subject-matter of speculative philosophy. It is thus the corrective and complement of all realisms and positivisms, and all attempts to force the abstract methods of science into the concrete forms of speculative synthesis.

(b) Difference of Objects.

The main points of difference in the *objects* of the discursive intellect and of the contemplative intellect have already appeared in the discussion of the act-forms of the two functions.

The object of the former is a pure subjective abstraction, modelled after the form which its own activity uniformly takes. The object here is the precipitate outline or contour of the mere movement of the cognitive act. It is substanceless, a pure instance of abstract form, and its meaning lies in its meaninglessness.

The object of the latter is not determined by the form of the cognitive act, but by its sense-substance. The sense-substance is determined by the quality of the presented material.

The relation of this quality to the form of the act is the relation of appropriation or appropriateness, which we shall call fitness. It is a relation of pure value-implication, and is inapplicable to existence. The contemplative object then takes such form as *can* be given to it, the *can* being determined by objective *fitness* inherent in the quality of its material and by the direction of the movement of the act. The object is then substantive or substantial.

The formal substancelessness of the discursive cognition, and the substantial form of the contemplative, are united in the real of speculation. The mistake of aesthetic theory here, which is due to the discursive substitution of "epistemology" for logic, lies in the confusion of substancelessness with form. It is through the development of the objective implications of form that the "object of art" finally becomes intelligible. Form, it will appear, is not mere lack of substance, but has a positive substantiality of its own. Hence it is capable of design, which effects the final synthesis of formlessness (existence) with feeling (value) in the objective real.

A final question remains. Is knowledge in the aesthetic experience mediate or immediate? This question has become critical for modern discussions of knowledge, largely, I fear, because the meaning of the distinction has never been made clear. It has generally been taken as representing two "kinds" of knowledge, thus ignoring the fact that the expression "kinds of knowledge" is meaningless, if it implies a distinction of forms of the primitive noesis. There are no "kinds" of what has its essential nature in the universal, there can only be distinctions within the content to which the universal gives form. And what is thus distinguished *within* the universal will and must be known in terms only of its appropriate characters, the qualities fitted or appropriated to it by its relational or substantial form. Thus mediacy and immediacy are not kinds of knowledge, but characters that belong universally to knowledge, qualities that every act of knowledge must possess. If then there are not two kinds of knowledge, but two phases of the knowledge process involved in every act of knowledge, these should be set out clearly by definition, that is to say, a clear statement of the fact is required.

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The relation of this quality to the form of the act is the relation of appropriation or appropriateness, which we shall call *fitness*. It is a relation of pure value-implication, and is inapplicable to existence. The contemplative object then takes such form as *can* be given to it, the *can* being determined by objective *fitness* inherent in the quality of its material and by the direction of the movement of the act. The object is then substantive or substantial.

The formal substancelessness of the discursive cognition, and the substantial form of the contemplative, are united in the real of speculation. The mistake of aesthetic theory here, which is due to the discursive substitution of "epistemology" for logic, lies in the confusion of substancelessness with form. It is through the development of the objective implications of form that the "object of art" finally becomes intelligible. Form, it will appear, is not mere lack of substance, but has a positive substantiality of its own. Hence it is capable of design, which effects the final synthesis of formlessness (existence) with feeling (value) in the objective real.

A final question remains. Is knowledge in the aesthetic experience mediate or immediate? This question has become critical for modern discussions of knowledge, largely, I fear, because the meaning of the distinction has never been made clear. It has generally been taken as representing two "kinds" of knowledge, thus ignoring the fact that the expression "kinds of knowledge" is meaningless, if it implies a distinction of forms of the primitive noesis. There are no "kinds" of what has its essential nature in the universal, there can only be distinctions within the content to which the universal gives form. And what is thus distinguished *within* the universal will and must be known in terms only of its appropriate characters, the qualities fitted or appropriated to it by its relational or substantial form. Thus mediacy and immediacy are not kinds of knowledge, but characters that belong universally to knowledge, qualities that every act of knowledge must possess. If then there are not two kinds of knowledge, but two phases of the knowledge process involved in every act of knowledge, these should be set out clearly by definition, that is to say, a clear statement of the fact is required.

Let us say then, that immediacy is the elementary awareness of cognition, the direct revelation in every cognition that an object is involved without instrumentation through any-

thing other than itself, so that there is something there in addition to the act of thought itself, but which requires no further act to substantiate it. Its presence there is of course in some sense due to the act from which it is distinguished, but it is the presence there, and not the character of the object, that is involved. The presence itself is perhaps a synthesis of its characters, and this synthesis may be attributed either to the act of cognition or to the relational substantiality of the object, since it is the ground of their unity, i. e., of *act* and object, in the real. Then immediacy, as the elementary awareness of cognition, is the (material) basis of all knowledge of whatever "kinds," since "kinds" itself, as implying distinction, will have to represent distinctions within immediacy. There is then no immediate knowledge, since immediacy is the factual ground of all knowledge. It is immediacy in this complicated sense that characterizes contemplative knowledge, in which the object appears directly as the individual which it is, the individual that it is because its relational substance is *also* its content of meaning, the instance once and for all of objective contradiction, or identity of being, which is "given" to us in aesthetic contemplation.

And there is also no mediate knowledge. Mediacy merely refers to the procedural technique by which knowledge (there are no "kinds" of knowledge) progresses in every case toward its completion in the object. It is the abstract *process* of knowledge, mistaken for its substance by instrumentalists and logisticians because of a perverted instinct which misapprehends and distorts the unity of relational substance. Of this relational substance process is a mere subjective phenomenon, and this is confused with meaning-content, which we have just seen is the ground of the real object. This confusion of process with substance, the apotheosis of function and tendency, has made mathematics of science and "operational" logistics of logic; neither of which refers to anything real, and it reaches the *reductio ad absurdum* when metaphysics becomes epistemology, with the consequence that beauty, truth and goodness, the Holy Trinity of reality, are lost in a universal paroxysm of states of mind in the "queen of sciences," psychology. And Culture and Civilization have gone down under the withering sarcasm of the fraud—Reality is a state of mind.

This is why a false logic has its eternal "problem of ob-

jectivity;" it hopes, as did Kant, but without the philosopher's reasons, to construct the object out of the active or motive or processional features of the cognitive function. And this it can never do. So "universal validity," taken as a concept supposed to be necessitated in and by the *movement* of the thought-process, can never give a final basis for real objectivity. And this is what is assumed in the famous definition of objectivity in terms of abstract universality, a monstrous concession to the subjectivism and psychologism of the empiricist "philosophy." What I shall always see, perceive, even if falsely, or even in abstract possible futurity, a parody on the nature of time, that is the object! The object does not arise from the process of thought, but inheres in its substance. And this substance is the elementary space-time-motion of cognition in its mediate aspect in discursive thought endowed with meaning in the elementary color-tone-rhythm of cognition in contemplative continuity with the substance of the real.

It is our purpose to demonstrate this in the instance of Beauty in what follows. If we get the vision it will be through the mediation of the aesthetic judgment. This we here tentatively describe as an act of the intellective intelligence which furnishes the abstract scheme or design into which there is to be poured the content of sense-feeling experience, with the whole, act and content, objectified and realized in contemplation in an individuate object selected from nature-culture by its appropriateness to the content it is to embody and express. It is thus a complex corporate judgment, representing the whole of experience, both in its actuality and in its possibility, as embodied in characteristic externality-forms that are trans-experiential, the type of all judgments expressing individuality. It is in a peculiarly appropriate sense the judgment of individuality, and the system of its concepts is the detail of aesthetic theory. In later sections of this work we shall attempt to formulate this system of concepts as the categorial structure by means of which the contemplative intuition or intellect determines the aesthetic object as an instance of reality in terms of value.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF FEELING

IT IS AGREED by all theorists that feeling has a large share in aesthetic experience and in the determination of beauty. But there does not seem to be any clear realization that feeling is the most ambiguous of words, and that hardly any two persons who use the term in a theoretical connection mean identical things by it. One is tempted to believe that we quite generally take feeling in its immediacy to be self-evident as to its descriptive qualities and as to its relations with other functions of mind. With respect to its qualitative nature there seems to be no accepted conviction among psychologists, and the logicians appear to be equally confused as to its relations with other mental functions. The question of feeling would therefore appear to be at least open, and we may find that the aesthetic approach is as likely to be successful in dealing with it as, e. g., the merely psychological, or the abstractly logical, which must be at least partly wrong.

Approaching the question of feeling from the point of view of its general relations among other functions within the total mind-life, and also from the point of view of its specific characters in that aspect of it in which it seems to be involved in the meaning of beauty, what are the possibilities? With regard to the first of these questions, that is, its general locus or position among mind functions, there seem to be three possibilities: Feeling may be (I) a mere phenomenal fact about beauty or a fact of its phenomenal appearance; (II) it may be a factor in or feature of the act by which beauty is apprehended in experience; or (III) it may be the stuff or material from which definite objects of beauty are constructed. From the point of view of the second question, viz., the specific characters of feeling in its peculiar relation to beauty, (1) feeling may be the sensuous matter of beauty, (2) it may be the plastic or motive principle by which beauty is determined in objects, or (3) it may be a synthesis of the former in some universal character like that of, e. g., Form.

Let us examine briefly each of these possibilities, and inquire whether the clue to the fundamental nature of feeling

is to be found in any of them taken singly, or in a combination of any or all of them.

I. We can raise the question first whether feeling is a general, or generalizable, mental function or a specific mental function, in this sense at least: Does it refer to a *type* of function, in the sense that it implies classes or kinds of objects as its complement, or does it imply a specific object as its complement? For example, would feeling be realized equally fully if it entered into any one or any definite number of a class or group of object-types, i. e., would my anger be realized equally well if I murder my enemy, or burn his house, or break his bank or seduce his daughter? Or will my anger in every case have a specific character and an implicative reference to an individual object as its complement, i. e., would it require that I find my anger realizable only in burning my neighbor's house and in no other form of injury to him? We shall find that each of these involves a real character of feeling in the sense that it points out and emphasizes an aspect of feeling that cannot be ignored, but that since each finds only the necessity to take into consideration a single aspect of feeling, and tends to isolate this aspect; neither can be the truth about feeling, since it leaves feeling without essential connection with the rest of what is assumed to be real. For in the one case feeling refers to the abstract universality of an object, in the other to an object as an isolated particular. There is in either no suggestion of their synthesis, and from the point of view of either feeling as a generalized function or as a specific qualitative aspect, we shall find the possibilities taking the form of series of alternatives, i. e., the feeling will be a this *or* a that in every case, and we shall have feeling represented as in the innumerable classificatory schemes of psychology, where there are as many feeling theories as there are psychologists. Does this uncertainty mean that there is no possibility of clear description or classification applicable to feeling so long as feeling is assumed to be nothing but a mental function or state? The question is worth keeping in mind.

But let us return to the question as to whether feeling is a generalized mental function. We have just seen that there must be a set of alternatives, and that the alternatives will in this case be three: feeling is (1) Fact, (2) Act, (3) Stuff.

(1) Is feeling a matter of fact, i. e., is it the sort of thing that is capable of complete representation in the abstract

scientific terminologies and classificatory schemes; or, in other words, is it necessary to take feeling just for what it appears on any occasion in experience to be? But the difficulty is that it does not, in a given case, appear to be anything in particular, and it has on this simple empirical assumption been given a great variety of descriptions and interpretations. It has been in turn connected with each of the primary mental functions, sometimes as an aspect of the cognitive process, or again as a phase of conation, and often as the elementary basis of emotion. It appears that no insight into the meaning of feeling is available merely from recognizing it as a necessary part of the mind life, and the suggestion is, negatively, that feeling is not a mere factual mental element or fact to be taken without critical inquiry as to its nature and relations; or, if it is that, how much more is it also?

(2) It is frequently argued that, whatever else feeling may be, it is not a passive element of mental substance and thus inert in the mind-life. The fact that it is in experience often associated with conation and facts of action seems to indicate that it is of the nature of "will." Croce finds it has characters such as to enable him to identify it with intuition, and it would thus appear to be an aspect of the "action" of thought. Feeling can be observed, of course, in connection with perhaps any experience, and, when it is identified with pleasure-pain as the initiator of movement, it seems to connect directly with the conative process. But that may be the occasion, even the cause, of action, which itself has not the nature of an act. And we shall see that this is probably true of feeling, viz., that it has generally a connection with other forms of experience, and yet maintains a character and status of its own which may not be of the nature of experience of any kind, but outside the class of experiences. What this character and status are will have to be left to subsequent discussion. But here it appears preferable to say that feeling is not essentially of the nature of an act, and that it is at least not an explanation of it to say that it is connected with the conative experience.

(3) Is then feeling a "stuff" in the sense that it does not possess the qualitative character of a determinate entity, but has a character only as it derives one from its relations to something else? We have doubted above whether it gets its character from being closely related to any special type of

experience, and this may suggest that feeling is not, essentially, altogether a phenomenon of experience; whether we may not have to go beyond the sphere of experience and find feeling connected with realities that are logically prior to all experience in its historical forms. Feeling, that is, may have a non-experiential and "objective" nature which we may have to seek outside the merely empirical realm of consciousness, and beyond any inferential interpretation of either mind or organism or both. It may have metaphysical characters which connect it up with the scheme of reality as a whole in such a way as not directly to involve psychological processes at all. Possibly then it is not a psychological question at all, and this may explain why the psychologists have not been able to do anything with it. The possibility is worth noting.

II. The Specific Characters of Feeling.

Before however we decide negatively with respect to the possibility of a psychological explanation of feeling, we may examine what are regarded as the possibilities of the psychological method.

These we have noted above as the assumption that feeling is (1) sensation matter, (2) plastic motive principle, or (3) the synthesis of these two in, e. g., the universal concept of form.

(1) Is feeling merely sensation regarded as having become a sort of substance because of its capacity to persist in memory and in images? It appears to be this capacity to continue as a sort of ground element in the image for all experience, that leads us to accept sensation as a sort of persistent stuff or matter from which the formed and organized structures of experience are all made or developed. This tends to distinguish a sort of essence of sensation from the physiological or psychological processes usually signified by the name, and to give to it a non-derivative but permanent and original substantial character by reference to which the structure and order of objects in experience are explained. We shall urge that this tendency to consider feeling as a sort of independent entity which nevertheless is somehow closely related to sensation is probably right; but shall want rather carefully to consider just what relation to sensation this substantial feeling holds, and by what methods of investigation such an entity could be justified to thought.

(2) Is feeling specifically a plastic motor or motive

energy or principle which is conceived to act upon a given stuff and to impose structure and organization upon that stuff? This is of course a similar view to that which identifies feeling with conation or perhaps with intuition, only it conceives this energy as operating in some special way with sensation. Generally, feeling in this sense is called instinct, and is conceived as some sort of mysterious force which operates directly upon life in the sensuous process and transforms it into the acts and objects of practical existence. But this view confuses the conception of principle with that of energy or force, and forgets that principles have as such no cogency whatever; they *do* or *cause* nothing. So feeling can hardly be explained as the cause of given or designated effects. It is in this sense that Croce is wrong in regarding feeling as identical with the active intuition. We shall have to see that the interpretation of feeling as active is probably wrong, and that a more acceptable view involves the return to the older notion that feeling is "passion" in the literal sense of immobility. The reference to sensation in theories of feeling seems to be in the interest of supplying physical terms with which to explain feeling as a form of active energy, since a cause or a force presupposes a background of matter to make it intelligible.

(3) Feeling is often regarded as the "sense of form" when form can be analyzed into the two factors described above in (1) and (2). That is to say, feeling is now made to symbolize both a sensuous and immobile matter and an active principle as synthesized in the structure of an object regarded as concrete. This idea is as old as Aristotle, in its major emphasis at least, and has since been the basis of many aesthetic interpretations of feeling. This concept of form works well in most of the major types of metaphysical system, and as a consequence is a central concept in all philosophies. It is of wide applicability also in practical connections, including practical theory. In fact, form, with its derivatives, symmetry, harmony, measure, balance, order, is the basis of the structure of most of our thought upon any subject, and, so far as the mere abstract system of thinking is concerned, it works rather well. But it leaves thought about aesthetics peculiarly formal and empty, with the consequence that discussion has turned largely upon matters of rhetoric, and questions about what essential natures the sensory elements and elements of principle should have in the concrete aesthetic

object, or what should be their general characters for purposes of theory, have been almost wholly neglected. It is suggested that these fundamental questions should be revived in the hope that beauty theory may recover the wealth of suggestiveness of the classical Greeks, which appears to have been lost so far as modern theory is concerned.

We shall, however, want to insist, in the proper place, that the concept of form is only half developed in any of the modern formulations, and that with its full interpretation it is capable of explaining many things heretofore inexplicable in aesthetic theory. It will later be a part of our task to work out the half of its meaning that has been overlooked.

It is at any rate clear that psychological description and classification of sensation and feeling have no suggestions to offer in the way of a theory of the nature of aesthetic reality, and as a consequence can be ignored. It is necessary therefore to approach the problem of feeling in an entirely new way, and on a basis of altogether new assumptions.

Some such new assumptions appear to be in process of formulation in recent discussion, and there are here and there suggestions in the traditional literature of philosophy of more broadly conceived attempts to deal with the elementary sense-feeling experience. The first such suggestion is Aristotle's "common-sense," which is evidently the idea of a fundamental awareness or consciousness in which all the particulars of sensation, in the psychological and the physiological sense, finally merge. This amalgam of all the sensations from all parts of the organism at a given time perhaps determines the "mood" of the individual, so that it is identified with what would now be recognized as a feeling. But thinking of the sensations merely in terms of their cognitive or noetic basis, of which active attention and an isolating discrimination are characteristic, they constitute the consciousness in the technical sense. At bottom then there is no difference between the two attitudes or assertions expressed as "I know that . . ." or "I feel that . . .," since both expressions refer to the same elementary and primordial background of experience which, considered as substantial ground, is feeling, and against which attention reflects a single sense-element for the purpose of clearing it up as a conscious phenomenon; the background is itself nothing more nor less than the amalgam of all other sensations coming at the moment from all parts of the organ-

ism, which are fused into a homogeneous mass by the more or less continuous effectiveness of memory relations to past situations of a similar nature. No sensation is an instantaneous occurrence, but has a length or durational stretch, and this durational stretch or continuity is what we experience as time. What we call space is the same thing, and the lateral expansivity which is characteristic of space is due to the simultaneous presence of a number of sensation elements in one instant. But these characters of sensation are dominant only when the conscious situation, as an object of experience, is determined in abstraction. In a real object, and in a concrete experience, the durational stretch is "felt" or "known" as the character of the substantial color or tone by which any sensation identifies itself; that is, the stretch, or substantiality, is a stretch in the *color* or in the *tone*, and it is the color and tone that *have* the extensity and the expansivity which we experience as time and space. It is the color-tone character of the object which is thus responsible for the object's being real; the object in terms of space and time is an abstraction of physical theory, an existence. It is thus only in aesthetic theory that the abstract science of nature can be completed as an account of reality. The real object is determined within this background of elementary experience, whatever it may be named. We might thus be tempted to say that we will call the background feeling when we refer to what we may call its general quality or its conscious affectivity as a whole, and we may call it consciousness or awareness in proportion as some element within it stands out with the emphasis which attention gives it and thus tends to present the background to itself in terms of a specific quality which we speak of as "a" sensation. At any rate what is there at the bottom of experience is normally indistinguishable as awareness or feeling, and it is indifferent as to what we should call it. Perhaps the distinction it is most important to keep in mind is that between the active and the passive character of the background. And the importance of this distinction lies in the emphasis which it is necessary to put upon the passivity of the elemental Fact or background, since it is this passivity or inertia which is the basis *in experience* of the concept of substance. The substantial aspect of presented reality is thus identified with feeling, and the psychological attributes of feeling become identified with the qualities of real objects. An object is concrete in

the fact that, in the experience of it, feeling substance becomes the condition of its self-identity; while an object as abstract can be identified through the empty conceptual space-time "frame of reference" without having the weight of substantiality. As we shall see later, it is the substance of things as identified in color-tone that makes the objects of experience real; or color-tone becomes the substance of all objects that can be apprehended within the conditions of reality.

This appears to be consistent with the conclusions of recent psychologists. We may then tentatively regard feeling as at bottom the fused or merged sum of sensation elements, the experience-amalgam which we may call feeling or awareness indifferently. If there is a preference, the burden of evidence appears to lie in favor of designating this common basis of experience and reality as feeling, since the term clearly implies the universality of the qualitative basis within or upon which cognition seems to take place, and of which a cognitive state appears to be a particularized part endowed with intensity of emphasis. The cognitive state comes out like a star from the illimitable solid substantiality of the firmamental blue of feeling.

I think this assumption of the identity of feeling with sensation would be accepted by artists who have given thought to the matter. Indeed I imagine the artist likely to call that which he embodies in a picture or a dance a sensation rather than a feeling. And I see, introspectively, no reason why the generalized and pervading experience which goes to determine the content of a dance or picture or piece of music should not be called *a* sensation preferably to *a* feeling, if for no other reason than that the purpose of the artist has been to individuate the experience in as clear a contour as possible, while the individuation of experiences which we call feelings is a difficult process. Some sensory or noetic clearness, we may assume, is necessary if a feeling is to be embodied or objectified at all, and it may be the genius of the artist just to be able to give to a characteristic feeling a sensory definiteness that enables us to recognize it and thus to share it with him. And what appears to be the further fact that artists live within their sensory experiences as a way of cultivating the types of experience they seek to embody in their works seems also to presuppose an identity of nature of feeling and sensation. The artist seems to seek the greater variety and the rarer quality

of his senses in order to "know how to feel," as Thomas Hardy, I think, remarks somewhere. And it is always the sensory qualities of objects within the artist's environment that furnish him his immediate materials. The literary artist will describe in long and complicated passages the sensory qualities of nature in all its aspects in order to convey to the reader the mass of sense experience necessary as a background or medium within which the action of a character, or the temperament or character of a person, is to be made intelligible. And in the absence of all this display of sense the action is often not understood. The action requires this field of sensory quality as a stage on which to form itself. In the same way the poet will describe and symbolize the various aspects of nature and seek appropriate images of sense, through choice of words and movements of phrases, in order to build up the emotion he desires to express, assuming, apparently, that the emotion is literally constituted of these sensory materials. And in music the tone qualities, as sensations, seem to be literally the emotion which is carried over into the hearer's consciousness; one imagines or perhaps feels—in any case one *knows*—that the violin itself feels the emotions it creates, and it is easy to personify beautiful tone combinations as beings who live and walk and feel and *are*, independently of the artist who creates or the hearer who apprehends.

It would seem then that the assumption of the identity of sensation elements within a "common sense" or an "affective continuum," and the identification of this with the emotion normally associated with them, is well founded.

There appears to be a further evidence of the identity of the totality of sensation with feeling in the substitution of one sense for another, or the transfer of the essence of one sensory experience over into another. This would be difficult to explain except upon the assumption of a common basis behind or beneath the various senses, a common substance from participation in which each sensory element gets its basic meaning and quality. Thus when Oliver Wendell Holmes tells us that

Silence like a poultice comes
To heal the blows of sound

there is the very definite assimilation of silence as heard to the soothing feel of the poultice, and again of the force of sound

with the definite tactual experience of a blow. And one hears as well as sees

A host of golden daffodils,

and Poor Susan's thrush's song is a description of the sun-lit meadow with the soft turf felt under her feet as much as it is of the bird's song which is heard in imagination. Behind or within all of these definite sensations there is the common primordium of feeling, and which particular sense tract will draw off elements of the feeling and represent it in sense will depend largely upon the accidental sensory constitution of the environment.

A peculiarly interesting instance of this fusion of sensory elements into a generalized experience having only feeling characters is the case of colors and tones. Here we have what appears to be the complete synthesis of elements in the chemical sense that the original constituents are completely lost in a new substance with characters that bear no relation to those of the constituents. This will be an important topic in a later connection, and need not be emphasized here. But the fusion is here so complete as to suggest that colors and tones are not strictly independent elements, but more of the nature of complementary modes of the underlying feeling. That a feeling should come into consciousness as a color and be mediated through the eye may depend upon the fact that circumstances determine that visual phenomena are most prominent in the particular situation; in a different situation the same emotion would be determined to appear as tone. Of a beautiful landscape you might ask the artist whether he would paint it or play it on the violin. And this fact may mean that an experience of a definite sense quality may represent the dissolution of a fusion of sensory elements or qualities effected in an earlier experience. That is, what appears now as color may very well be the emotional substance that on a previous occasion was established within the primordium as tone. Examples could be given which appear to require such an explanation.

The assumption that all the various sorts of sensation elements coalesce or fuse or merge into the common substance of "mind" will then be taken as axiomatic for our purposes here. And what we call specific qualities of feeling, and specific cognitive qualities, are differentiations within this com-

mon substance or primordium, depending upon variations within the sensuous environment. The psychological grounds for the principle, and the experimental work that has been done giving support to it, have been impressively stated by Hartshorne in *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*, (Chicago, 1934). And the philosophical grounds have been only a little less successfully or adequately portrayed in the same book. What we have referred to as the common primordium of experience Hartshorne very strikingly describes when he lays down the "theory of the contents of sensation as forming an 'affective continuum' of aesthetically meaningful, socially expressive, organically adaptive and evolving experience functions" (p.9). The significant idea is contained in the phrase "contents of sensation as forming an affective continuum." The expression "affective continuum" is particularly fitting, especially when one may not any longer use such old-fashioned terms as substance but must do homage to science and the dogma of process. But it is not quite obvious why one should speak of the "contents" of sensation; is not sensation a content in and of itself? And what is its form? Anyhow, if Hartshorne means that the "affective continuum" is the elemental feeling that everybody directly experiences as the foundation of all variations and distinctions of quality in experience, and that it is, analytically, a composite of all the sensation elements of the psycho-organic life, but synthetically and really a homogeneous simple substance with primordial characters inherent and original, then he is quite obviously on absolute ground, and there is no objection if the ground is used as a basis for a particular type of metaphysics. The evidences he uses come largely from introspective study, and this is another recognition of the fact that it is possible to use mind in the study of mind, and that there are situations where experimental machinery merely makes muddledom much muddier. But the really decisive "evidences" are those taken directly from the author's aesthetic experiences, since anybody "who knows how to feel" can have them for himself. I take therefore the affective continuum as established.

But I should like to draw somewhat different inferences from it, and for my purposes the scientific and processional aspects of the concept will give way for a metaphysical interpretation in terms of solidity and permanence. This I do because I cannot conceive of a logical ground as shifting its pos-

ition and nature while I am standing on it, and therefore demand a basis a bit more Parmenidean in stability. When I try positivism I am invariably afflicted with logical sea-sickness. There is, of course, no doubt that process has metaphysical implications; but different sets of metaphysical implications must somewhere come to terms with one another, if I know the metaphysical implications of logical method. And when process is restated in terms of its metaphysical implications it becomes the problems of change and motion and time, and can, as a problem, at least, be made intelligible, where mere process remains irrational. Any process, that is, is ultimately the infinite process, and this is intelligible only in terms of pure abstraction, that is to say, when it is empty of meaning, which is absurd, as Euclid in his prepositivist simplicity used to say. It seems to me better to allow a problem to grow into rationality than to adopt the positivist's trick of changing your universe of discourse when the argument gets difficult or threatens contradiction. One's "perspectives" may become too broad, at least too various. It seems to me better to recognize contradiction and utilize it as a matter of principle than to dodge it or change bases out of fear of it, since the attempt to dodge it will invariably fall into it anyhow. This seems the only way to avoid such dogmatic agnosticism and scepticism as Russell falls into in his famous definition of mathematics. It sounds confusing for a modern mathematician to suspect his own definitions; he ought to find some way of incorporating his principle of uncertainty into his definitions, and must do so if he expects the respect of others who sometimes also try to think. I think that the "concept" of process is the attempt to force the idea of an undefined uncertainty upon the method of logic, and I should merely suggest to such mathematicians that they follow their own instinct to a definition of process in terms of uncertainty to some degree of positive meaning, and thus avoid a purely negative and meaningless conclusion. Then only can one see the principle of contradiction emerging as a constitutional principle, a principle at once determinative of the real and regulatory of the thought "process." Hartshorne's process-philosophy turns him into a very interesting primitive, but the significance of his primitive is that in it the original process is *aufgehoben*. That the primitive is the beginning of wisdom all may concede; but it is a long way from it to a logico-meta-

physical principle of the constitution of reality. A pan-psychism or pantheism of process is an interesting spectacle; but good, aesthetically, when you don't expect or need or want to be convinced. So I return to the simple notion of an elemental fusion or merging or coalescing of all sensation elements in a primordial experience-mass in connection with which relations of process are remote, and to represent this shortly will speak of it as the *primordium*.

Now I come back to the *primordium* because it is simpler, and while I accept the principle which requires that I "suspect my simplicity," my suspicion will be genuine scepticism—that is, I will proceed to try to understand what the simplicity means. I do not mean that the concept of the *primordium* is itself simple or can be made so; what its simplicity means is that it facilitates the handling of the manifold of elements that enter into it. For sensations are not disposed of merely by being sunk and lost in the *primordium*; in fact it is only as they are caught in the complicated net of the *primordium* that meanings come to them. That is to say, the *primordium* is "simple" in that it gives a ground on which sensations as individual objects and as structured combinations can have meaning. This is why a sensation considered as a pure or sheer cognition or mere awareness is meaningless. Its cognitive character comes from just the fact that it is abstracted from or withdrawn from the matrix of massed sensations by the attention, that is, the attention endows the sensation with cognitive meaning merely by the fact of singling it out from the mass. And this singling out is the awareness "quality" which is supposed to be the essence of the sensation.

If it be asked what is the "attention" by which sensory clearness or cognition is created, the answer is that it is just the urgent effectiveness or weight of the whole mass of sensory elements—that it is the effective energy of the *primordium*, and has its source, as Aristotle says, in what it is. That is to say, the *primordium* has this power to endow a sensation with cognitive significance by virtue of the fact that it is the dynamic whole of which the sensation is the part. The noetic character of the sensation then comes from the operation of the *primordium*, as feeling whole, upon the sensation, considered as organic process, as part, this operation being what is called attention, and it is within the power of the *primordium* thus to endow the part, or attend to it, just because it is

what it is. That is to say, the function of the primordium in determining cognition is a direct consequent of the structure of the primordium, a power inherent in that structure. Just by virtue of having the structure that it has, by the complication and fusion of elementary sensory processes, considered as organic and psychic elements, the primordium invests its parts with natures that are appropriate to itself as whole, and specific to them as parts. And this it does by virtue of the fact that the fusion invests the fused elements with qualities they do not have as elements. This type of fusion will get further explanation in connection with the discussion of the principle of analogical identity later.

This derivation of cognition from feeling seems a little awkward when viewed from the standpoint of the usual analytic method by which such questions are approached. But it is necessitated by the *a priori* interpretation of the nature of the elements that enter into the aesthetic and other types of developed experience. When we come to face the question of the meaning of aesthetic, religious, and ethical experience we are driven back to the elements of experience and compelled to give them such natures and characters as are demanded of them by the higher values of life. We invent elements and endow them with explanatory power, that is, we create hypothetical entities, and find that the "facts" substantiate them. Here we are doing exactly what is done in speculative science, and what must always be done everywhere if we are to have a "science" of the knowing function; we are going back to our atoms and molecules and finding that they do have the characters that they must have if our universe is to be intelligible. Inference is thus the ground of the relation of an attribute to the substance to which it belongs; it is a relation of analogical identity (ch. VI), and the inference in the last analysis has its basis in the substance, and not in the experience of the quantity or quality of the attribute. Sensation "qualities" are then speculative entities, inferential functions of the primordium from which the sensation has its being, and the important and interesting question, for aesthetic qualities, is that as to the nature and structure of the primordium as it appears in the objects of experience. The tracing out of these structural elements is the deduction of the aesthetic categories, and will occupy us in later chapters. (Chs. VII to XIV).

The elementary simplicity of the primordium consists in the

fact that it shows an inherent dichotomy. And because of this dichotomy the essential nature of the primordium corresponds to, and is thus accessible to, the judgment as the instrument of its description. The judgment is found fundamental to the nature of the primordium in the fact that it is by its specifying and individuating the cognitive quality in the primordium that the judgment itself as well as the primordium becomes intelligible. This creative *nisus*—it is not an act, and is below the plane of process—by which the primordium endows a part of itself with quality is then itself the original judgment, and the judgment by which the world of values is spoken into existence is pronounced by the original being and substance of value itself. But it is not these metaphysical speculations that are required here—however interesting they may be in later connections. But the fact is that the urgency of the primordium, in specifying itself into determinate forms of existence, inevitably raises the old questions about creation and origins, forces them upon us in so far as we find it advisable to maintain our metaphysical basis as we go along.

The primordium, then, by its own urgent nature as *primum mobile*, existentiates itself as color and tone. And this fact, and its consequence, are anterior to experience, and themselves are conditions of the possibility of experience. It is therefore not an act. Color and tone are not, then, in their primary essences, experiences, but essences whose relations constitute the ground of experience. Or, if an analytic statement is demanded, color and tone, as the synthesis, in experience, of two elementary types of sensation, are themselves, as realities beneath experience, and as material possibilities of experience, synthesized in the primordium (Ch. IX). Thus it is that, from the first, the nature of the primordium involves order. And as we are looking at a fact objectively, you can either say that the primordium, by its self-expression in judgment, represents itself as color and tone, or that color and tone, by virtue of their own spontaneity, create the primordium by a free fusion in the judgment. Precisely how the primordium is constituted of color and tone will be discussed later (Ch. IX). Here we want to emphasize that color and tone are themselves, for experience, and by a principle we shall develop (Ch. VI), syntheses of two types of sensation, and between the two all possible original experience qualities are embraced. The reduction of the minor sensations, taste, smell, touch, etc., to

color and tone will be undertaken in the chapters on color and tone, in so far as such reduction seems to require argument.

If I were required to furnish evidences for this doctrine that the *Urstoff* of all value is feeling, and that feeling in individual experience is a mode of sensation, I should not feel it necessary to go beyond the great philosophers and the great religionists. And if the psychologists could not "verify" my pronouncements, I should take comfort from the fact that the psychologists can neither verify nor invalidate anything in matters of this kind. But when Plato finds the Good in its aspect of Beauty at the bottom and the top and the middle of things, and when the religionists of the world find the Good and Beauty in Feeling, I will take comfort in finding that my own thoughts come out finally upon the ground they have discovered.

But these factors and features which we have found to be the essence of feeling constitute feeling the substance of value.

And as the substantial character of feeling is recognized here, the question as to what relations it has to whatever other substances there may be can not be avoided. The detail of these relations will be worked out in the proper places, each in its appropriate place if we can find that place. But we can say in general at this point that, so far as value must be interpreted in terms of experience, and so far as experience must be objectified and thus rescued from the limitations of the individual, feeling becomes the substance of value and value becomes the substance of culture, and feeling will thus take its place as co-ordinate with existence, which we conceive as the substance of nature. Then instead of setting the aesthetic problem in terms of the subjective experiences of the individual, the problem will become one of determining the nature of the relations between a metaphysical and spiritual culture, on the one hand, and a metaphysical and physical nature, on the other. Specifically, the question will be one as to how all these relations constitute the object in which, in experience, we find beauty incarnate. All the questions normally included in the discussion of beauty and aesthetic relations in terms of personal experience will find their places as details within the system, when they are valid questions, or will be ignored when they are not valid questions. Feeling, then, for us, is a metaphysical principle, the substantial stuff from which the world of values is created. And while in this capacity feeling be-

comes the basis and subject matter of all disciplines that deal with things cultural or human, we shall assume that the model of all such disciplines is represented in aesthetics, and will confine ourselves to a discussion of beauty and the aesthetic object. We must insist that ours is purely an objective study, in which the immediacy and rarity of personal experience is significant only in so far as it symbolizes a principle of universal truth. We shall therefore have no occasion to try to produce beauty, being satisfied if we may glimpse, in the constitution of the object in which beauty is objectively expressed, the process by which creation is accomplished.

All value, then, is a mode of feeling. Feeling is the material basis of values and culture, as existence is the material basis of nature. And it is on the basis of the analogy between nature and culture, and of the logic by which the philosophy of nature has been developed, that we hope to find an intelligible account of values as exemplified in the objects of beauty. We shall argue that feeling is the inert stuff out of which the aesthetic object is constituted; that in its cosmic essence and as the primordium of experience it is co-eternal with matter as the stuff of nature and existence; and that it comes to beauty in the aesthetic object where the object is a corporate individual created by the union of matter and feeling in accordance with metaphysical principles.

CHAPTER IV

THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF FEELING

WHEN we come to interpret the elemental formal implications of the fact of feeling (this was indicated as topic III in the previous chapter, but was not discussed there) we shall find that its meaning and place, both in experience and in independent reality, have been almost totally misunderstood or have perhaps remained undiscovered. As we have noted in all the aesthetic theories, their weakness lies in their subjectivity, in their assumption that beauty and the aesthetic phenomena have only a precarious and vicarious existence within the conscious experience of finite individual minds. Let us therefore trace the stages by which the *reality* of the world that appears in experience has been worked out by purely objective methods in the theory of *existence*, and ask if a suggestive model may not thereby have been set up ready for our use in attacking the problem of the reality of the value world.

A. Kant and the Subjectivity of Space and Time.

Kant's Copernican revolution was the discovery that space and time are forms of the intellect that perceives or conceives them, or perceives or conceives objects by means of them. But the significance of this discovery has been for the most part lost in the interpretation of the Kantian theory to mean that *since* space and time are real empirically in the inner forms and categories of the mind, they were *therefore* not real objectively in the world which is or exists, so far as space and time are concerned, independently of its being experienced. This mistake became troublesome in the theory of subjective idealism, which however is not a development from Kant but a normal evolutionary consequence of the empirical tradition of English thought before Kant. But it was the subjective interpretation of the Kantian theory as meaning that space and time were *only* forms of the apprehending intellect and not *also* objective structures in the world, that put philosophy (metaphysics) off its main track and on the curious byway of epistemology, with such tragic consequences, in recent times.

The natural consequences of this subjective misinterpretation were the element of the fantastic in the idealism of Fichte, the mystic-aesthetic ideal absolutism of Schelling, and the voluntaristic scepticism of Schopenhauer, etc. Other important and altogether negative consequences of this were the subjectivistic positivism of law and politics in Bentham and Comte, utilitarianism and hedonism in English ethics, and lately the psychology of sociology.

But the systems of Hegel and Schleiermacher show that Kant is capable of another interpretation. Kant had, no doubt, begun his thinking from purely subjective and psychological presuppositions. But the persistence with which an existent external world pursued him prevented him from remaining within these presuppositions, in spite of the fact that he perhaps never developed a language adequate to the objective view. There is, even in the idealism of Fichte, in the assumption of the identity of the thing-in-itself with the moral ego, a recognition of the existence of the external world, and in placing this really existing ego at the center of his metaphysical system, there is a recognition of its importance, even if it had to be shadowed by the non-ego in order to endow it with veridical reality. And in Schelling the identity of the real in nature with the real as self, at least the giving the non-ego the same real status as the ego, even in the extremely abstract way of aesthetic mysticism, shows that the objectively existing world of time and space can not be made to evaporate by whatever emphasis upon the subjective. And in Hegel the objective existence of nature is fully realized. The fact that Hegel makes nature a "stage" in the development of reality need not blind us to the fact that each stage included the whole of reality, and, in being succeeded by another, remained the totality in a determinate aspect. But the objective world of space and time was recognized as the reality equally with the subjective world of mind, and philosophy became the logic of their identity. Mind and nature, thought and the space-time world of existence, are of one and the same reality.

Kant's bringing space and time into the mind, then, proved them real against the shadowy status which they had formerly had as mere conditions for the existence of the physical. Now they are part and parcel of that physical existence as known. As forms of the intuition *and* categories of the understanding space and time *are* the physical world *in* mind; and time and

space are forms *of mind in nature*. Discovery that the space-time world exists inherently and necessarily in mind did not transfer that world into a subjective space-time different from the external space-time scheme in which it had prior existence. It merely showed that space and time are points in the continuity of the two worlds, and developed the logic by which the two worlds received, through space and time, a common objectivity. The external world, in its elementary forms at least, exists in mind; but this does not negate or destroy the external existence which it already in nature had; it means that, *as it is*, the external world is intelligible, and existence itself thus becomes one of the grounds of intelligibility. The alternative in *or* out of mind is contradictory, when it is not meaningless. What is real, including mind itself, is both in and out of mind.

B. Relativity and the Objective Reality of Space-Time.

Objective idealism since Kant had prepared for the cutting of the tangle of epistemological knots which came from the assumption that what pertains to mind must be essentially different from that which gets its character from its status in the external world. This may have been due to Kant's apparent assumption that the subject and the predicate of a logical judgment could never quite attain a complete unity. Kant seems never to have quite got beyond his psychological assumptions; to the last he treated the judgment as in essence a psychical process, forgetting that behind it, or within it, there must be a world-ground if it is to be true. In their metaphysical reference, these psychological and epistemological difficulties were all due to the essential dualism of subject-predicate in the approach to the problems both of mind and nature. This attitude of dualism was itself due to a misconception of the nature and function of the concept of substance. Substance is traditionally that which stands *under* or *back* of the empirical reality to which it is supposed to give status; that is, the relation of substance to that which it substantiates is conceived as an instance of cause and effect. As a consequence the substance must be distinguishably different and quantitatively distinct from what it substantiates, and if we think the relation between substance and "attribute" we must presuppose them as distinct and separate realities. This is the famous argument that began with Kant, for the modern period, at least,

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and continued to Hegel on the question: Which is primary, and which dependent on the other, Mind or Nature?

As we have noted, this is a confusion of the problem of substance with the problem of cause. And it was only after a long and laborious development and interpretation of the Hegelian principle that identity is the ultimate relation, or the only and appropriate relation between ultimates, that the concept of substance was freed of causal limitations, and that as a consequence a way was worked out by which the confusions of subjectivity and the trivialities of epistemology could be avoided. It involved, as we say, the avoidance of the dualism which was inherent in the failure to distinguish cause from substance *in terms of* the relation of each to its correlative.

The full development of the Hegelian principle of (concrete) identity was left to the cosmologists or "mathematical physicists" of the past generation or two. It came in the form of the discovery that relation itself is substantially real, and so universal, and, in its metaphysical implications, *the* reality. Relation is not the nothing that prevents the coming together of the entities between which it holds: it is the way, and there is no other way, that the realities of both terms can *be* and can be thought; that is to say that in a judgment the relation expressed in the copula makes it possible to overcome the duality of terms, and it does so because the essence of the relation is being itself, i. e., it is the existential relation. It embeds the terms in the continuity of being, and establishes their essential identity through their empirical distinctness. The existential relation is then the hypothesis of identity as itself the reality. The terms, that is, can be thought *as real* only through relation; they become realities, that is to say, by the fact that thought rescues them from the mere status of existence-or-mind to which they are condemned on any scheme that does not begin with their identity and go on to show how the identity relation is the substance of which the terms themselves are attributes. So long as there is an alternative, *in* or *out* of mind, existence *or* mind, reality will be uncertain, truth unsubstantial, and the disjunction the mother of contradiction.

The problem then as to which is real and which dependent, the space-time world or mind, becomes the problem as to what is the meaning of the identity of the term situation (space-time-world)-mind. The meaning of this identity came to be

formulated in the proposition: *The* reality, space-time, is the ultimate identity of mind and world. This, as we shall hope to see, was a little too precipitate and ambitious, but what it meant was that the space-time world does not require any substance behind it in order to make it exist, does not require a cause to make it intelligible, but space-time is itself the substantial ground of the intelligibility of the world. And the expression, the intelligibility of the world, means the identity of mind and world through the judgment by which it is experienced. The suggestion is of course that mind is just the intelligibility of the world where the world is regarded as constituted substantially by space-time, and this is expressed in the proposition that space-time exists, or has existence, or is existence. And the proposition expresses the condition in general of intelligibility. Space-time might abstractly *be* without the assumption of its intelligibility, but it could never be *anything*, could never exist; but it can only be *after* it exists for a mind that recognizes it; it exists or subsists or "stands out" through its own intelligibility only, and this intelligibility is its mind, or is the judgment that mind is in the world. When we say that space-time exists we say that space-time *worlds*, or *minds*, that is to say, thinks; it is the judgment which attaches existence only to what is antecedently recognized as a world, and this recognition constitutes mind. We shall see later what is further implied in attributing intelligibility or existence to space-time, after the systematic and substantial character of intelligibility has been recognized as the ground of that world which existence postulates as its other—the world of values. The final synthesis (identity) of intelligibility with existence will be effected in the concept of Reality. This is the concept of the ideal perfection of the identity under the conditions of a possibility determined in the nature of the identity relation itself. The emotional attitude in which we picture this reality to ourselves is God. It is sometimes attempted (as by Alexander) to intellectualize this attitude as Deity.

Space-Time is then the reality of the external world. It is itself the substance with respect to the external world, and this substance we call existence. It is then the great Primal, as Color-Tone is the Primordial. Space-Time is the real of the world, it has or is reality or substance, because its intelligibility gives it existence. The world as Space-Time may hence-

forth be referred to as existence, or as existence-substance, to distinguish it from a further reality which we shall now investigate.

C. The Objectivity of Color-Tone.

Intelligibility factualizes itself into empirical attributes of color and tone, in an analogous manner to that in which existence is experientable as Space and Time. It will be necessary to inquire whether Color-Tone is the substance of a unique form of intelligibility, just as Space-Time is the substantial import of intelligible existence.

We have seen that existence can be attributed to space-time because of the principle of intelligibility which makes space-time a world; or we have seen that space-time is existence because it is thereby and only thereby an intelligible world. What now is the factual or empirical import of intelligibility?

Intelligibility with respect to space and time means that Space-Time must exist in order to be intelligible. It logically imposes existence upon the empirical realm of space-time. But every relation, we have also seen, is *really* a relation of identity; then intelligibility *is* a structural part or element within existence, or existence is the form that intelligibility takes when it gives character to space and time. Intelligibility thus characterizes space-time with existence; or it characterizes the real world as existent by endowing space-time with substance. Analogously, intelligibility also characterizes the real world with significance or worth or value by endowing color-tone with substance. We have then the substance of the world given in two empirical forms; the existence-substance which it has by virtue of the empirical characters of space and time, and the value substance which it has by virtue of the empirical characters of color and tone. We shall see that just as existence-substance *is* Space-Time, so value-substance *is* Color-Tone, and we shall speak of the two substantial characters of the intelligible world as Existence and Value. They are together the constituents of Reality in that they are identified through their common factor of intelligibility. We noted that it is through intelligibility that space-time has or is Existence; it is also through intelligibility that Color-Tone has or is Value. The essence of value is then that it is the intelligibility of the world as empirically expressing itself as Color-Tone; and intelligibility, considered as the

life of the Individual, is constituted of the value that precipitates from his experiences of colors and tones.

Color and tone then have the same relation of identity to value-substance that space and time have to existence-substance. It is the unity or synthesis of what is uniformly experienced as two, i. e., space *and* time, color *and* tone, that gives substantiality in either case; that is, it is Color-tone that is Value and Space-Time that is Existence, and the unity is effected in both cases in the same way. Reality here is given in the synthesis of space and time, color and tone, because the synthesis becomes an identity, and identity is the principle through which the divergent in experience becomes realized as unity. That is to say, the abstractly *real*, or abstract or Primal reality (existence-substance) that there is in space and time, and the abstract reality or Primordial reality there is in Color-Tone (value-substance), are made experienceable or put in the form of experience by similar concepts: space *and* time become experienced reality as identified Space-Time or existence in and through *motion* as their identity; color *and* tone become experienced reality as identified Color-Tone or value in and through *rhythm* as their identity. These two *concepts* are *similar* because of the substantial identity through difference of their objects; motion is the unity of Space-Time in terms of their intelligibility *as experienced*; rhythm is the unity and synthesis of Color-Tone in terms of their intelligibility *as experienced*. This substantial similarity, that is, this similarity of substances, we shall call analogy, and it will be the experience-form of the elemental relation of identity in many important connections throughout this book. It will thus represent a real relation, or a relation of reals, and reals thus related are called analogues. Rhythm and motion are thus analogously the subjective or procedural phases of the reality of which value and existence are objective or substantial phases. Their unity constitutes the empirically real, which is most immediately evident in a work of art, but is present in any real (individual) object of any kind.

The special logical significance of motion and rhythm lies in the fact that they are the most elementary of empirical concepts, in the sense that the systems of all concepts for the empirical determination of reality are derived from them. Thus from motion are derived all the systems of concepts for the empirical determination of the world as existence. Even

the concept of relativity (relatedness) itself is derived from the empirical motional aspects of existence as the unity of Space-Time, as space-time appears in experience in the form of motion. All subordinate concepts, cause, quantity, number, quality (in the abstract logical sense), time and space as empirical categories, all get their intelligibility as expressions of motion. Analogously, which ultimately means identically, all the concepts for the determination of the world of value as experienced get their intelligibility as expressions of the varying phases of rhythm.

The systems of existential categories are pretty well worked out in the sciences as synthesized in logic. The systems of value categories, while present and operative in experience as long as there has been culture, have hardly begun to be reduced to terms of their intelligibility. They exist in the limbo of rhetoric which passes for practical philosophy in the "social sciences," and their elemental intelligibility in a logic of value is not as yet perceived to be a problem. When they have found their intelligibility in a consistent synthesis they will constitute aesthetics as a logic of value. The logic of existence and the logic of value constitute metaphysics—when their system has been achieved. It is our purpose, after further explicating the matrix concept of Color-Tone-Rhythm, to proceed to a "deduction" of the systems of value categories (as instanced in the system of aesthetic categories) through which the realm of value gets its intelligible form. We will fortunately be obliged to ignore the psychology and anthropology of value.

D. The Metaphysics of Value.

Space and time, then, through their dynamic identity or unity in motion, constitute the world of existence.

Color and tone, through their dynamic identity or unity in rhythm, constitute the world of value.

It is now our task to show that what appears to be these two distinct worlds is after all one and the same world. Kant has shown us that with respect to the world as "given" in space and time, while that givenness or determination within space and time constitutes the world of existence, still "existence is no real predicate." To say therefore of any fact merely that it exists is to say nothing as to the fact's status within the real world. Such a judgment "adds nothing" to the concept of the subject, all that it means as existing is just

what it was as postulated universally by the concept of the subject term. This raises the question of the subjectivity of the category of existence, whether, that is, existence has no meaning except as the mere method by which the intellect pictures objects to itself but makes no contribution to the meaning of any object. What Kant really meant by this was, perhaps, that existence, being a "form of the mind," was of no use as a classificatory device such as the sciences use to impose the order of thought upon nature by placing objects under distinguishing rubrics. It was of no use for this purpose simply because, applying to all objects alike, it applies in a specific or distinguishing way to none. It is therefore useless as a category of objects just because of the fact that it was the most universal of references to objects in general. And being applicable universally to all, it particularizes nothing or distinguishes nothing, so that nothing is added in the way of that inner relativity by which objects may be synthesized into bodies of knowledge.

Kant is right therefore in saying that existence makes no reference to the reality in so far as it undertakes to apply to any object. But he was wrong in going on to assume (if he really did) that because of this failure to make specific reference to reality, existence could refer only backward and inward to the mind. The real reason, as we have seen, why existence is no real category, is that it is the external reality itself, and is not a category for Kant simply because Kant insists that all categories must be merely and simply mental forms and nothing else. On the assumption that a genuine category represents not only a device or mode of mind but also a factor of the elementary structure of mind, this conclusion would not have been necessary. And on the further assumption that, as a category which is a structural element of mind, it is also a real object in the real world, the category no longer expresses its nature in a mere reference, which is difficult to explain on any ground, but expresses itself directly as the reality upon which the universality of all categories depends. How what is used as a category may be a form of mind and *also* a real object, or the principle of an object, is difficult to make specific in the case of existence-categories. But the "also" becomes a simple matter, with respect to values, through the principle of analogy.

Existence is then a real category, verified by the intelligibility of the experience-forms of space and time, as that intelligibility is made immediately experienceable in the dynamic unity of space and time in motion. Motion can only be formulated through analogy, and the analogy does not seem as clear as in the case of value relations.

Now with respect to color and tone we have an analogous story to tell. "Axiology" fails to show that value is a part of the real, or has anything to do with the real, because it proceeds in accordance with the assumption that value is no real category. It is not a real category, so it is said, because the essence of value lies in its being a "form of the mind" only; that value is an "experience;" and all value theory can do is to seek indefinitely for the distinguishing mark of value in a peculiar state of mind or some phase or quality of the subjective life. Practically all value theory, as we have shown (Ch. I) refutes itself with this subjective fallacy, the assumption that the backward and inward reference to some habitual device of mind or some peculiar quality or state of mind constitutes a deduction of the reality of value. Instead of taking value-objects as real and showing how these objects as experienced necessitate an objective deduction, that is, a logical demonstration of the presence in value of the very reality itself, the theories ignore objective value as it is given in the ordinary world and look for value in some gloriously ineffable subjective state.

But this procedure by analytic methods and the attempt to traverse the infinite process of experience to its ultimate is hopeless. As you do not find existence by looking in the dark corners of the universe, so you do not find value lurking within the multitudinous confusion of mental states.

Value is no real predicate, it is true. It "adds nothing to the concept of the subject" to say in the predicate that value or worth is expressed. And the reason is similar to the case of existence. Value is not a predicate because it does not distinguish objects, since, from the mere point of view of value as an abstract concept, all objects "possess" it alike though not to the same degree. Value, therefore, is a ground, *the* object, hence the principle, both *essendi* and *cognoscendi*, of all practical as well as aesthetic distinctions. The mere psychological or qualitative account of value therefore is purely descriptive and classificatory, or literary and artistic

in its completer forms, but does not touch the question of the *reality of value* which is the fundamental issue for any genuine theory of value.

Thus the synthesis of color and tone in feeling, which, as described in the preceding chapter, and is now identified with rhythm, becomes here the essence of Value, a reality on its own recognizance, a constituent in the structure of the world. In fact, Feeling, Value, *is* the world that is to be understood in all practical connections, the substance upon which culture is built up. Feeling then is the ontological stuff of the world, has its part in the life of the Deity itself.

Let us look a little more closely at the question of color-tone, keeping in mind the analogy to space-time. We have seen that space is a "form of the mind" for external nature, and have noted some of its more general characters. And we have emphasized the fact that its being a form of the mind does not make it any the less the substance of external nature also, the fundamental substance in which all objects of nature share. And time we have seen to be a "form of the mind" for internal nature, the internal sense by which the objects of nature are known and at the same time a constituent of those objects. And we noticed that the identity of time and space as constituting the nature-substance also obliterates the alternative distinction between inner and outer, so that the distinction is never a distinction *of* time and space, or of time *from* space, but always, when it genuinely has meaning, is a distinction within the temporal, or within the spatial. The only distinction that is true *of* time and space, or that can be applied to them as it were from the outside, so as to be true of their relations, is the distinction of the difference that is the ground of their identity, and this distinction is the analogy or the analogous relation between space-time and color-tone. But this is at the same time the relation that determines that space-time and color-tone are analogues, so what will be true of one of the duads will be true in some sense of the other. But the sense also in which what is true of one duad is true of the other is determined by the general terms and conditions of the difference that is the ground of their identity. So that space-time-color-tone constitutes the ultimate identity that is behind, and the substance of, the distinction that becomes the ground of the identity of nature and culture, and the physio-worthy, existence-value stuff of every

object in the world. It is in these terms that we begin to be able to distinguish and identify the characters that belong to Reality as such, to mark out and specify the relativity that constitutes the body substance of the Absolute.

Space and time, as Space-Time, then, represent the whole of existence, and through their unity in motion, every motion being space-time particularized or instanced, they become existence as experienced. This is nature, which is the ground of all knowledge so far as knowledge is discursive and formal; and the ground of all life in so far as life can be made the subject matter of formal knowledge. As concretely experienced it is the world of natural objects as described in the systems of the sciences, the world of objects as determined in accordance with the system of existential categories.

But we are repeating this description here in order the more clearly to picture the analogue of the natural world. It is the outline of the culture world that we want as the background against which to draw the picture of aesthetic reality.

This is the world of Color-Tone, as we have seen. So we have things to say of color and tone that are the direct analogues to what we said about space and time. Color is a "form of the mind" for external culture objects, the condition in general (or, as Kant would say, an infinite given whole) under which objects of the external sense have value. Similarly, tone is a form for all value objects of the internal sense. Color and tone are then the general scheme of conditions for all objects in the realm of culture, and as such they constitute that realm. Color and tone, or Color-Tone as effected through rhythm as their unifying and identifying principle, determine and constitute the whole of Value as the Feeling-Substance of the universe, the *materia* of the objective reality of culture as the realm of values. This identity obliterates all differences, as dispersive individual conditions that determine specific value objects, and amalgamates them in the difference that constitutes the ground of the identity itself. The realm of culture is then the Whole of Values, which is the ground of the reality of all *contemplative* knowledge, just as the realm of existence is the ground of all discursive knowledge. It is essential to the comprehension of contemplative knowledge that the *veracity* of every contemplative judgment is a reference, direct or remote, to this ultimate color-tone substance of

the universe; just as the *validity* of every discursive judgment is a reference to the space-time substance of the universe; and just as the truth of every speculative judgment is a reference to the Absolute as the final identity of Space-Time-Color-Tone.

What therefore is important about Kant's famous theory of space and time is not so much their subjectivity, but the fact that they constitute the system of nature by determining the conditions within which there can be objects in that system. In the same way the importance of the doctrine of color-tone is not in the recognition that they are forms of the apprehending contemplation, but in the fact that they determine the conditions under which there can be objects within the system of culture. But they are not mere conditions; they are necessary conditions in the absence of which objects are not conceivable. Thus, Kant's arguments for time and space apply analogously to them: the non-existence of a world of culture objects is conceivable; but the non-existence of color and tone is not conceivable so long as any *value* objects are presupposed. It is perhaps possible to conceive of a world without value or worth; but it would be a dead world, still as the tomb without tones, dark as oblivion without color. Mechanism and materialism sometimes try to picture such a world, but the image is contradictory and blurred, and no judgment can describe it since every real description involves the value-elements of color and tone. So the conceivability of a world of values depends upon the presupposition of colors and tones, just as the existence and conceivability of nature depends upon the presupposition of space and time. Space and time, and color and tone, are, then, the *a priori* conditions of the existence of a world which can be represented to experience.

Color and tone are then conditions *a priori* of a world of experience. It is the realization of this, perhaps, which misleads the aestheticians to insist upon the subjectivity of value. Color and tone have an immediacy and certainty which make their objects necessary. And it is this fact, perhaps, which induces the theorists to attempt to identify the objectivity of the objects of color and tone with the immediacy with which they are experienced, thus cancelling the conditions of real objectivity for those objects. That value objects *must be as experienced* does not necessitate that they *be* the mere process of experiencing, nor need their substance be identical with the presumed substance that gives stability to psychological pro-

Existence is then a real category, verified by the intelligibility of the experience-forms of space and time, as that intelligibility is made immediately experienceable in the dynamic unity of space and time in motion. Motion can only be formulated through analogy, and the analogy does not seem as clear as in the case of value relations.

Now with respect to color and tone we have an analogous story to tell. "Axiology" fails to show that value is a part of the real, or has anything to do with the real, because it proceeds in accordance with the assumption that value is no real category. It is not a real category, so it is said, because the essence of value lies in its being a "form of the mind" only; that value is an "experience;" and all value theory can do is to seek indefinitely for the distinguishing mark of value in a peculiar state of mind or some phase or quality of the subjective life. Practically all value theory, as we have shown (Ch. I) refutes itself with this subjective fallacy, the assumption that the backward and inward reference to some habitual device of mind or some peculiar quality or state of mind constitutes a deduction of the reality of value. Instead of taking value-objects as real and showing how these objects as experienced necessitate an objective deduction, that is, a logical demonstration of the presence in value of the very reality itself, the theories ignore objective value as it is given in the ordinary world and look for value in some gloriously ineffable subjective state.

But this procedure by analytic methods and the attempt to traverse the infinite process of experience to its ultimate is hopeless. As you do not find existence by looking in the dark corners of the universe, so you do not find value lurking within the multitudinous confusion of mental states.

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cesses. Value objects are neither mind-stuff nor mind-process; they do not depend upon the accident that they are individually experienced; but they do depend on the set of real conditions upon which depends also the existence of mind and its processes. And among these real conditions, and foremost among them are color and tone; other conditions of essentially the same order will be exhibited in the categories by which all value objects are made the content of contemplative judgments, the aesthetic categories as such. The system of these categories, as including color and tone and their synthesis in rhythm, will furnish a complete exposition of the nature of the aesthetic object.

This immediacy and certainty of color-tone objects comes from feeling by contemplative intuition, when it is expressed in terms of its psychological processes. Feeling in this case is of course the individuate instance, the instance particularized in the mind of the individual, of the total objective or real Feeling which is the stuff of the culture universe. As the reality thus appears in the individual mind it carries with it the immediate certainty of its self-identity, and the reality of the world is known directly in this intuition. This is the explanation of the certainty of religious experience, and of the perfect realization of the object as the fulfillment of the world which one gets in the genuine apprehension of a work of real art. The basis of the certainty, let us repeat, is the identity of the feeling-object, which constitutes the content of the apprehending mind, with the Feeling which *is* the great world, and the knowledge which results is the knowledge of the continuity of that which fills the mind with that which constitutes the universe. This immediacy and certainty of color-tone objects is therefore the ground of all belief and conviction, even of that degree of belief which is described as the "certainty" of formal truth in logic or mathematics, so far as this formal truth can be thought as real. It is *a priori* certainty and conviction. Still more obviously is the value object, as determined by color and tone, the condition of all certainty and conviction and belief in practical experience. The only possible way to give "authority" to the objects and ends of morality is to picture them in the colors and tones of individuated goods or ends, thus giving them an appeal which no other character could bestow. And this is true throughout the entire practical life. And it is for this reason that the "science" which

gives a satisfactory account of the Object in its aesthetic character is at the same time laying down the principles of the metaphysic of reality itself. The basis of the conviction of reality itself is the beckoning appeal that comes to us in the color and tone harmonies of the spheres.

It is for these reasons that we are entitled to say that the value object as determined in color and tone is the principle of all objects that can be motives to the will. This is quite obvious; and as it is the subject matter of ethics we can drop the question with a few remarks. First, it is clear that it is the color-tone object that is the central image in any happiness theory, and *some* happiness theory of ethics must be final for all beings who have their reality in an experience conditioned upon the primordium of feeling. This does not appear to be arguable, and the only, or perhaps the major, task of ethics is to paint the picture of happiness in the colors and tones that harmonize with the biological and social background of life, remembering that life's dull and moody gray is a composite of all the brightness and vividness, all the softness and piercingness, all the thunder and flash and brilliance and gloom of the infinity of experience. It is done perfectly in the combination of Plato-Aristotle, the man-artist of Greece, and all that need or can be done is to brighten the color-tones of the picture by removing the rubbish of the intervening and for the most part lost years. When this is done it will appear how tragic has been the blurring of the picture by our confused notions as to the function of feeling—how the Value reality, the color-tones of our happiness, have been splattered with the mud of a morbid emotional life. It would be equally simple to show the significance for ethics of desire on the basis of our principles. It would at once account for the functions of sensation and of the organism, and by giving a rational account of these would once and for all dispose of naturalism and materialism in ethics; not, of course, by foolishly denying sensation and the flesh, but providing in the structure of happiness for their completion and fulfilment. Here the content of the ethical life is the aesthetic experience, and it is the same with the whole of life; in so far as life, moral, religious, practical life in any sense, is real in terms of meaning and value, its content will be a content of aesthetic objects experienced to the full. And the "problem of desire" will be shown merely to be a problem in the definition of an object in the tone-colors

necessary to harmonize with our natural-cultural feeling substance as institutionalized in the forms of social life.

One other point. It would be expected that here some one would object in the interest of what is supposed to be a more rational determination of the meanings of life. It would be, is, argued that the determination of objective values cannot be left to the "blindness" of feeling, and we have ourselves argued that feeling is not an active principle and therefore not a determining cause. This muddle between the rationalist and the emotionalist seems, however, to be simply cleared away when we reflect that the "clearness of ideas" for which the intellectualist argues is after all a feeling-clearness in the sense which we have previously developed. That is to say, the clear idea is merely a nucleus within the mass of feeling, and the "clearness" which distinguishes it as a truth-element is a quality of the original substance of feeling after being polished by a clearer and exacter vision of the colors and tones which constitute the feeling substance. That is to say, the nucleus is an "idea" only by grace of the attention which polished it out of the original stuff of feeling, and the intellectual functions are themselves merely modifications of the primordial effected largely by the life history of the organism in its physical contacts with its world. There seems therefore no way to get outside the original feeling in a way to show that the idea is a different form or kind of experience; it must have as its fundament the same stuff that makes the rest of experience real, otherwise there would be no way of showing that our ideas could be *about* experience in any sense.

Hence it seems necessary to accept feeling-clearness, which is analyzable into elements of color and tone, as the basis of all clear images of imagination and even of thought, and this means that cognition itself can only be understood to approach the real when conceived as operating within the sustaining medium of feeling.

Color and Tone also have their "antinomies." It has already been remarked that color and tone do not characterize or qualify existence. They have their own real status co-ordinate with and analogous to existence. But the relation is not one that can be expressed by any existential category. This is the explanation of the irrationalities of "epistemology" and "theory of perception." Such theories have tried to force color and tone and the so-called "secondary qualities" to char-

acterize or qualify existence, and have failed because they have assumed that color and tone were attributive in nature, whereas they are not attributes *in any sense of anything* but are substantives in their own right. It is they that are subjects, because all value categories are predicates of them, are derived from them, in the sense that every element of their meaning must involve a reference in the last resort to color and tone. Color and Tone have no relations, in the sense in which relation is regularly used, for they are not dependent upon anything, but can only be analogues of other things, and of things that are also substances in their own right. To say that a color qualifies an existence is to abstract all its value meaning from it; red does not qualify the rose; the rose *is* red. That is to say that the rose, as an existence, *is*, in the realm of value, symbolized or, better, constituted by red, where the *in* is the analogy between the existence and the value; it does not mean that, in the existential or logical sense, rose as one existence is included quantitatively within the red regarded as another existence. It is equally false to say that the red is included in the rose in *any* sense; that it belongs to, is possessed by, "had" is the realist's metaphor, or that it qualifies, designates the rose in any sense is contradictory, and creates all the confusions of perception theory.

Color and tone then do not refer to existence in any way. They are themselves the referends for all real qualities. If they did refer to existence, they would derive their characters from existence, and would be capable of measurement. But all suggestions of measurements of value elements are contradictory. The "experimental" measurements of sense are the prejudices of the psychologists. This whole structure of "perception theory" is doubtful. For it is a violation of the letter and the spirit of the law that the "relation" of a substance to its attribute is one of the appropriateness of analogy. Men do not gather figs of thistles. No value has any quantity, or any other existential character. Colors and Tones are estimable, appreciable, prizable, respectable, appraisable,—in a word, valuable—that is to say, values are valuable, or, better, valuables. They do not "are" anything; they do not exist, have no existence, but constitute a realm not of being but of worth of their own. Colors and Tones and the values they constitute are then "independent" of existence, or would be if independence meant anything when predicated of them.

But it does not, since it is an existential category. But they by analogy coordinate (all categories of order are metaphysical, and not physical or limited to existence, but refer to the Reality as synthesis of existence and value) with existence to constitute the Reality which is the subject matter of metaphysics or Speculative Science. To attribute color and tone to existence gives rise to contradiction and to nothing else—but before it is contradictory it is meaningless and trivial. Color and Tone are attributes of nothing; they constitute Value, or Feeling.

The “subjectivity” of color and tone then means that their “existential” reference, their reference to reality, is a reference to Feeling or Value, and not to existence. Psychologically, this means that they are present in individual experience in the affections, using the term in the sense of indicating all the elementary affective states. They are not references to the intellectual processes, and any artist will tell you that the burden of meanings which colors and tones carry are unintelligible so far as expression in other than aesthetic means is concerned. You can only *really* express yellow as color, there is no other way. Even the metaphorical color of tones is still color, a symbolized expression of the analogous “relation” between color and tone.

Feeling is thus the content of color and tone, and likewise the content of all objects determined by them. Hence color and tone are the special sense intuitions (they are also categories of the contemplative understanding) for aesthetic experience because, though not differing in psychological characteristics from the other sensory processes, as e. g., touch, taste, etc., they are the sense-forms that have become so clearly marked by the cognitive quality that they lead to the determination of objects by the method of categorization, that is, they lead to the cognition of objects by a characteristic set of categories, line, mass, form, etc. The other and “minor” senses lead to no special categories, hence there are no objects for taste, smell, etc. If the cognitive quality could be developed in smell to the extent it has been developed in sight there would be clearly determined objects corresponding to it, and the sense world would be represented in another object-form and the world of experience would possess another dimension. But as it is there are no objects for the “minor” senses, and we correctly look upon them as subjective, or as psychological modes of colors and tones. It is perhaps ex-

perience in its historic aspect which has led to such clarification of color and tone within the universal sensuous continuum—the circumstances of the human constitution and the structure of nature may have determined that we recognize our value world in terms of color and tone rather than in terms of taste and smell. Color and tone are then the cognitive basis of the aesthetic object and of its elementary experience structure, while we may view the tastes, smells, feels, etc., as the uncognized stuff or material that gives the structure body. Thus we speak of the warmth, sweetness, smoothness, etc., of a color in painting, or of a tone in music. They may thus be uncognized qualities of the rhythm which, as a generalized material, the categories of color and tone work into the orders, arrangements, structures, etc., of experienced objects.

But an aesthetic object is an existence. All real objects are existences, and all are also values. The orders, structure, etc., which we have just mentioned, are aspects of all objects. The “existence” of a value object is just this abstract structure or “form” (in the literal and as it were carpenter’s sense) into which feeling-content is poured to mould the total object. In specific terms this formal structure is constituted by what is generally called the “materials” of the value object; in the case of beauty objects it is determined by the qualities of the words, pigments, marble, movement, etc., which the different types of beauty object elect for their embodiment or “expression.”

Feeling, as the synthesis of color and tone into the whole of Color-Tone, is an elemental and substantial constituent of the universe. The unity of the synthesis is maintained in rhythm, and it is as rhythm that the primordial feeling is experienced. Feeling is individuated in the objects of art and nature where it appears to the subjective emotion of the individual as beauty and the other aesthetic forms. Feeling is the analogue of matter or existence, which is constituted, analogously to feeling, in the infinite whole of Space-Time as the unity of space and time. Matter or existence is individuated in the objects of physical nature where it appears to the intellect of the individual in logical forms, and these are mediated in the sphere of experience as motion. The world as experienced is the synthetic unity by analogy of motion and rhythm; the world as real and presupposed in all experience is the identity by analogy of the spheres of nature and culture,

or, in terms of its metaphysical substance, of existence and value. Existence and value are made intelligible in and by systems of determining or constitutional categories; the categories of existence are formulated in logic and science; the categories of value are as yet unsystematized in the cultural disciplines; it is the purpose of this essay to find systematic wholeness for the aesthetic categories, on the assumption that they are at least typical of, if not logically prior and basic to, the categories of all the cultural disciplines.

CHAPTER V

THE PERCEPTION OF VALUE OBJECTS

THE perception of value is the contemplative apprehension of an object through the forms of color and tone. There is little to be done in the way of description of the psychological processes involved, and there is no important aspect of the perception process that can be objectively described. The function of perception is to constitute objects of experience, consequently it does not give us images of its own procedures, but only of the entities that have been brought to determinate form at the conclusion of these processes. And as it is the object that issues from the process that is important, it is the object that is the proper subject of discussion. Moreover, since in the process of perception we are not directly aware of the nature of the process but only of its object, we have to proceed on the assumption that the object is such as the process which produces it is fitted to produce, and then infer the nature of the process from the character of the object which it determines. The statement of the theory of perception is then the description of the whole logical process of determination of the perceptual object, with its systems of categories and its elaborate inferences as to the relations of these categories to each other and to the whole which they create. We shall be concerned with these categories throughout the rest of this book.

The theory of perception is the logic by which the nature of the perceptual object is exhibited. The theory of the perception of the aesthetic object is then no description of psychological processes as experimentally derived from instances of such perception in fact. It is nothing less than the full logical account of the significance of a set of aesthetic concepts, called categories because of their position in the system, and not because they represent classes of objects existing in nature or modes of the mental processes in terms of which these objects are imaged. So it is not a description of self-existent objects assumed to have a nature independently of the process by which they are located and described. Nor is it a description of objects whose only claim to substantial status is their involvement in mental processes.

of description. The one of these is the object of physics; the other, of psychology. In any case it is "empirical." If once we can get this empirical fallacy out of our minds, or at least get our thinking extricated from its uncritical clutches, there may be some hope that the nature of the value object may begin to become clear to us. In any case all there is to do here in connection with this topic of the perception of the aesthetic object is to lay down the set of elementary assumptions which the nature of the perceptual object, as known in aesthetic experience, obliges us to make with respect to the logical process by which the object comes to be what it is.

The first of these assumptions runs to the effect that, following Kantian language, color and tone are the prehensile organs of the contemplative intuition. This is an assumption based on the fact, which can be verified universally, but not proved experimentally, that color and tone elements are always present as fundamental characters in every aesthetic object. This, we say, cannot be "proved," unless we mean by proof the citation of the inference by which the assumption is formulated. Color and tone are present in every aesthetic object because the structure of the object itself immediately implies them—they are "necessary to the concept of an object as such." But as color and tone, while thus determined objectively as substantial characters of external fact, are also present to the consciousness as substantial constituents of its immediate feeling stuff, we say that the feeling which the representations of color and tone are, in our experience, is identical with the substance of the object, and the object thus becomes identified *within* our experience and recognized as the object that it is because it is identified *with* our experience in the sense that it is found to be identical in substance with it. We have already seen in an earlier connection that any relation will become, when pressed to its logical ultimate, a relation of identity; and this principle that identity is the ultimate relation is itself perhaps a transcript of the fact as known immediately,—the fact that the object known is formally identical with the constitutional scheme in our thought by which it is known. The scepticism which many philosophers give vent to on the hopelessness of knowledge, or knowing ever becoming identical with the object known, is thus shown to be itself a crude form of empiricism: naturally you can not set up the knowing and the known at different places on a

laboratory table and then by hocus pocus compel them to become one. This *empirical* identity is, at the last, unintelligible, as indicated in the physical principle that two things cannot occupy the same space at the same time. The substantial identity which we have here described is vaguely felt by the psychological theorists, who create rhetoric in trying to find an adequate literary description. And the instinct to appeal to literary technique is sound; only the principle of that technique, the principle of identity through analogy, is not recognized.

But if now the principle of identity can itself be interpreted in accordance with the principle of analogy, and if analogy can be formulated with logical precision, the self-contradictoriness of abstract identity may be overcome. Let us then try to see what results from the attempt to bring together the two principles.

The difficulty which comes from the abstract or empirical interpretation of identity is due to the attempt to apply the principle to the relations of individuals where individuals are represented experimentally as particulars. But individuals have no relations, in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term. This is proved by the assumptions of "individualism," which represent the claims to truth which the theory expresses. For individuals can be understood, in the sense commonly intended, only when kept in complete isolation from each other. Their relations are all negative. But what is a negative relation? Is it a type of relation among others? Then it is not a negative relation. So we are left with the result that a negative relation is merely the absence of a relation. But the absence of a relation is not a relation. So individuals can not be related, and will have to be thought in terms of some other type of reference to each other. The difficulty comes from the fact that only individuals are real, which means that all relations, not holding among reals, are themselves therefore unreal. And this is the result we require. When "relations" are real they are not relations; when they are relations they are not real; for nobody but a positivist would care to argue for the reality of a relation between non-entities. The holes in two doughnuts can not even be related by another hole. In its ordinary literary and scientific use relation is hopelessly ambiguous. It will be our task to show, in the

proper place, that it is not the relationality that becomes principle, but it is ambiguity itself which has the principled character.

Then individuals are *identical*, if their mode of reference to each other can be conceived neither relationally nor non-relationally; and they can be represented as plural only on the assumption that identity itself is not a relation. We accept the latter alternative (although it is probable that the two alternatives are after all one). Identity, we will say, is not a relation; it is an analogy. Or in any case, the "relation" between reals, i. e., individuals, is not a relation in the same sense as any other relation. And the problem now becomes one of finding some real meaning for the term.

The first illustration that occurs is to suggest that since the difficulty arises from a contradiction between the individual and the concept of relation, one or the other of the contradictory terms should be given up. But this is impossible, for the very possibility of reflective thought itself rests on the assumption of things in relation. But the fact that the possibility of thought rests upon things in relation does not mean that the actuality of thought does not contain other fundamental elements besides things and relations. Then there is the possibility of something necessary to thought that is neither thing nor relation, and we find the instance of this in the universal. The universal "horse" is not a horse, nor is it a relation among horses or among any things. It is not anything, nor is it any relation among any things. So far, then, as our assumptions go, the universal is neither thing nor relation. But the universal nevertheless contemplates a plurality of things, and a plurality of things is an instance of things in relation, and the question becomes one of how a plurality of things can stand to each other in a universal when a universal is not a relation. The choice therefore is to say that the universal is either a unique relation or not a relation at all. But a unique relation is an individual, and an individual is not a relation. There remains therefore only the alternative that the universal is not a relation at all.

The universal is then an analogy. It is what it is in spite of, or perhaps because of the contradiction between unity and plurality, or, better, between uniqueness and utter indefiniteness. When therefore in perception we say "This is a rose" the judgment is a statement of the identity of the experience

out of which the judgment arises and the object which at the same time the judgment determines, and the identity is carved out of the substance of the universal, as the universal is represented in the system of logical assumptions which makes the total situation intelligible. But this judgment "This is a rose" is an identity, and as such and because of its plurality and inner diversity it is the design of the inner structure of an individual, and the judgment has created something real. The point for emphasis here is that it is a contemplative judgment in which the ultimate identity which is analogy is accomplished, and it is accomplished in this judgment and not in the discursive because the contemplative judgment creates within a medium of feeling, and the stuff of feeling becomes the material essence of the object created. The fact that we just now described this medium as a system of logical assumptions means that we were describing its intellegibility; now, when we state it in terms of feeling, we are exhibiting it as the essential objectivity which grounds it as real. The discursive judgment abstracts from, withdraws itself away from, the feeling medium, does so by cultivating the abstract character of clearness of cognition, and so lacks any substance for the creation of an object, and is limited to the creation of the abstract design of an object in general. The universal that becomes the principle of the discursive judgment is the universal of empty quantity and abstract extensity, and an object, which is individual when real, is never attained but only the abstract and formal or conceptual design of an object.

Perception, then, as the act of the contemplative experience, is the apprehension of an object as an individual. The discursive experience apprehends an object *as such*, that is, in the abstract, the empty and formal design of an individually real thing. This is the reason why the realist theory of perception can never find a place for quality. And the theory of perception in any case is merely the tracing of the processes and relations involved in the structure and nature of the object. Where the object is of no *kind*, that is, represents abstractly what design all kinds of objects must satisfy, but specifies nothing in particular, we have the discursive judgment involving the perception of mere truth. Where on the other hand the object specifies, by virtue of a content derived from the medium in which it was formulated, the individuate type to which it belongs, it is said to *mean* something or to

have value. The object is not now perceived as an instance of truth but as an instance of worth, and while both truth and worth will inhere on occasion in the same thing, they can be recognized as inhering in the same thing by no relation discoverable between its truth aspects and its worth aspects, but only on the basis of analogy. This analogy then becomes the basis of the reality of the object, or the objectivity of the real, and the rhetoric which perfectly formulates the analogy becomes the logic of value. This rhetoric has its categories, the categories of analogy, corresponding in a way to the categories of relation in the logic of truth, and the complete account of perception for the theory of value is the development of the system of these categories. This account is given in later chapters.

The discussion of perception thus makes necessary the recognition of the value object as the major problem in aesthetics. The object is determined in perception; the truth-object as the expression of the abstract *process* of perception, and the value-object as the manifestation of the concrete content of perception. We must now try to see what the value object is when considered as a constituent of the world of culture, for it is evident that this larger value "cosmos," or valent system (restoring the obsolete sense of the English word valent, *valeo*, to signify, to be worth) lays down the conditions for perception, and thus it is this system that determines the object through the experience processes in the individual. What we want to know then is: What are the universal conditions of value objects?

The value object will be an existent object in any case, and its characters as existent have been briefly indicated in the discussion above. Its categories are for the most part the abstract qualities and relations represented in the schemes of science and generalized in formal logic. We can therefore take it for granted that, *as an existent*, the value object is already known in so far and as adequately as it is possible to present human knowledge. But the object as a value still awaits its "science," i. e., it still is without the system of constitutional categories necessary for a full comprehension of its nature. As we have already said, this is our major task, and we must move on to that task soon. And once the categories of value are discovered, their "relations," if there are such, must be traced out. The categories of the valent system are

the conditions of the value object. The value object will, then, presuppose the object as existent, and this presupposition as an inference-form is the subject-matter of metaphysics. Its structural characters, or content characters, color and tone, will presumably have some reference of some kind to the structural or content characters of the existent object, space and time. We shall assume at once that this "relation" is one of analogy, and will later point out the relation as the internal principle of the self-identity of the speculative object, in which the existent object, with its content of space-time, and the value object, with its content of color-tone, are brought together in the ultimate or individual Real. As this task has never since Plato and Aristotle and the scholastic theologians been seriously attempted, it will be found to be of extreme complexity and difficulty. The result may be anticipated here by saying that this ultimate identity is reached through the harmonizing the concepts of existence with those of value under the authority of concepts of method, the final harmony being effected when the two methodological concepts of ambiguity and cumulation are brought to logical synthesis in the constitutional concept of analogical identity. It must be stated here also that the synthesis does not in any sense involve the existential relation of causal dependence; the existent does not "depend on" the valent, and the valent does not "depend on" the existent. The "relation" involved in the final synthesis is one of mutuality, which again raises a difficult problem, for "relation of mutuality" is a self-contradictory expression. But we can here avoid full discussion of this problem with the remark, found as a conclusion of the investigation of the problem, that the existent and the valent can be symbolized as standing to each other as form and content.

Now the problem of the nature of the value concepts and of their "relations" (the term "relations" means, of course, the analogies) to the existence concepts becomes the problem of the principle of the objectivity of value. Then we may approach the problem by a sort of Kantian method, assuming that the objectivity of value is a valid assumption if the conditions of its possibility can be pointed out in terms of logic, and then can be discovered in the concrete facts of experience where the possible becomes the actual. We may then ask, How are value objects possible?

We know that objects in experience are in general, i. e., abstractly, possible because of the *a priori* capacity of mind to form them. But this general *a priori* capacity is a synthetic symbol of a series of capacities corresponding to the several types of objects in experience, so the question becomes one of deducing a set of capacities or categories. That is, the problem of value objects is one of determining the *a priori* forms of functions of thought through which the elementary color-tone content of experience is transformed into objects. These forms are the categories of value. The most persistent difficulty lies in the fact that language is fitted and adapted primarily for the description and formulation of the objects of the natural world, existent objects, while we shall require a set of words whose primary objective reference is to the objects and "relations" of the value world, valent objects. This difficulty is doubled in the fact that every value object is an existence, and every existence a value object in some sense and degree. Our terms must necessarily be such as to do justice to one of these systems of the great cosmos while not violating or misrepresenting the other, and as a consequence every major term we shall use will be subject to a variety of interpretations centering around the distinction between existence and value. This is the ground of the principle of ambiguity, the methodological basis of the principle of the self-identity of the real.

The concepts which seem to be necessary and sufficient for the organization of ideas of value fall into two classes. One class of concepts have their major implications of meaning in their reference to the modes and processes by which mind or thought approaches value objects; the other group have their reference most emphatically to the nature and character of the objects which are conceived to "express" value. In addition to this difficulty there is the further and more serious problem of terminology involved in the fact that every value object is an existence, so that every value term must provide in its meaning for such aspects of existence as is necessary to make it intelligible as the basis of the value factors which it is its primary purpose to express. This double dichotomy of meaning of aesthetic categories makes discussion extremely difficult when one is interested in logical clearness and precision. But the fact that the same shiftiness of

meaning is the basis of the variety and richness of imagery upon which the artistic or aesthetic use of language depends leads almost irresistably to the aesthetic use of language in aesthetic discussion, where it is in a peculiar way necessary to be clear if our ideas are to avoid confusion. That is, it is difficult for the writer on aesthetic subjects to keep in mind the distinction between *clearness of ideas* in the appeal to the intellect, which is the basis of *aesthetic discussion*, and *clearness of impressions* in the appeal to the contemplation, which is the medium of *artistic expression*. The consequence is that much aesthetic writing is artistic expression rather than aesthetic discussion, which does not tend to the creation or clarification of a terminology for logically precise use in this connection.

While the examples of Aristotle and Kant should make one wary in proposing a fixed list of categories, I suggest nevertheless that the following list of terms may be used to represent the ideas and concepts of aesthetic discussion, at least it will serve as a tentative list until a better can be devised. The first group of terms have appeared to me necessary for methodological purposes, and the second a little less certainly necessary for strictly logical purposes. The categorial use of language cannot of course be restricted to any fixed system of concepts, and as knowledge of aesthetic subjects becomes more extensive and significant the "table of the categories" will be required to expand. The perception of beauty thus requires the elaborate logical machinery which we have attempted to describe, or some other and better if it can be formulated. In our discussion the categories are:

I. Methodological	II. Logical	III. Objective
Appropriateness	Color	Line
Ambiguity	Tone	Mass
Analogy	Color-Tone	Form
Cumulation	Rhythm	Design
	(Feeling)	(Individual)

The logical categories determine every aesthetic object in accordance with the principles represented in the methodological categories; and every object determined by the logical categories and in accordance with these principles is an aesthetic object. When the determination takes place in con-

sciousness under conditions to be specified later, it constitutes an aesthetic experience, an act of the contemplative intuition, the perception of the value object. The experienced object can be recognized by the characters represented in the objective categories.

There is a general correspondence between the groups of concepts in the list of value concepts and the groups of concepts in the list of the concepts of existence, so that the logic of value and the logic of existence represent once more, in their "relation," the fact that the principle of analogy is of the broadest universality, and thus a principle of methaphysics. The concepts of the methodology of value logic correspond closely to the Laws of Thought of the logic of truth or existence. What we have called the logical value concepts correspond to the material concepts of existence, and our list of objective value categories are correlates of the causal-substantial categories of existence. We can therefore write the lists in corresponding columns thus:

Concepts of Value Logic Concepts of Existence Logic

Appropriateness	Consistency
Ambiguity	Contradiction
Cumulation	Continuity
Analogy	Identity
Color	Space
Tone	Time
Color-Tone	Space-Time
Rhythm	Motion
(Feeling)	(Matter)
Line	Cause
Mass	Substance
Form	Structure
Design	Order
(Individual)	(Purpose)

The concepts of Feeling, Matter, Individual, and Purpose are written in parentheses to show that they are, strictly, summative each of its preceding list of four concepts, and that each is in reality merely the experience-form of its preceding concept. Thus, Feeling is Rhythm *as experienced*;

Matter is Motion *as experienced*; Individual is Design *as experienced*; and Purpose is Order *as experienced*. These are then rather conceptions of epistemological method than genuine concepts of logic.

CHAPTER VI

THE METHODOLOGICAL CATEGORIES

By A methodological concept we mean one which does not refer to objects in the ordinary sense, but to the major types of established processes or phases of the act through which mind passes in the comprehension of objects. In the sense that anything to which mind directs its attention is an object, these processes are objects. But we are distinguishing object here primarily on the basis of its being outside of and external to the mind that comprehends it. In reality this over-against relation of mind to object is a fiction dictated by the necessity that the existence of the object demands its representation in time and space. In a relational logic, where objects are not restricted to existence, objectivity is itself a methodological device erected into an axiom. The relatively fixed logical processes which are in question here are not objects, although they are the "objects" of our attention in the processes by which we describe them. The assumption we are making here is that there are certain processes and attitudes involved in the mind's apprehension of an aesthetic object that are not to be found in the apprehension of the ordinary objects of existence; or, if not distinct and peculiar processes and attitudes, at least some that are used in a way so different from their ordinary use as to make them for practical purposes unique. We have already seen reasons for drawing a rather sharp distinction between the ordinary cognition or intuition, and the contemplative cognition or intuition, and we have related this far-reaching division of functions of mind to the metaphysical distinction between the two "worlds" of existence and value. It appears then justifiable to assume that mind approaches its object by different methods or by exercising different modes of its cognitive power, when it apprehends an object of science, from those methods or modes it uses in connection with the aesthetic object. And it would seem possible to describe some of these modes and methods in such a way as to give light on the nature of the aesthetic experience and the nature of the aesthetic object.

I Appropriateness

We have already made use of this conception in at least one earlier connection, and will be making such use of it in later connections that it is desirable to state its meaning as clearly as possible. The term has a general value implication. By this I mean that its first suggestion is a reference to the appreciating, esteeming, prizing, of objects, and these attitudes all imply that an object is involved some of whose characters make a peculiar connection with the person or mind that is apprehending the object. This is of course different from the ordinary scientific or most prevalent attitude, since in most cases the object of our apprehension has its characteristics, and the characteristics have their appeal to us, from some relation in which the object stands to other objects. The whole situation, object related to object, is outside and external to and beyond the contact of the mind for which the objects are there and are related, and each of the three elements in the situation has its meaning without involving the mind that apprehends the situation. But in a value situation the basic element of meaning, at least so far as meaning is a function of mental processes, appears to be a reference of the nature of the object to the apprehending mind of the appreciator, the reference being altogether due to the character of the object. This is probably the reason why many aesthetic theorists undertake to explain the aesthetic experience, and sometimes also the object, in terms of interest, where interest appears to mean just this backward reference to the experiencing agent.

But there is this difficulty to be observed. It appears equally or perhaps more accurate to say that beauty has its meaning precisely in the absence of this interest relation. One of the outstanding theories is to the effect that beauty is precisely disinterestedness, and in other subjective theories other terms which seem to mean the same lack of interest are made to represent the essence of beauty. Such concepts as "psychic distance," "repose," etc., seem to imply just the absence of a personal reference as uniquely the feature that distinguishes beauty. As a consequence we shall have to face the possibility that the distinction of value phenomena from existence phenomena cannot be made to rest on the reference to the apprehending subject, but shall have to agree that some value objects, and particularly beauty objects, get their character-

istics from a situation just as impersonal and "objective," and as lacking in subjective reference as the situation that uniformly is made up of existent objects and their relations. That is to say that value judgments must have an objectivity and independence just as definitely as do judgments of existence, and the question then becomes one of determining whether the objectivity must be the same in the two cases, or whether each may have its objectivity after its kind. We shall assume that the basis of objectivity is different in the two cases, that the objectivity of existence rests upon a foundation distinct from that upon which rests the objectivity of value.

It will thus be necessary to distinguish these two bases, by whatever methods we may be able to find. What then is the basis in each case?

As the first consideration it would seem to be necessary to ask what is meant by a basis of objectivity in any case. We are reminded of the Kantian universality, but there are many difficulties which have been so often pointed out as to be unnecessary to mention. The naive realistic basis of objectivity in sense-perception also requires no discussion. And the more sophisticated realistic basis in a system of physical postulates has brought the charge of subjectivism. The mystic "presence" would seem also to require no argument. The only argument that appears to stand the test of time, is the original one of Plato, as developed by his idealistic successors. In this tradition, if I understand it on this point, the basis of objectivity, which means reality, is the necessity (logical) of the substance-attribute situation, in which there is an internal or self-necessity attaching to the mutual reference of substance and attribute, where their unity is the point of emphasis; and an external and causally implicative necessity involved in the relation between substance and attribute, where the emphasis is upon their difference. In any case the objectivity of the situation is totally independent of the incidence of a mind which apprehends it, and lies uniquely within the situation without any implication of mind either in the abstract or in the individual case. That is, it can be conceived as totally independent in every way of the mind by which it is conceived. What we mean then in general by objectivity, is a function of this substance-attribute relation, since this relation by which an attribute attaches to a substance, or a substance implies an attribute, predetermines the concept of being by determining

the meaning that the connective in a judgment can have, that is to say, it determines the meaning of the existential verb by which a judgment is expressed.

Then the question comes to be one of whether there is more than one possible type of relation between the substance and the attribute, and the answer to it will appear to depend upon a fundamental distinction to be made within the nature of the judgment function. Can the "existential" verb of the judgment be ambiguous, mean two *kinds* of things? I believe it can.

The question is one as to the nature of the relation between the substance and the attribute of the substance—we are asking if there is any sense to the question of the *nature* of the relation between substance and attribute, and, if so, are there a number of possible senses attributable to the relation. Ordinarily, I suppose, the relation of attribute to its substance is supposed to be immediate in the sense that there is no distance or distinction between them, which begins to look like the assumption of two unrelated entities within the same universe of discourse. And this seems contradictory. Apparently there must be some way of assuming a relation between substance and attribute, for otherwise there would be no relation of subject and predicate, and this would mean that thinking negates itself. These problems are not ordinarily faced, since they would arise only in a purely theoretical connection, and only in those theoretical connections which concern logical ultimates. The interpretation of the relation as one of identity raises the difficulty as to how there can be two things which are one under the condition of existence, and then the question becomes one as to whether there are a plurality of realms of existence, or whether some realm may exist coordinately to existence yet different in nature from it. If it is suggested that this assumes attributes of existence, while existence is a mere abstraction and does not possess attributes, the reply is that if existence is a pure abstraction then it is useless for all possible purposes, since a pure abstraction is self-contradictory, in that it implies a meaning for what is by definition meaningless. It is necessary therefore to think of some concrete character as belonging to the relation between substance and attributes, and we may inquire what that character is.

Perhaps the common way to think of the relation is in

terms of the attribute as "belonging to" or "inhering in" the substance. And this seems to involve the logic of quantity or at least the logic of extension to make it mean anything at all. As a matter of fact the ordinary interpretation of the relation, when it is considered at all, is in terms of the inclusion-exclusion scheme of formal logic. But it is clear that this imposes upon the relation of substance to attribute the limitation to existence, and equally clear that no such relation could be postulated in connection with a consideration of values. The assumption that values are purely subjective and internal, in the psychological sense, would seem to indicate that they could have no relation to concepts so fundamental in logic as those of substance and attribute, and that a psychology of values is the only consistent account that can be given of them. Values then have no objective reality; the relation of substance to attribute is an objective (existential) relation; hence values have nothing to do with such fundamentals. But on the assumption that values have a reality co-ordinate to that of existence the substance-attribute relation would become important at once in the discussion of values. And it would appear to be necessary to find an interpretation of the relation that would not be limited to existence and extension.

Such a relation we have, I am convinced, when we think substance-attribute in terms of their appropriateness to each other. It may be sufficient for mere existential logic to say that the red of the rose inheres in or belongs to the rose, or that three-sidedness belongs to or inheres in the concept of triangle. Such attributes may be regarded as "immediate" to that to which they belong or in which they inhere; but in that case the attribute must be interpreted as unreal in so far as it is thought of as other than the substance. And the "reality" of the quality will itself be extremely hard to explain. On the realistic assumption that quality is intrinsic it is difficult to see what intrinsic could mean except *intrinsic to* that in which the quality inheres. But if red is intrinsic *to* the rose, does this mean dependent upon the rose, and, if so, could it be real in any sense? But if red is real on its own ground, then how it could belong to anything is unexplained. And if it is dependent on a substance, how can it be a universal in the sense that it is a quality that can belong to many substances independently of each other, as yellow may qualify roses, buttercups, dandelions, gold, and so forth?

But if red is *not* other than the substance in some sense then the use of it as qualifying the substance is meaningless. The predicate "existence," even trinagularity, etc., may add nothing to the concept of the subject, but red either does add something to the rose or its use is meaningless. This absurdity seems avoidable on the assumption of the relation of fitness or appropriateness as expressing the nature of the substance-attribute relation where the universe of discourse is other than existence. Red is "fit" to rose, or is appropriate to it; and what we mean is that rose is *such as* requires red. Red then "belongs to" rose, but it does so *because* it is what it is, and if it were not red it would not be what could belong to rose. The fact of belonging seems to have a reason, and the reason lies in the nature of rose and the nature of red. This reference to the nature of rose and the nature of red suggests the principle of identity which we discussed in another connection. Rose and red are not two things, but one. There must be an important sense in which "the rose is red" is equivalent to "the rose exists," since nothing beyond rose is referred to in either case, and it is obvious that any reference beyond rose in either case is not intended. Both judgments express the self-identity of the rose, with the implication of the principle of appropriateness or mutuality among its parts which makes its self-identical individuality intelligible. But such reference beyond rose is not merely not intended; it is just as plainly apparent that the limitation of reference to rose *is* intended in both cases; that is, it is a part of the positive meaning of both predicates not to make a reference beyond the subject, but to confine the reference strictly to the subject. In this case, and in this type of case, the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic judgment does not hold, and shows that we are not dealing with the narrow universe of discourse restriction to which was what made it possible for Kant to give the distinction importance. Kant's universe of discourse is *within* existence, applies to judgments all of which derive their meaning from the set of presuppositions which determine existence. Our universe of discourse, when we supersede the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, includes other (possible) realms co-ordinate to existence but within the same whole with it, so that our principle of distinction refers in one direction to the realm of existence and in another direction to a different realm. So with the principle of appropriateness

as embodied in the substance-attribute relation; the "is" in "the rose is red" refers to existence in one direction and to a different sphere, value, in another. It expresses a fitness that makes the concept of a world intelligible in a higher sense than the mere mechanical intelligibility of existence by itself.

Perhaps this can be made clearer through examples. The confusion of universes of discourse may be represented in terms of the confusion of "red" with 'color.'" And it is clear that "red" is, in every case where properly used, an example of what we shall describe below as the "principle of ambiguity." For it is clear that "red" means, in any and every use, both "color" in the sense that a substance possesses a characteristic common to all substances of a type, and "color" in the specific sense of a particular and unique, i. e., individual quality of something given immediately in perception. Then "the rose is red" means "the rose has color" and "the rose has the specific and particular hue which you see in this presentation." There is no such thing as a red color, nor such a thing as red considered as a universal; red is always individual, some particular and unique shade or hue within the universe of color. But color is a universal, or the universality of an individual, that is, it is substantially real; so that it is color as the universality of red that identifies with the substance to which it is referred. An attribute is then appropriate to its substance through the universal that is common to or identical in both, and the relation of appropriateness is by analogy identical with the existential relation within a universe that includes both.

Thus we have the relation of appropriateness or fitness as the analogical identity of an attribute with its substance in the universe of value. To say the "rose is red" and "the rose exists" is to name two perfectly parallel judgments which are identical, as instances of a type of judgment, but which nevertheless refer to quite distinct, and easily distinguishable, universes of discourse. The one is a judgment of value, refers to the real in terms of the realm of feeling; the other is a judgment of existence and refers to the real in terms of the realm of cognition. But this is putting the case in terms merely of epistemology, from the point of view merely of states and attitudes of mind involved in the *process* of judgment, and is not logically conclusive. The one judgment, as a judgment of a value, with logical and ontological implica-

tions, is a constitutional reference to the reality of color-tone, as color and tone fuse in rhythm and become experience in feeling. The other, as an ontological reference, is a judgment of existence, a structural reference to space-time as these fuse in matter (motion, in the abstract) and become experience in movement. Formal logic and "science" generally refer to the latter realm; real logic and "practice" refer to the former.

II Ambiguity

The principle of ambiguity means that every logical category of value expresses two *kinds* of meaning, refers to two distinguishable universes of discourse, the universe of existence and the universe of feeling. And the two meanings are present together in every use of the category—it is not meant that the category has one meaning in one connection and another in another connection, both meanings are present together in any and every case where the term is used as a value category. Ambiguity of value categories is thus a logical consequence of the principle of appropriateness as the latter rests on the substance-attribute "relation." This principle of ambiguity will be explained in detail in the discussion of the categories severally, and here we need only give the general implications of the two kinds of things that each category means.

We have already seen how an aesthetic object is both an existent object and a value object, how all objects are determined both by existential and value characters. Every object of experience can be explained through the terms of the classification schemes of the "sciences," that is to say that every object of experience gets its signification as a natural fact through the representation of it in terms of quantity, quality, cause, time, space, etc. And for purposes of contemplation of the object, the same object, there exists a set of terms more or less adequate through which the object is represented as a fact of value. That is to say, it is possible, or will be possible when the categories are determined, to give an adequate expression of the significance of the object in terms of form, line, mass, color, tone, etc. If it is possible to reduce this system of ideas to complete clarity of meaning, each being rendered individually clear and the entire system made clear in terms of the relations among the various ideas, and if the idea of their individuate order can be made definite, then the representation of the object as an object of value will have the same

"certainty" and the same *kind* of certainty as its representation as an object of existence. In any case the logic of value will be just as "necessary" as the logic of existence when its elements are worked out with the care they deserve. Any object of experience, then, belongs to two realms of meaning *at the same time*, and every thought-device used to describe or formulate or represent it, will have a double meaning derived from the double reference it makes to the realms of existence and value. Kant has vaguely appreciated this fact in his conception of Amphiboly, only the distinction between the realms, and the definition of the realms, are not clearly drawn, and are confused with the false assumption that runs throughout his work, viz., that in order that any term be given its essential meaning it must first and ultimately be reconciled to psychological limitations. He is too much obsessed with the "possibility of knowledge" in its subjective form, and forgets that anything that is real, even a state of mind, can be formulated as knowledge objectively and independently of states of mind, and must be so formulated before it begins to have the features of truth.

The ambiguity of value concepts then refers to the fact that every category in every use carries implicatory references to both the realm of existence and the realm of value at the same time. We shall see also that the value categories have a double reference within the realm of value, and it is through this that their reference to existence is mediated.

In the specific case this ambiguity can be very well represented as the distinction commonly made between the figurative and the literal in the literary form. Thus Holmes' "silence like a poultice comes" has a clear literal reference to definite existential phenomena as made evident to experience through tactual imagery, and this aspect of meaning can be more or less satisfactorily expressed in ordinary scientific terms of quantity, time, color (physical), etc. But there is in the phrase the more obvious elements of feeling value in the soothing and comforting which cannot be represented in literal or existential language, and must be ushered into our consciousness through such vicarious representation as the quality of the feeling demands. This vicarious and precarious representation is what we mean by the figurative. Its logical basis is analogy. It is even useful to extend the distinction to that which we may describe as the figurative on the one side and

the figurate or the configure on the other, especially when we are thinking of that which is represented and are trying to give to it some definiteness by which its permanence in experience is to be assured.

But there is a still more important distinction to be made. When we speak of color, for instance, in the artist's usage, we find we may go back and forth between two distinct meanings which nevertheless seem mutually to be involved in each other. When color refers to an expanse of grass or to a tree mass it has its definite aspects of size, degree, quantity, or the literal characters; and it has other features, not so easily named, which accrue to it by virtue of its relations to other phenomena in the total situation, that is, it has qualities which depend not upon its literal or existential appearance but upon the configuration of the whole of which it is a part. A blue which has a definite value when standing alone will acquire different value effects when taken in connection with other colors, line combinations, forms, masses, etc., that is, it has characters vicariously, or better, precariously (in the literal sense of "by another's will"), through the individuate wholeness of the object to which they all belong. For the expression of these values in language we must resort to circumlocution, for the reason that language has developed primarily as a practical (literal) instrument and therefore is premised on the existential world in almost an exclusive way. And the far-fetchedness of many figurative expressions has become an element in their value-meaning just for the reason that creative activity is required to make the relation represented assume any definiteness of form at all. Also, the incongruousness of some suggested figurate relations has something to do with the various forms of the comic, and in a profound sense this incongruity appears to assume substance in tragedy in such a way as to attribute irrationality to any world we can think.

The many different ways in which the distinction between the literal and the figurative may appear in value situations—some form of the distinction will appear as a part of the essence of every value experience because of the essential mutuality of existence and value—indicates the fundamental importance of the concept of ambiguity, and suggests the part it is to play in the interpretation of the logical categories of value in our scheme. If we ask for a statement of the nature of the relation between existence and value as manifest in the

literal and the figurative, we shall be brought back once more to the general metaphysics upon which our value theory rests to give an account of space-time-matter in "relation" to color-tone-feeling. But "relation" here is a mode of reference which has its meaning in the inner nature of the two realms, in their mutuality of reference, and has no meaning as a mere connection. Real relations are not made, they are. That is to say, the fundamental "relation" in value metaphysics is analogy, and this is not a connection, but a principle of unity and individuality.

III Analogy

It is here the purpose merely to lay down the more general characters of the "relation" of analogy, since, here again, it is hoped, the detail of the idea will become clear in the specific applications of it later. Already the original import of the concept has been stated when we spoke of the relation of "subject" and "object" in perception, and of that between the realm of color-tone-rhythm (Feeling) and the realm of space-time-motion (Matter). There is still left, however, the necessity to point out a further difference between analogy, in the sense we are using it, and relation, as the term applies to other modes of reference than analogy. In the ordinary case of relation one term is related to the other through a suggestive reference to a third something, a "point of reference," as when we say that one object is to the right of another the rightness has what meaning it has through the suggestion to this third thing, which in this case is the position at which the speaker stands. "New York is east of San Francisco" involves a reference of both terms to a common basis, and except with reference to this basis "east" has no meaning. Even in more abstract relations, as "like" and "different" there seems to be no way of imaging or even thinking them except in terms of a reference to something else than the things compared. Things are alike in terms of quantity, size, color, age, etc., and nothing is like anything in the abstract.

But the "relation" of analogy raises the question whether the reference involved in analogy may not be direct and not mediated through anything not actually stated or expressed in the formulation of the relation. It would seem that, by the mere limitations of the quantitative possibilities, the "third thing" would somewhere be exhausted, and there would be

two things left which were related or had some mode of mutual reference without the intervention of anything. This infinite "point of reference" is, by the way, a difficult problem for the relativity doctrine. Of course it is a question of what is to be the meaning of relation; and to develop and formulate a doctrine of "relativity" which does not somewhere depend upon the infinity of process, the abstract infinity, the *regressus ad infinitum*, becomes the metaphysical difficulty. Either relation, as a character of the real world, is concrete and capable of being instanced in individuate form, that is to say, is a *reality* on its own basis, a substance; or it is a pure symbol signifying nothing except the endlessness of process, and in this case it has become a mere form of language with no meaning attributable to it except its abstract meaninglessness. That is to say, process, when it has *any* meaning, and steadfastness or permanence, when it and process both refer to the reality, have the absoluteness of their difference overcome in the analogical self-identity of substance with attribute, where permanence *means* reality and process means the capacity of reality to exist in or as modes of value. Here "*reality existing as a mode of value*" states the fundamental essence of substance, states, that is, a definition of reality itself. That is to say, somewhere relation must *become* the real *if there is to be any real in relation*, and we have found this point in the case where existence-substance and value-substance coalesce in the same object through the relation of an identity, where to say "*plurality becomes unity*" is the same thing as to say "*unity is plurality*." This is the corporate individual in which all attributes are appropriate to their substance, in which all "relations" are aspects of its self-identity and, in this identity, relation has overcome its dependence on a "beyond-reference" as well as its dependence upon the disparity of its terms, and *is* an analogy. Analogy is then an instanced or realized or individuate relation, a case where all the meaning of relation, the universal of all modes of reference, is represented in a case of a law, and this identity of thing with its own law is what we mean by reality. And here relation as realized in analogy has nothing whatever to do with "connection" or with "points of reference," and relativity appears as the abstraction that it is; although we do not mean to belittle the "discoveries" of our great scientists, without which life would be minus some of its nobler delectation. As a consequence of the fact that

analogy is a synthesis of all meanings of relation, there is only one instance of genuine analogy, that "relation" by which the real constitutes itself a corporate individual. We say something like this when we speak of the uniqueness of a picture or of its individuality; it is a picture which is like itself, existing as a value by a law of its own, a law instancable in no other case in the universe, a case of individuate law where the law is itself the reality. And the individuate corporeity in which it is realized is the objectivity of the law, its reality as an object.

What must be kept in mind here is that while the language which describes value categories is essentially figurative or configurative it is not "rhetoric" in the sense that rhetoric is a dependence upon merely phenomenal aspects of things. "Literal" has an abstractly narrow existential meaning only. A properly figurative expression is true, and is literally true, where literally means true to the letter, that is, true without restriction, but this does not justify the loose language which merely repeats isolated qualities or suggests abstract quality relations. Quality, it must be kept in mind, is an existential fact, just as stubborn and hard as quantity or momentum, and we do not go beyond the sphere of existence by finding a way over from quantity to quality, as in degree. For degree is a pure existential category—in the realm of values there are no degree relations, since everything is individual. This hue is not a degree-difference between two other hues; but itself a hue; it is the hue that it is, without reference to other hues, and solely by virtue of the corporate analogy by which its character is made characteristic, that is to say, by which its substance is identified with its attribute, the attribute being in this case quality of color. But the hue *is* the substance. We say the hue *is* quality, its substance and its attribute are analogous, it does not *have* or possess quality. The arrangement of colors on a scale or spectrum, or the display of tones in a scale, is a pure determination of existence characters, and depends, in the case of color, upon the analogy to space, and in the case of tone, upon the analogy to time. Pitch, after all, so far as it is in any way represented, is a distinction resting finally upon time, and it is only through space and time and their existential characters that any *formal* expression of pitch is possible, although when we come to discuss form we shall find the suggested analogous or figurative meaning of form

difficult to state. In fact it will be hard to state just because of what we are asserting here, that is, that *any statement* of anything depends finally upon the reference to existence, while in theory the figurative or "formal" aspect of form is purely ideal. But this meaning of form, and its suggestion or involvement of design, will have its own place in the discussion.

It is at least evident that the concept of analogy is fundamental in any discussion of values, and that it is also necessary that the concept be given definiteness of meaning as the internal law of the value object, in whose content or meaning are included all "relations" or modes of reference as the substance of an individuate whole. For us here analogy has its meaning in its being the mode of inter-reference of existence and value as they constitute reality.

IV Cumulation

What is peculiar to the system of value categories is the fact that there is a one-way continuity of meaning "relation" running through the entire structure of the system, such that the position within the system occupied by any category is fixed and its relations to other categories determined by the nature which the structure of the system constitutes. This systematic character of the categories is a function of the fact that the value object is always an individual. Hence the object is such as to predetermine the order of the categories according to which it is constituted, that is, the relations of the categories within the system are predetermined in the idea or design of the object before it exists. The object, it will be recalled, has an analogical identity, i. e., substance, independent of existence, although it may not be corporately real except through the system of existential categories. And the difference in nature between one value object and another is determined by the varying emphasis placed upon the different categories and relations within the system, and not by a point of reference outside. Or, the same fact may be stated in the reverse: the varying emphasis placed upon different categories within the system determines the peculiar individuality of the object and its type as a value object. And the point of emphasis is itself determined by the nature of the categories in the system and the relation of cumulation among them. This last statement is seen to be the controlling principle in the distinction of types of aesthetic object, e. g., beautiful, tragic, comic, etc., where

each of the types is seen to be an embodiment of some sort of emphasis upon the category that is characteristic of the type. The sublime e. g., is what it is, and differs from other types, in the fact that in its constitution there is an emphasis upon, or an exaggeration of, the characteristic mass.

It was noted just now that the relations within the system of value categories, which constitute the system, are all one-way relations, that they all tend toward the individuality which they constitute, or all are instances of the general function of direction. This fact, as we shall see, shows that the concept of line, e. g., runs through the set of categories in the determination of any aesthetic object. It is because of this fact that the categories determine an individual and not a mere space-determined form of existence. Where the relational tendencies are to come out is foreordained in the constitutional structure of the individual they embody. The categories of existence have no system, and their relations no direction, for the reason that the objects they prefigure are of no constitution, have no universal form to which their relations could be determined by directions prescribed in the design of the form. There is, to be sure, a question as to whether time does not prescribe direction within the motions of existence, considering motion the principle of the relations of the categories in the existential system; but it is doubtful if time has definiteness of meaning, as a category, sufficient to justify such an emphasis. Bergson's failure to connect time with any system, his tendency to make time a *deus ex machina* or an extraneous absolute with respect to the system whence it gets what meaning it has, deprives him of any such privileged use of the category. And the suggestions of recent mathematics with respect to time seem to indicate that the categorial meaning of time is not what has long been supposed. There is doubt of the irreversibility of time; so direction cannot safely be attributed to it. Or if direction be said to be relative, then no intention can be a character of any existence, so no design, so no form—and formlessness in nature would argue the irrationality that would negate the entire system of the categories of existence. The difficulty is here, of course, the assumption that time, in the abstract sense of process, is a category of the real. But the "unreality" of time has always been known to philosophers. The unreality consists in the fact that time, either alone, or through operation within the system of existential

categories, is an imperfect category, and incapable of determining an object. Except through its analogy with tone and the involvement with the system of value categories which this analogy entails, time has no objective or real significance, no power to initiate the determination of an object.

It is this one-way direction of the value categories that is peculiar. We have just noticed how it determines the final categories of design and individual, and how in these respects it distinguishes the value system from the existence system. It remains now to point out just how this is effected in the nature of the separate categories.

We see that color, when regarded as an existential quality, has the ineradicable aspect of being an attribute of something that is not color. And yet it is not a true attribute, since there are aspects of it which are substantial to other attributes. Furthermore, the substance phase and the attribute phase of color are appropriate mutually, so that the meaning of one is represented in its entirety in the other. We discover that the attribute phase of color is a relation to tone, just as the attribute phase of tone is its relation to color, and the substance phase of color a relation to rhythm such that its embodiment with tone constitutes rhythm on the principle of analogical or appropriate identity. Now the principle of identity decrees that the same description of tone can be given as is given of color, and that the description must be worded with respect to color in the same way that the description of color had to be worded in terms of tone. Then color and tone, by virtue of their relation of analogical identity, constitute rhythm. *And they constitute nothing else.* It is only rhythm that color and tone *are* related to. And the fact that they are thus related is final; there could be no other possibility because of the fact that here we are back of and below the conditions of possibility and are constructing the very grounds of the conditions of possibility. Hence the relation of color to tone, to color-tone, to rhythm—in this relation is direction determined, and in this relation only is it determined. This is the relation of Cumulation. We shall see later how this directional relation runs through the entire system of value categories and binds them irrevocably into the principle of individuality. And its significance in interpreting the various categories will be pointed out in connection with the discussion of each category. What is necessary to see here therefore is that the “relation” of

cumulation is a constitutional principle determinative of the individuate character of an object. And in that it carries with it all precedent reality, as well as anticipates all "future" or subsequent reality, it formulates the principle of the type for all objects.

It is from the point of view of these principles of Appropriateness, Ambiguity, Analogy, and Cumulation that we now have the task of undertaking to set up the system of the categories necessary to make the value object, in the instance of the aesthetic object, completely and fully intelligible. It has been assumed that the intelligibility of any object depends upon its being adequately categorized, that is, depends upon the deduction of the system of the categories necessary to the determination of that object as a factor in the constitution of things. And the method we shall pursue in the deduction of the aesthetic categories will be the one which the reality itself imposes upon us. Kant had, no doubt, thought himself to be depending upon the same reality in deducing the existential categories when he accepted the principle of the forms of judgment; but his mistake lay in failing to see that the forms of the judgment are themselves determined in the order of the categories, and the order of the categories itself determined by the nature of the categories, and this, finally, by the Object itself. We cannot go behind the nature of the categories as that nature is revealed to us; and if that nature is not clearly enough revealed as determining the relations of order, etc., of the categories themselves, then reality will forever remain hidden and the significance of values will wander into eternity upon the unstable and shifting basis of subjectivism and will appear to us only in the feeble uncertainties of our states of mind. The possibility that a stable basis may be found for value or worth will, we hope, justify the adventure among the uncertainties in the subsequent chapters.

The following chapter will introduce us to the problem of the deduction of the logical categories of value.

CHAPTER VII

COLOR

COLOR is a form of the contemplative intuition. We must keep in mind that it is not upon some unique mental capacity or process or state that we depend when we are seeking the mode of determination of the nature of objects. We do not determine the nature of the object from the characteristics of the mental process, but determine the character of the mental process from the nature of the object *a priori*. We say rather that distinctions of mental processes or states or modalities are governed by the nature of the object to be apprehended. It is not therefore a unique or specialized capacity of mind that determines that there shall be aesthetic objects. There are aesthetic objects, existing within their own substance of feeling, possessing their own natures as modalities of that substance, and with a form conditioned upon the qualities of that substance, there *in rerum natura* to which the mental act adapts itself in the event of apprehending it. Color, then, as a form of the contemplative intuition, is not a pure derivative of the abstract act or movement of thought, but a function of the mental process which has its ground in the procedure by which the process appropriates itself to the object it apprehends. It is therefore as true to say that color is a "result" or "quality" or "attribute" of the object apprehended as to say that it is derived in any way from, or belongs to, the apprehending mind. It is not an attribute or quality of anything; it is not derived from, does not belong to, anything; it is a substance which, under certain conditions, solidifies and precipitates in the experiencable fact of feeling. It is therefore not a quality of mind, or an epiphenomenon of a mental process, not a quality of material things, although in its manifestations related to them, but a substance in its own right with its own appropriate modes and relational possibilities. Its "essence" as a mode of being is its complete substantiation through appropriation to tone in feeling. Complete appropriation to tone is effected in its analogical identity with space, as we explain lower down. It is through its relations, analogical and identical, to tone, time, and space that it is substance.

When we say therefore that color is a form of the contemplative intuition we are not dealing with psychological facts, but with facts the psychological appearance of which is purely phenomenal and thus, for logical purposes, irrelevant. We are dealing with mind—the logical presupposition of psychological facts. In this sense then color is a form of the mind's intuiting function. But as a logical fact it has its own objectivity, and as such it is a category of the intellectual function by whose operation objects in general are determined. Just as space and time are forms of sense or intuition *and* categories of existence, so color, and the same is true of tone, as we shall see in the next chapter, is a form or mode of mind or a form or mode of value-prehension *and* a category of objective value. When therefore we speak of the *qualities* of color the implications of meaning are relevant to the psychological processes by which colors are apprehended *and* to the structures and relations and designs of real objects. These objects have their reality in the sphere of feeling after sensation has given feeling an independent status. The substantial status of feeling comes through the loss of the specific sensation character, when sensation elements fall into the fusion of the "common sense" in a new individuate substance. That is to say, the object, constituted of the substance which has previously been fashioned out of the fusion of sensations, is not a quality or result of the further sensations by which it is apprehended. It is not a cause of the sensations that apprehend it, nor is it an origin of them. All these relations are proper to the discursive description of existence, but in the apprehension of value, which we are here describing, existence and all its relations are presupposed and transcended, and we are dealing with the logical aspects of value where a different set of relations are involved. The psychological facts are taken for granted as present in the situations we shall have to image to ourselves, but they are present there as presuppositions which have been accepted and are not active in determining objects, which are the attainment of thought. Our account will therefore hope to be an account of elementary logical relations as they objectify against a background of psychological fact.

It is necessary to remark at the beginning that the most fundamental relation in which color stands, a relation that is

constitutional to the very idea of color, either as experience or object, is the relation of analogy to space. Color is therefore the value analogue of space, since it is in appropriation to space (with the corresponding analogous relation of tone to time) that color can take on the *being* which it has in feeling; and it is through this relation that color phenomena have the existence that makes them subject-matter of psychology and physics, and capable of investigation as ordinary natural facts. If it were not for the elementary analogy to space color would be an essentially "intelligible" object only; that is, it would be a pure concept and its formulation in experience would depend either upon the processes of discursive abstraction or upon the operation of the contemplative imagination alone. But its analogy to space (and we must remember that analogy involves substantial identity) makes it an empirical or experienceable fact, and as such proper material for investigation by the methods of natural science. It is however to be remarked that the account of color given by empirical science is only half true, that it has no *value* whatsoever except in the derived sense that any objective result of thought has formal or truth-value. But truth-value has significance only in so far as it is capable of becoming the form of a content in feeling, and until it has that content it is and remains a value only in anticipation of an object, and the object can only be attained in contemplation.

We must repeat that this relation of analogy to space is the condition of any logical investigation of color. Also we must warn that the results of empirical investigations of the relation are true only of the implicated element of *space*, and it is only in so far as the analogical relations of such results can be imaginatively realized after the results are obtained that they can have value or significance.

There are certain problems arising out of the empirical facts and relations of color that require to be examined.

Color, empirically considered, includes all the phenomena of hue, lights and shades, and brightness. In its broadest connotation it embraces all phenomena that can strictly be called visual. For many of the phenomena that are ordinarily designated visual are not light-phenomena at all or are so only in a derived sense. But for our purposes it makes no difference just what specific facts are to be described as color, since we are dealing with the general relations rather than with the

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We must repeat that this relation of analogy to space is the condition of any logical investigation of color. Also we must warn that the results of empirical investigations of the relation are true only of the implicated element of *space*, and it is only in so far as the analogical relations of such results can be imaginatively realized after the results are obtained that they can have value or significance.

There are certain problems arising out of the empirical facts and relations of color that require to be examined.

Color, empirically considered, includes all the phenomena of hue, lights and shades, and brightness. In its broadest connotation it embraces all phenomena that can strictly be called visual. For many of the phenomena that are ordinarily designated visual are not light-phenomena at all or are so only in a derived sense. But for our purposes it makes no difference just what specific facts are to be described as color, since we are dealing with the general relations rather than with the

specific qualities of color. And for this purpose the essential "quality" of color is hue.

Hue is the very stuff of color, it is the "color" of the color, it is color as experienced, and bears the same relation to color as pitch bears to sound. One of the most important questions connected with hue is the question of the order of hues, and also as to whether such order as is to be found among hues is intrinsic to the hues or is accidental. To say that there is an intrinsic order among hues is merely to recognize the fact that, when the color-idea is particularized and pluralized (it is essentially an infinite given whole), it is necessary to regard it as an organizing concept of the contemplative intelligence, and not merely as an abstract form of sense. Through its essential analogy to space, color carries hints of form in its simplest instances and applications, and it is this hint of impending form in the plurality of hues, due to the operation of the principle of cumulation, that is meant by saying that hues have an intrinsic order. On any other explanation there would be involved the mistake of regarding "order as given with the facts," as simply *another* fact, when in such a sense as ours, order is not a fact at all but a matter of principle. It is because of this principled character of color-order that it makes necessary connections through tone with line, mass, space, form, etc., and thus becomes the elementary condition for the transition from a mere subjective experience of vague feeling to a real object of value. The "intrinsicality" of the order of hues is therefore nothing more, nor less, than the total effect of the analogical references which the hue, in expressing a meaning, makes to the other concepts in the aesthetic system; it is merely the apprehended congeries of the relations of the hue, those which it must have if it is to have meaning. The hue of the color, with its aspect of order involving form, is the feeling as the material element in the contemplative act by which the object is given. This is the reason that it can be said that the given order of hues is the basis of all color structure (Prall), if it is meant by structure not mere existential arrangement but the formed design or designed form of a value object. This may also be what is meant by saying that there is an ordered structure of pure sound (tone) but no pure ordered structure of color. This raises the question as to whether such a view does not neglect the fact, or is ignorant of it, that space-time is the element of

existential ground present in every quality, or present *with* every quality in such an intimate way that it can be said that the quality exists and therefore is an element in the order of structure of every real object. In the absence of this analogy to space-time it would be difficult to imagine what any quality might be; it appears that the analogical reference to space-time is of the essence of a quality, and that differences of quality are all based upon differences in this "relation." Tone has the same ordered structure, but it is unintelligible apart from the analogical reference of tone to time and the analogical identity of tone with color, which latter gives the logical and factual ground in rhythm for all distinctions of quality whatsoever.

There is another aspect of the question of the relation of color to space described by saying that spatiality is inherent in the very perception of color. With reference to existence we are in the habit of saying that color implies space, that no color is experienceable where there is not an experienceable expanse of space. We say from this fact that existence for us is experienced as colored space; analogously, we can say that value is experienced by us as spaced color, meaning that color in the very experience of it involves the character of spatiality. Just as I cannot imagine, and never can perceive, a space which is not colored (in the broad sense where color means all light characters), so I cannot imagine, and can never perceive, a color which is not spaced. And just as in the case of existence the space is substance and the color attribute, so in the case of value the color is substance and the space is attribute. And, in the experience of a given object, which system of categorial determination is necessitated by the nature of the object is what determines whether the object is experienced as an existential or a value object. This once more is an expression of the principle of appropriateness. It is through this fact that existence and value are demonstrated the two aspects of Reality, which are not separable except by and in abstraction. Thus a fundamental metaphysics, also an intelligible epistemology, is grounded in the ontological unity of space-time with color-tone as objectified in the "relation" of analogical identity.

Thus the question of the order of hues, whether intrinsic or otherwise, leads to the question of the metaphysical substance of color in its ultimate relations. The question of

specific qualities of color. And for this purpose the essential "quality" of color is hue.

Hue is the very stuff of color, it is the "color" of the color, it is color as experienced, and bears the same relation to color as pitch bears to sound. One of the most important questions connected with hue is the question of the order of hues, and also as to whether such order as is to be found among hues is intrinsic to the hues or is accidental. To say that there is an intrinsic order among hues is merely to recognize the fact that, when the color-idea is particularized and pluralized (it is essentially an infinite given whole), it is necessary to regard it as an organizing concept of the contemplative intelligence, and not merely as an abstract form of sense. Through its essential analogy to space, color carries hints of form in its simplest instances and applications, and it is this hint of impending form in the plurality of hues, due to the operation of the principle of cumulation, that is meant by saying that hues have an intrinsic order. On any other explanation there would be involved the mistake of regarding "order as given with the facts," as simply *another* fact, when in such a sense as ours, order is not a fact at all but a matter of principle. It is because of this principled character of color-order that it makes necessary connections through tone with line, mass, space, form, etc., and thus becomes the elementary condition for the transition from a mere subjective experience of vague feeling to a real object of value. The "intrinsicality" of the order of hues is therefore nothing more, nor less, than the total effect of the analogical references which the hue, in expressing a meaning, makes to the other concepts in the aesthetic system; it is merely the apprehended congeries of the relations of the hue, those which it must have if it is to have meaning. The hue of the color, with its aspect of order involving form, is the feeling as the material element in the contemplative act by which the object is given. This is the reason that it can be said that the given order of hues is the basis of all color structure (Prall), if it is meant by structure not mere existential arrangement but the formed design or designed form of a value object. This may also be what is meant by saying that there is an ordered structure of pure sound (tone) but no pure ordered structure of color. This raises the question as to whether such a view does not neglect the fact, or is ignorant of it, that space-time is the elem-

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There is another aspect of the question of the relation of color to space, described by saying that color is not in space, but the very perception of color. We are in the habit of saying that color is experientiable where there is space. We say from this that space is experienced as colored space, and that the space experienced by us is as colored as the very experience of it. But this is as I cannot imagine, and I cannot not colored in the present sense of the characters of color. I cannot imagine color which is not colored, and I cannot value the space's substance as colored. I value the space's substance as colored in the experience of it, and I determine the experience of it as colored. I determine what determines the experience of it as colored, and I determine the principle of its existence and its reality. Reality which is the principle of its existence. Thus a fundamental analogy of color to space-time is the analogy of color to space-time.



order, perhaps in no case and certainly not here, is not intelligible as stated merely in empirical terms. As an abstract speculative problem of order it is perhaps one for mathematical theory, and has no place here.

There is however this concrete possibility. If hues were all individual, if they could be treated as value objects, then the question of their order would be formulated in one way. But hues are not individual, not value objects, but particular aspects of value objects, that is, aspects that are specified and determined by categorial relations, they are aspects of the relations that color has to tone, line, mass, etc. As a consequence, the theories which concern themselves with the question whether a plain color is beautiful, demonstrate their aesthetic character by their absurdity—they are instances of the grotesque. Unless, of course, beauty is what pleases. It is in connection with this non-individual character of hues that the question of their order arises, and the question of the order of hues must not be confused with the question of the order of colors, where color is recognized as having its essence in its cumulative continuity with line, mass, etc. In the case of mere hues there is no tendency established by their order in the direction of the individual, so the order of hues has the indefiniteness and endlessness required by a mathematical relation—that is, it has the character of abstract universality and it has only that character. So it is possible to say, as Prall does, that there is no pure ordered structure of color if he thinks, as he seems to do, only of color as if it were constituted of the manifold of hues. But color is not constituted by a manifold of hues, which build it up from the inside as a house is built by putting bricks together, or as a billiard-ball is made up of, and by, its constituent atoms. The real constituents of color lie outside it within the system of categorized entities to which it belongs, or, more simply, the internal constitution of color is made up of the external cumulative relations which hold it in its place among the other categories within the categorial system. Color is thus determined, constituted, by and of relations between line and mass, line and form, mass and form, form and design, design and line, etc. It is true of course that in the mathematical and physical sense color can be thought of as a manifold of hues, but it is not color in its value aspects or as a constituent of an aesthetic object, but as a constituent of an abstract existential object. And here we

have the principle of ambiguity showing us the importance of the distinction between the literal or existential import of an idea and the figurative and value import of the idea.

The "order of hues" leads to literalness and abstraction and physics until we interpret it as connoting a tendency or *nisus* toward the individual. In this case the idea of the order of hues points onward and forward to line in that characteristic of line which indicates a direction. The meaning of hue then lies in this reference onward to the structure of the system of value categories, and in this way sets the tendency of cumulative effectiveness that, in the stage of formed design or designed form, culminates in an individuate object. Hue then is not a mere form of sense, but an idea, an Idea; has its meaning immediately in the analogy to tone and the rhythm they together constitute; but they, as principles of elementary distinction, so constitute the substantial rhythm (feeling) that lines are created inherent in its structure, marking off the masses from each other and thus setting them up with respect to each other and to the Idea in such form as has design. It is this cumulative aggressiveness of hue, subjectively called its "appeal" or its "pleasantness," running on until it constitutes an object an individual that is the aesthetic meaning of hue; and the mere fact that hues can, empirically, or can not, be placed in definite literal or existential relations such as constitute a mathematical order, is a phenomenon of existence about which propositions are true or false but have no necessary relation to the value of anything. The order of hues then means the characteristic modality *power*, the referential modality, not "sense" or "relational" quality, by virtue of which color, with its sensible variety, can and does complicate the system of categorial value factors into the individuate value object which we know as *a* value, that is, an instance of the universal Beauty.

The important fact then about hue and color is that color possesses these traits of ambiguity and cumulation—the former the basis of all its possible structures and orders, and the latter the ground of the value object's becoming or being an individual and thus having a status within the system of realities. The ambiguity of color justifies its interpretation in the two realms of reality. In the one, color is analogous with space, has the characteristics of objects that are determined by and in mathematical and physical conditions. But

it is also, on the same principle of ambiguity, interpretable in the terms of the value system, and is here subject to the logical conditions that are imposed upon it because of its implications within that system. Both together, its existential and its value implications, complicated in an object on the determination of the categories of value, make it an aesthetic object.

It is on the basis of this analogous identity of color with space that an aesthetic object is in every case an instance of physical reality. In its spatial relations color is a physical fact, and the colors that enter into a painting are pigments, those that enter into sunsets are relations conditioned upon the movements and distribution of light as it permeates the system of physical objects generally. The "color" of music has its existential and empirical grounds. The rainbow is an object constituted of the relationality of certain sets of "weather" conditions, and is there to be present to any perception that may contemplate it. The statue is marble, the poem is words, the music air vibrations, and, as such, that is, by virtue of their existential substantiality, they become the permanent existential things that get organized into the cultural scheme of things and lay the foundations for all communication (continuity) within the cultural system. What form of matter will be chosen by a given type of aesthetic design will depend upon the principle of appropriateness, the principle that a value is objectified only in the material that is determined by the spatio-temporal analogues of its value-categorical conditions. This appropriateness is not, however, a matter of the physical qualities of matter alone; the hardness of granite will express the rude strength of the warrior as well as the tender gracefulness of the saint or madonna. But it is perhaps a relational continuity of hardness with molecular structure and light-refraction, etc., that is, it is perhaps the complexity of structure of the physical substance which makes it capable of expressing a variety of value qualities. But it must be kept in mind that the substantiality of physical "matter" is ambiguous; the saint or madonna is even more rudely strong than the soldier. There is also involved here, perhaps, the fact that there are common elements of a universal nature running through all the value forms, aesthetic, religious, moral, practical generally, as well as the various aesthetic types, and possibly based on them, that is, it is the elements common to all forms that are responsible for the fact that values of

different types may be expressed through the same material means. But it is clear that it is the analogous relation to space-time that makes any value capable of expression at all, and quite probable that it is this reference to the material that is responsible for the flexibility in the modes by which values are objectified in concrete objects of experience.

It should be mentioned here that in giving a fundamentally relational interpretation of color we are denying vigorously the oft-repeated dogma that the color system and the tone system are independent. As qualities, and with quality defined in terms of mere psychological sensation process, color and tone are as different as any two things in the world can be. But even here it is to be remembered that difference does not imply independence in the sense of the absence of all relations. And the assumption that seems to be forced upon us, is just that the fusibility of colors with tones is the basis of any rational aesthetic theory. In fact it seems clear that the relation implied in the fact of fusion of color and tone is just the relation of analogous identity which we have described. The denial of any real relations between colors and tones, and especially, the denial of the fact of their interchangeability, is perhaps a consequence of the childish assumption that each and every pleasant sensation is by itself an aesthetic object. To argue that a plain or simple color is "a beauty" is totally to misconstrue the nature of the aesthetic experience, and to lose entirely any possibility of there being an aesthetic object, and is merely a superstition made necessary by the acceptance of a naive empiricism. It certainly puts art-theory "beyond our theoretic grasp." But as the question of the relation of color and tone will require separate consideration, we may leave it here with the remark that the question has been ably handled by Hartshorne.

And the question whether a sheer or plain or pure color is an instance of beauty is easily disposed of. If a genuine aesthetic experience, and by a genuine aesthetic experience we mean one that can definitely establish its own objectivity in an individuate form, is a logical consequence or issue of the operation, in perceptual experience, of the categorial system, then the question is answered at once. The mere presence of a sheer color, however sensuously impressive or pleasing, is not an aesthetic experience, and the color is not beautiful. To be an aesthetic experience, or for anything to be beautiful, means

that there must be an object built up within the experiential aspects of color-tone and space-time in accordance with the system of aesthetic categories; and obviously a sheer color is not that. What is meant, of course, by saying that a sheer or pure color is beautiful, is that the color is an instance of pleasurable sensation, and this implies that beauty or the aesthetic experience is nothing but this pleasurable experience. Or, if we assume that the aesthetic experience is unique and is not pleasure, then we will identify the plain color with this unique subjective state, and argue that, as thus experienced, the color is beautiful. But this is obvious nonsense. There is no reality of any kind whatsoever that can be identified with a simple sensuous quality, and the reality suggested in and by such a quality appears in the experience only as a consequence of the development within the experience of relational implications beyond the quality. Such a simple quality is a feeling, i. e., is the stuff of a pleasure or any definable experience, only in that it penetrates other qualities and thus forms the ground-content of an object. So that the sheer or pure color cannot even be conceived as existing, it certainly cannot be felt, except through complicative relations with other qualities. In any case no communication of the color could be assumed in the absence of relations to other facts. The demonstration of the essential continuity of color with tone and the other necessary elements in the determination of beauty and the aesthetic experience will emerge as we pursue the logic of aesthetic experience further.

It will perhaps serve to clear up many of the statements we have been making above, admittedly without the necessary validating arguments, if we will return for a moment to the relations of color as involved in the principles of ambiguity and cumulation. And this may bring down upon us the charge of repetition in our argument.

The essential fact about color is its two meanings, the two *kinds* of meaning which characterize it along with all value concepts. These are the meanings that attach to it by virtue of its implication in two worlds at the same time; one directly, through its continuity with the system of value categories, and the other vicariously, through its analogical identity with space and its consequent implication of the system of existential categories. And as a consequence of both together of these systematic complications, color has being in an interpenetrative

fusion with tone, which, because of its analogical identity with time, is also analogously identical with space in the determination of existence. Color-tone is thus the substantial analogue of space-time in that the two dyads, in their substantial identity, constitute reality. And as space-time is the substantial stuff of existence, so is color-tone the substantial stuff of value. Color-tone is thus the substance of all value, that which is the ground of its objectivity, and thus that which constitutes value's reality in rhythm, which is, *empirically*, the substance of all objects in the culture world. Rhythm is thus the universal "place" or medium and substance of value, and appears in experience as feeling. So color is lost and *aufgehoben* in rhythm. And it is important once more to remind ourselves that feeling is not "merely psychological." When we say that rhythm "appears in" experience as feeling, we do not mean that feeling appears as a state of mind or any particular modification of our self-awareness. We mean rather that feeling obviates itself to us by contemplative intuition as the universal ground of there being an individual experience at all, as the condition of the appearance of any fact in consciousness whatever. And as we say in the discussion of feeling in a previous chapter (IV), feeling is not itself one of the "faculties" or modes of awareness. As a consequence feeling is not describable in terms of motion or movement, since these terms are fitted to characterize existence only, and are not applicable in any sense to feeling, which is not an existence but is co-ordinate with existence in the reality-structure.

This indetermination by motion or movement of the elementary feeling, the complete independence of feeling of any type of characterization by these existential terms, has a consequence of vast importance. It is this: feeling has nothing whatever to do with action, and is thus not a determinant of moral distinctions. Further, feeling itself does not move, therefore does not act, and the earlier medieval characterization of it as "passion" is literally true of it in every respect. And the epithet passion or passive is singularly appropriate to the nature of feeling, since, as we have observed, action, motion, movement, *as categories of existence*, have no applicability to feeling at all, have nothing directly to do with it whatever, and the only possible reference that can be made to feeling by them is through the ambiguous configuration of color and tone represented vicariously through time and space.

And since language is almost entirely adapted to the expression of existence, it is singularly appropriate that feeling should be expressed by means of terms whose connotation is wholly negative. Feeling is thus describable only in terms of qualities which it does not have, of the absence of qualities. Feeling is then passion, absolute passivity, a perfect analogy to the matter of existence, and is the stuff, inert and inane, "the windy bottomless inane" of which value objects are created.

Feeling, then, is not motion, but rhythm. It does not act or move, but vibrates. It does not transgress, or pass through, space, nor does it endure or eternalize in time; it does not exist. Its space does not space, nor does its time time. It has its own mode of being, peculiar and appropriate to it, which nothing shares with it; it *rhythms, valit, (valere, to be worth.)* Rhythm is what it is; not what it does. And what feeling *is in experience*, is an interpenetration of color and tone; analogously as existence, matter, *is* an intermingling of space and time. And the same analogy which constitutes space and time an identity in matter or existence also constitutes color and tone an identity in feeling or rhythm. And the same analogy extends, since analogy of ultimates is identity, to the relation of space to color and time to tone. Since therefore this analogy extends throughout the structure of being, and connects its dyadic essences, each of the latter itself possesses a double reference, is characterized by duplicity, or ambiguity. Color thus has a dual character, two essential features. It is necessary, therefore, in all discussion of color as a value, to emphasize also the existence aspect of color, involving its relations to space, and all the space characters, size, shape, contour, etc., along with the value aspect of color, involving its implications of pure meaning in ideal combinations and contrasts with colors, tones, forms, etc. This latter is the metaphorical or figurative meaning of color and thus its real meaning. The two dimensions or directions of meaning of color are, then:

1. Its literal, figurate, structural, existential character, and
2. Its allegorical, figurative, metaphorical, value character. These two kinds of characters in their unity constitute the beauty of color, which must exist *and valit*—be worth—in an object that is real. The object will have all the existence characters as a basis, with the value characters constituting the import of the whole.

As a consequence of the constitution of the real every object whatsoever has value, and as beauty is the proto-type of all value, every real object possesses beauty in some form or degree; and as every real object has, as one of its constituents, color (light) every object in the universe, existent or imaginative, is colored.

Returning to the more specific problem of color it may be simpler to try to present its more prominent qualities through examples. Painting is, essentially, color with its spatial reference made predominant by the emphasis on line, mass and form (literal). It is for the most part constructed of massed colors or colored masses so contrasted as to throw the lines that distinguish them into strong figurative emphasis, at the same time slurring over the literal aspects of line in such a way as to make them conspicuous by the sly design by which they are hidden. One might even speak of a negative emphasis on line; but in whatever way we undertake to express the structural meaning of painting our words will all necessarily be so broadened, by their instancing in every case the principle of ambiguity, that the language will look like mere rhetoric, until the real references behind the two kinds of meaning represented are fully realized. Once the principle of ambiguity is seen in its far reaching consequences, the analogical relations in metaphor and language figures generally will be seen to express real characters and qualities with equal accuracy and more adequacy than the more literal language forms express existence. A figure is impressive, not because it is "imaginative" in the sense that it exaggerates or distorts, but precisely because there is a reality in the analogical relation which it expresses; and it expresses this with as much accuracy as the propositions of mathematics express the nature of abstract space. And the figurative tonal elements in a painting express the value aspects of the colors accurately and precisely because there is no other way to express them at all, and the language of tone has been created expressly for the purpose of making the colors sing. In this sense the notation of music, and the instruments by which music is expressed, are what they are because they are embodiments of the functions by which colors are made audible. It is highly doubtful whether one who does not hear a good picture can see it at all as a value object, or one who does not see a good piece of music can hear it as such. I hope that these statements will

not be taken as instances of a loose or irresponsible imagination, but attempts to state literally the fact which has been so long and so tragically misunderstood.

It is this convertibility of colors to terms of tone that makes the painting vibrate and live with rhythm. The "life" we attribute to a good picture is literally the perceived rhythm, and the rhythm is the harmonic unity into which colors and tones fuse when the conditions are made appropriate by the presence of the right lines and masses. These latter impose form and design upon the original material of feeling presented in the colors and tones, and thus give designed form or formed design to the whole. It is thus that the order of designed form is inherent and prophetic in the very quality of color and the relations which it necessitates to tone, line, etc., in accordance with the principle of cumulation, by virtue of which a color is a color and a value only in that it anticipates the design which is possible to it in the space it possesses by analogy. It is thus that color implies space, time, tone, line, mass, and the whole system of value categories, and it implies them ontologically; that is, color implies the categories in the fact that the system of categories must operate as a whole if color is to be regarded as a value event. Each of the categories is thus, by cumulation, a product of the system of categories as a whole, in the sense that the system as a whole is the content of meaning for each of the categories. They for this reason constitute their object an individual, because the principle of individuality—the principle that the real has its content outside itself in the order of its circumstance—is their inner meaning, in the sense that it is the law by which the category is realized in an object.

We would arrive at the same results from an analysis of architecture and sculpture with respect to color as we have just reached with painting, except that whereas painting is interpretable in terms of color in relation to the immediate space elements, architecture and sculpture are embodiments of color, and its essential rhythmic substance feeling, in mass relations. Color is here achromic, present as pure lights and shades. Here color combines cumulatively with mass and line to produce appropriately the effects of form and design. It is not necessary to go into these subjects here, but the comparison of architecture and sculpture with painting, about the detail of which I confess I know nothing, will enable us to see again and

more forcefully the universality of color; it is present in every object that can be a value.

In painting, considered as a pure color art, the combination or fusion of color with tone to form the substance (the value-substance feeling) of aesthetic objects, exhibits such emphasis upon color that the tone element is overlooked, or regarded as a mere ideal quality of *our feeling*, such as could have no inherence in, or other close analogical relation to, color. Of course it is true that the tone of painting is a function of feeling, since feeling is the substantial construct of color and tone united in rhythm. And it is just this material feeling which distinguishes the painting as a cultural object from the mere physical fact which it represents, or from a photograph of the physical fact. But that tone is there literally present in painting is shown by the fact that it compels a comparison of painting with music, and by the further fact that it almost literally determines the structure of architectural fact and dictates the definition of it as "frozen music." And architecture is a good instance where both color and tone, as independent qualities, are subdued and transformed in the preponderance of form; but the slightest examination shows that, in the absence of color and tone, or color-tone as their synthesis in rhythm, architectural form becomes nothing, or little, at least, besides the mere abstract or mathematical pattern of structure, the abstract plan or skeleton upon which the flesh of concrete color-tone could be molded, and in the absence of which the "form" sinks to pure mechanical literalism with no trace of life. Architecture, without its reference to its color-form of painting and its tone-form of music, would *look* like the gaunt and empty steel framework awaiting its obliteration and transcendence in the living stone that is to hide it, the merest and barest abstract possibility of a beautiful object.

In painting therefore the element of tone is submerged and ideal, but it is *there*, and is not lost in the fleeting subjectivity of the individual consciousness. Color and tone do not depend for their being upon anything so insubstantial as the "mind" of the individual. They do depend upon mind, in the sense that they constitute mind materially, furnish the stuff of which mind is made, but they are never limited to consciousness in its particularization in the individual. They are no part of the individual, since they constitute the totality of the individual. As such, that is to say, as *values*, and not spatio-

temporal facts, color and tone are known only to the contemplative intuition, where they are *there* as literal instances of sense experience which, if it were not ideal, would not be intelligible in the lowest sense in which its existence could be known. In the reality of experience, which goes infinitely beyond the mere circumstance of psychological consciousness, the synthesis of color-tone is represented and exhibited to us visually as color; audibly, as tone; but beings merely with eyes and ears and "color-perceptions" never see paintings, and, except for the accumulation in culture of elementary feeling-substance derived from real colors and tones and operating as the background of vision, the artist could never paint the picture and the observer never see it.

Just as we have been obliged to anticipate the discussion of tone here, so we will find it necessary to speak of color again in the next chapter on Tone.

CHAPTER VIII

TONE

TONE is a form of the contemplative intuition for all cultural objects, and is strictly analogous by identity with color. It is a form of the "internal" sense, meaning that its interpretation of the value object, taken as a single concept and by itself, is primarily in terms of immediate experience. In experience, then, it is an analogue of time. Thus the value object is expressed, so far as its tonal features are concerned, largely in terms capable of psychological interpretation. Its characterization of its object is mediated directly through feeling. But it is to be added that this fact does not identify tone with any state or process of mind, any more than color is to be regarded as a state or process of mind. Tone is not a state or process of anything, nor is it a mode of anything, except that it may be regarded as a mode of its unity with color. It is, as color is, itself a substance, possesses its own modalities, stands in relations peculiar to itself, is not reducible to, or describable in, terms of anything but itself. Tone is therefore a substance in its own right, and the only question that can be involved in identifying it is the question of its substantial relations to other substances. These substantial relations are capable of logical expression only. In the description of these relations we are repeating, from a different angle, the same facts we described in discussing color. The relations in which tone stands are the same relations which give to color its substantial status. Tone, that is, is connected by analogical identity with color in creating the self-identical substance we call feeling, and we may thus state once more, and in terms of tone, the ultimate identity upon which is based the structure of the value universe. This states that color and tone interpenetrate and fuse into the substance of feeling just as space and time combine to form existence. And it is this substantial status of tone that we must keep in mind all through the discussion; even where the description may couch itself in psychological terms there is to be understood the substance of color-tone-feeling postulated as the essential background that gives to psychological terms all the meaning they possess.

And in the same sense as with color, tone is a form of the contemplative intuition that creates, in our experience the objects that we designate as cultural objects. It is therefore not only a form of the intuition, but also a category determining objects in the real world, the world of objects which becomes the criterion for all relations of truth. The mistake of Kant must be guarded against here; space and time *are* forms of the intuition, but they are *also* determinants of objects in the world in some sense independent of the mind that perceives them. So are color and tone forms of the apprehension by which objects are grasped by us, but they are also external and independent determiners of objects in a world which *is* antecedently to the clear determination of mind itself as an object. Tone is an idea, and that it exists is an accident of its relation to color. When therefore we speak of the qualities of tone, the implications of meaning are relevant to the psychological processes by which tones are apprehended *and* to the structures and relations and designs of the real objects. These objects have their reality in the sphere of feeling after sensation has given feeling an independent status through the loss of the sensation character. The sensation character is lost in the fusion of the sensations in feeling as a new individuate substance. Color and tone, we may keep repeating, are themselves syntheses of all the types of sensation elements that make up the substance of organic life. They are themselves fused again into the single and identical substance of feeling. And feeling is the *Urstoff* of the culture world just as existence is the primary matter of the natural world. Feeling is thus the cultural primordium, and color and tone are its primary modes, just as space and time are the primary modes of the existence which their fusion constitutes. And just as we may and do speak of existence, in specific empirical connections, as Space-Time, so we may and do, in empirical situations, refer to primordial feeling as Color-Tone.

Tone, then, is a form of the contemplative intuition regarded as an inner sense. As such it is of peculiar importance in reducing objective situations to terms of immediate experience in such a way that they can be stated in psychological terms. And in the aesthetic tradition tone is regarded as the nearest approach to pure experience that we have, and there is, so it is assumed, no other clearly characterizable datum that so nearly identifies with the stuff of experience as tone

and the constructs in which tone is a prominent element. This is seen in music, where the content is largely made up of tones and tone relations, with just enough of other elements to set off the qualities of tones. And the fact that in music we approach so near the inner core of experience gives to that art the congratulatory designation of spiritual. It is perhaps for this reason that it was the only form of art accepted by those religions which adopted a purely subjectivist content. But in any case the assumption has been that tone is the form of the inner life and experience of human beings in a peculiar sense and degree. And yet there is serious doubt whether tone has any advantage over color in the aspect of immediacy.

There is however another sense in which tone is the form of things with an inwardness that is peculiar. Not only does inner refer to the inward of human and individual experience, but it refers with equal clearness and emphasis to the internal constitution and structure of objects. It is the tone of the individual's health and feeling that represents to him his organic condition as to welfare and proficiency. And while in this case the language used is metaphorical and recognized as such, it is for that reason here regarded as more expressive of truth than more literal descriptions would be. In fact the whole meaning of tone, outside of the specific existential reference to sound sensations, is a pure value meaning, and it is used to state the realities of things where other forms of expression would limp hopelessly. Where a man's language may be perfectly clear and unambiguous when taken in its ordinary logical and rhetorical statement, we still may complain that we do not like the tone of his remarks, meaning perhaps that in his elementary feeling the realities are not what the clear language would lead us to expect. The tone of "diplomatic" language often expresses more than its words, and often what the words express are contradicted in the tone in which they are expressed. But it is easy to show that not only do we think of tone as being the essence of experience, but it is also and as often the essence of material things. We "sound" a tree to find if it is hollow, or a piece of steel to see if it "rings true." We "sound out" a man on a given public question to see where he stands, and we drop a coin on the table to test its metal, just as we try a horse to find his mettle, or thump a watermelon to see if it is ripe. Even of things more materially substantial we tend to think of the tone of

their relations as an index to the quality of their substance. So that tone seems to be the inner essence of things both as spiritual and experiential and as material and natural. And it is clear that tone is one of the constituents of the world in a way that only a few other things are. And, on the principle of ambiguity, this metaphorical use of the term carries a valid reference to the real which it is folly to question.

But when we say that tone is the inner substance of experience and of the structure of things we are not speaking quite accurately. What we mean is that tone is so near to the essence of feeling that we tend to confuse it with feeling. But it is feeling that is the inner substance of the world of culture, just as existence is the substance of the outer world of nature. And tone is so close in many ways to feeling that it is hard not to confuse them. It is so near in fact to the realities of things that it is next to impossible to find words adequate to express its meaning, and this because the very structure of language is adapted to the formulation of the exteriorities of the real rather than of its inner meaning. It is difficult of description also because the intricacies of tone are so intimately bound up with other elements that it is often hard to say whether description is of tone or of something else; tones and colors fuse and confuse so infinitely in experience that it is difficult to distinguish what is tone from what is color, and there are instances where the distinction can be made only through some objective test. And unfortunately the objective tests of language all apply to its truth form, and not to its capacities for adequate aesthetic expression. It is the assumption here that pure tone and pure color are abstractions; that neither is concrete and real apart from its analogy to the other in the identity of color-tone.

But in spite of these difficulties of language it is necessary to undertake to make clear some of the essential features of tone by way of exhibiting its function in determining the aesthetic object.

The discussion of the previous topic shows that color and tone cannot be considered or described or understood independently of each other. The experience of them is perhaps in every case the experience of their synthesis, and what we call pure color or pure tone is the instance of each in which the quality of the other is, for our experience, but not in reality, lost in the emphasis of or submerged in the quality of the one

experienced. But in reality, that is, in experience as contemplatively entertained and understood, there are no pure colors nor pure tones. What we call a color, pure or otherwise, is color-tone adapted by our organism to the function by which it is perceived; elementary color-tone made red, blue, etc. *for the eye* by the necessity that to be experienced it must pass through the organic function. And tone is color-tone adapted for experience in the organic functions of hearing. Color, or tone, is then not the reality, but the empirical representation which must be supplemented by contemplation in order that the reality it represents may appear to mind. This reality is color-tone, rhythm, feeling, which we do not need to perceive, since we intuit it directly as the reality which makes all sensation intelligible. No "pure" or isolated color or tone then can be experienced, they can only appear thus to us by perceptual illusion, and they are really separable only in the contemplation or intuition. Every tone has then its color and every color its tone. Consequently, the question of the beauty of pure color or pure tone is either an exaggeration of emphasis or an analytical problem of the relation, structural or referential, of the color or tone quality to the whole of the object in which it occurs, this whole being, in substantial terms, the color-tone-feeling as substance of every object. Only this object can be beautiful, or "possess" tone or color quality, unless we are willing to accept the subjectivist canon, derived from abstract psychology, that beauty refers to what pleases in any way. Thus Prall's distinction of the "beauties" of pure sensuous quality, or pure color or tone, from the beauty of composed or structured forms, neglects or overlooks the essential fact about beauty, namely, that only through the postulate of the *objective* nature of beauty which it has by virtue of its inherent structure, can color or tone or any *quality* be made intelligible in experience. Any quality implies an object to which it is appropriate, and the object *is* that which the quality, in analogical identity with other qualities, constructs through the principle of appropriation. Hence there is no beauty without structure; nor no composed beauty, with or without structure, since beauty cannot be made, not even manufactured psychologically. Beauty is expressed; or better, expresses itself. And the same postulate of objectivity is necessary if line, mass, space, etc. are to have intelligible meaning. Neither the qualities of experience nor the forms of experience are self-

intelligible; the dog perhaps sees and distinguishes colors, but only on a basis of psychological existence or organic utility; he does not see color as a factor of beauty. So the dog's appreciation of music is a myth, and there is no reason to believe he can apprehend an object so complex as the beauty object. Sense is the substance of beauty, to be sure, but not its intelligible form or the schema through which beauty becomes an experience. In the absence of these schemata there is no beauty as object, so no beauty at all.

Tone then is a factor in the cultural substance which, brought by the principle of cumulation under the unique concepts of aesthetic experience, becomes content of objects of beauty. That it is never such alone has been pointed out. It is always present in any experience as an element of a compound even when the combination is not recognized in consciousness, and the invariable partner of tone is color. The two in their synthesis in rhythm constitute the reality content of every object to which the character of value can properly apply.

But we are interested here in describing the characteristics of tone as they enter into the whole of the beauty object.

First, with reference to qualities which appear to attach to isolated tones. That there are no isolated tones is clear from the fact that every tone has its overtones where the relations between the tones are not themselves tones but are of the nature of color conceptualized. Also every tone, as is true of every sensation, occurs within a general medium whose substance is the total effect of all the sensations of the body at the time it occurs and which we have identified as feeling. We have seen also that the sum of sensations in their historic continuity and in their social volume constitute the trans-individual substance of culture. But there are qualities which, in psychological analysis, appear to refer purely and singly to an isolated tone, and it is this apparent fact, or fact of appearance, that has led to the fallacious assumption of intrinsic quality in connection with color and tone. What is real in the illusion of intrinsic quality is the tone that *is* quality, that is, the tone that is substance. Color and tone taken literally as sense elements are pure sensuous matter, and this is a pure concept and not a sense-fact; and so nothing is intrinsic to them except the abstract quality of potentiality, or the mere abstract capacity to hold or be qualities, or the possibility of

referring qualities to them. Intrinsic quality is the implication of substance. But this abstract potentiality is a "quality" only under the condition that a quality can lack character, so that if it has any meaning its meaning is a reference to existence, since the "attributes" of existence (what can be attributed to existence) do not have character. Existence then *has* nothing; it merely *is*, and it is *this* or *that* as distinct qualities only as combined with value and as it enters into cultural relations. Nothing is thus "intrinsic" to tone but its "existence"; that is, its being as a substance, and we have seen that this intrinsic character of existence has no qualitative significance, "existence is no real predicate," but has significance only on the condition that it enter into relation with color, and through color, with all other characteristic categorial relations of the object. Then the only "qualities" of colors or tones are relations, and these relations will be existential if literal, that is, mediated through space-time as the existential basis of the object; or, value relations, if experiential or if they refer to the cultural status of objects, that is, the objects whose status is itself determined by color and tone and the characters they take on through their synthesis in value or feeling.

But there is a sense in which pitch, intensity and timbre are "pure," that is, isolated or isolable, tone qualities. They all refer to that peculiar collocation of circumstances which results in sounds being heard, and, the collocation being what it is, will have the effect of determining the way it is heard and thus of specifying the occurrence as different from others. But all of this, except the sound as an experienced tone and its implication of color, are matters of existence or the space-time-motion order, and if we identify the qualities of pitch, intensity and timbre with the aspects of this situation, as we uniformly do, then pitch is a question of the stretch of a string or the shape of a resonating body.

And similarly with intensity and timbre. What is called the unique or intrinsic character of tones, viz., pitch, turns out to be a reference only to the existence aspects of the situation in which the tone occurs. Pitch then has no inherent or necessary cumulative reference onward to involution with the system of categories, does not implicate an object with individuality, and is not a "dimension" of tone in the aspect in which tone is an aesthetic or value fact. The same is true of intensity and timbre; they are references to existence. But

these references to existence, through analogical involvement with categorial relations in the aesthetic structure, become genuine aesthetic elements.

The intrinsicality of tone, then, does not refer to a quality of *tone*, but refers to the fact that there is a unique relation within the total system of relations in which the tone occurs. And this relation is capable of two interpretations; its identity has incidence upon two worlds. In the first case, as a relation of value categories, the relation connects with an experience, and becomes a factor within the life-continuity of the experiencing being. This means that the relation *is heard*, becomes an experience specified as tone. The other case is that in which the relation refers the situation out of which it arises to an analogous situation, the latter being that which in experience is known as color. This relation of analogy to color is what is intrinsic to tone, and is all there is that is intrinsic. The peculiar essence of tone is that it can and does identify analogically with color to bring into being the situation called, when it is the rhythm of an organism, experience, and thus becomes the substance of cultural reality. The intrinsic "quality" of tone is, then, color; and the intrinsic "quality" of color is tone. By which is meant that the only quality or relation, or attribute of any kind, that characterizes color is its relation to tone, and that which characterizes tone is its relation to color. The relation between color and tone is mutual and unique, the relation of analogical identity.

It is true of course that, given the identity of color and tone in experience, the identity remains valid while the elements identified are discriminated or distinguished from each other. This is the peculiar and distinctive feature of experience, as the contemplative intuition, and the empirical ground of the possibility of the realization of values; that it can comprehend its own structure and constitution within the details of experience which come in; the feature which has often been misrepresented as self-consciousness. But it is the capacity to identify itself within the variety of its own content that distinguishes an experience from all other things. And that which, within experience as the identity of color-tone, distinguishes the elements of color and tone within itself, is this, that, *in this subjective relation*, color appears to self-analysis as hue, and tone appears as pitch. But color and tone have a status in reality that is logically prior to the distinction of

hue and pitch, in that the experience in which hue and pitch are distinguished is itself grounded upon the prior unity of color and tone. This unity of color and tone into color-tone is the metaphysical ground of the existence of mind and its experiences; consequently all distinctions made within experience will be distinctions within the substance of this unity, and the discriminative power of mind itself by which hue and pitch are distinguished is simply the ultimate instance in which the reality of culture recognizes its own dual structure as resting upon its own self-identity as ground.

Hue and pitch are then color and tone in their mere psychological immediacy. But however "mere" and subjective they may appear, they are color and tone *as experienced*, and become, as subjective, the means through which the unity of color-tone is made intelligible to the individual mind. That is to say, the unity of color and tone is never an immediate experience; it is a uniform presupposition of experience; immediate not *to* but *within* contemplative intuition; it is always merely and vicariously suggested as an implicate of every experience so far as ordinary cognition is concerned, and this we saw to be the ground of the principle of duality or ambiguity of meaning of cultural categories. The real unity of color and tone, or color-tone as a reality, is and must always be, for experience, a postulate of the contemplative intuition made necessary by the interreferent duality which every cultural concept exhibits in experience at all points. Then the reality of color-tone is a postulate based, psychologically, upon a universal character in experience, that, namely, which shows the duplicity of meaning of all value concepts. But it is a logical postulate when its immediate necessity is realized. It would be an interesting quest to undertake to determine whether this omnipresent duality is not the ground of the subject-object nature of the judgment in logic, when the problem is stated in terms of the reflective intellect; and the reason why the duality of the subject-object identity can never be overcome in logic is that the relation is always stated in existential terms, since the reflective intellect demands this form, whereas all the identity that can be got out of the existential relational situation is the identity of motion, which to experience is never complete. This is evidenced in the fact that no theory of evolution or of any process can be made consistent. It is also responsible for the contradictions in which the theory of infinity

inevitably falls when it undertakes to apply to any concrete content. In concrete situations aesthetically considered the infinite gives no trouble, for it is instanced and its law known in every individual, and the aesthetic object is always individual. To overcome infinity means that we must go beyond the identity of motion to the identity of rhythm, where the limitations of motion do not hold.

But whatever may be the logic of the problem, what we want to impress here is that, for experience in its form of self-identity, i. e., for consciousness, color-tone is always given as hue-pitch. Now the reason that hue and pitch seem "intrinsic" is that they can never be proved by existential logic to lie within series that are continuous with each other. Hues seem to lie in a series which returns upon itself, a characteristic which we saw to be due to the analogous relation of color to space, and which appears psychologically as the fact that visual phenomena of color have extensity if they are to be experienced as color. The voluminousness of color is experienced as identical with the extensity of space. But pitches as such and as "pure" tone quality lie on a one-dimensional straight line, and no pitch ever quite identifies with itself qualitatively in another place on the line, since octaves are always distinguishable in some of their aspects as tones. This we say to be due to the analogical relation of tone to time, the fact that every tonal reality must have a complementary relation to an analogous reality in existence, just as color must have in every one of its appearances that character which establishes its foundation in existence, viz., its contemplative implication of space. But the one-dimensionality of tone series is an error due to the reflective identity of tone with time. Where the relation to time is analogical, tones do not lie in linear series, as is shown by the interpenetration of organ tones. Referring time to this character of tone, time becomes reversible, is thicker in some spots than in others, and has volume. So a color (hue) must have its spatial character if it is to be experienced, whether or not this is possible on grounds of existential and discursive logic; and a tone (pitch) must have its temporal, or as we shall see later, its durational character. There is no way by which the durational aspect of a tone can be expressed in terms of existential logic. But its necessity can be seen in terms of value-logic, and it can be expressed when the categories of value logic are deduced.

But the fact that hue and pitch cannot be logically equated is a limitation due to the attempt to dispose of cultural realities by means of the reflective intelligence. In the logic of the intuitive contemplation, hue and pitch are felt together, not merely as due to the accidents of fact and circumstance, but felt as belonging together, as having immediate implications of each other, and this immediate implication, this implication which does not depend upon existential mediation, is what is known in value experience as the sense of identity. This sensed identity—no identity of any kind in the sense in which it is experienced—can ever be demonstrated in existential logic, as the “identity-philosophy” has shown. But that the identity is real must be a presupposition of the existence of any logic, as is shown by the fact that all logics deal with the judgmental, or propositional relation, which is the postulation of identity of thought and existence. And the fact that thought, in so far as it is to be regarded as a value, can never be quite equated to existence, in the sense of identity as demanded in value logic, is the surd of existential logic. And this difficulty can only be overcome by the method of art, as we shall try to show in the discussion of the theory of tragedy.

The analogical identity of hue and pitch then, in their substances color and tone, which cannot be established by ordinary logic, becomes a postulate of the contemplative intelligence. Its demonstration is established in the harmony of the system of value categories, which form a complete system of mutual implication. And as every postulate must have somewhere its fact as its existential counterpart if it is to be true, so the identity of color-tone, in the experience of the mutual implication of hue and pitch, rests upon the fact of the existence of feeling, that is to say, upon identity by analogy of existence with feeling in the One of reality. Color-tone, or as experience in the particular, hue-pitch, is the essence of feeling and the substance of cultural reality or value.

Tone then becomes an elementary category of the experience of value, a category which, with color and the synthesis of the two, gives the substance of value in its immediate sensuous form, and identifies this substance with the feeling which is the basis of every experience.

We have explained relations of pitch and hue, and shown that, while they cannot be made continuous with each other by the logic of existence, yet they are experienced in their

identity in the immediacy of feeling which is their unity. We saw also that intensity is not, strictly considered, a tone quality, but a character rather of the existential basis of tones, and its attribution to tone is due to the implication of existence in the quality of pitch, in that pitch has a time reference, and thus an existential reference, but is not identifiable with any time characters. The demonstration of this is given in the theory of rhythm.

We have, however, a somewhat different problem in the fact of timbre. This "quality" of tones is a resultant of all the congeries of existential factors within the body which sounds, as interpreted through sense in the immediacy of elementary color-tone, i. e., feeling. It thus expresses in value terms the whole meaning of tone *as an existence*. This is the basis of the significance of timbre, since as expressing the whole existential meaning of tone it carries the implication that tone as a reality involves the object. It is thus timbre that gives in experience the objectivity of tones, and that lays down the lines along which the logic of the continuity of value with existence is to be worked out. Timbre is then not so much a "quality" of tones as a relational attribute of the value object which tone necessarily implies, and hence suggests the total existence-value system as the basis of the order of tones and of the structures of which tones are capable in the value system.

We have now to show, by the application of the methodological concepts, how tone carries the necessary implication of an object. This is necessary because of the prevailing illusion that tone is pure subjectivity. The significance of any fact in experience lies in the fact that it implies an object, and that it carries suggestive anticipations both of the constitution and of the quality of the object. But no fact alone and by itself implies an object. The implication is always mediated through categorizations of the fact, that is, through relational connections of the fact as universalized in concepts. These concepts, for value facts, are what we have called the methodological concepts. We now apply the concepts of method to the fact of tone, and attempt to picture thereby the design of the object which tone implies. If we cannot find and identify the tonal object, cannot show that tone is a feature of every real object, then our logic has failed us or tone is not real.

We have already seen how the concept of tone is characterized by ambiguity, how ambiguity runs all the way through all the meaning implications which the term possesses. There is at every point in every use of the concept the implication of existence in the reference to time. By this relation tones constitute a linear series with no breadth and extending theoretically to a mathematical infinity. In this relation tones construct the bald structures of music, create the literal design according to which melodies are woven together. In the same way tone enters into the structure of poetry and dancing, and the movement framework of the drama and pageantry. And in the literal interpretation of these arts, that is, the interpretation on a basis of discursive logic, there is always the tendency to confuse the tonal element with time and motion. As a consequence any such interpretation tends to become hard and mechanical and the art-form is presented as stiff and prosaic. To overcome this difficulty, when the difficulty is realized, there is always resort to a loose rhetoric, the attempt apparently being to indicate by imitation what cannot be expressed by the method of clear statement as the logic of literalness would demand. Art criticism thus tends to become merely bad literature, bad in that it is obviously straining to express what is beyond the reach of the method adopted. Tone and time and rhythm are confused in an inextricable mess simply because of the assumption that all of these concepts are different expressions of the same literal temporal flow. But tone is neither time nor movement nor rhythm, and the attempt to identify it with them by the method of literalness results inevitably in confusion. What is the element of truth in the equating of tone with time and movement is the fact that time and movement are the implications which tone bears to existence. Time and movement are undoubtedly factors in the mechanics by which tones are produced, and they are elements in the process by which we attempt to image tones to our consciousness when we attempt to describe them by the ordinary methods of existential logic. But tones are not images, they are not the kind of stuff from which images are made. Tones are elements of feeling, and have their own modes of presentation, the psychology of which is not as yet available. The psychology of feeling, and of the sensations of which feeling is the amalgam, undertakes to reduce feeling to terms of processes in the organism. These processes are no doubt the existential basis of all sensations but they are not

the sensations, which have their own substantial being in another realm.

There is, then, this implication to existence in tone as such. And because of it there is the simplest relational constituent of tone that enters into every object. The implication to existence in time and movement runs throughout the entire system of categories by which value objects are determined. So it is obvious truth that the literal interpretation of tone is adequate to a part of its nature.

But tone is ambiguous, and the ambiguity lies at the basis of its nature. Hence there is also the figurative or value implication in every tone. By virtue of this fact tones extend their import throughout the entire system of value concepts, and thus share in the determination of objects as values. Tone always lies in a relation of analogy to color. And the significance of the tone is represented primarily in this relation, for it is through this relation as the constitutional principle of feeling that tone is an experience and at the same time the determiner of the inner structure of a value object. It is thus that it constitutes the inwardness of things. So while it is true and important that tone refers backward to time and existence, it also aspires forward through relations to color and line and mass and form to the design by which an object is created. The essence of tone as a fact of value is its relation to color, and this relation is universal in that it holds of all concepts by which objects are determined as values. It is this *nisus* toward the object that constitutes the creative urge by which objects are created, as it operates in the life of the creator. This is true even in the moral sphere where motives are all mediated through action; for the action is the urge toward form in the materials whose inner relations constitute the possibilities of form for the mind of the actor. It is not the "energies" of the "agent" that create the object; the creative urge lies in the materials which become the object by realizing the design of their constitution. It is also not the feeling of the artist that creates the object of art; the object of art is there in the constitution of the materials, and it is this relational system or constitution implicit in the materials that creates the feeling or that *is* the feeling in the artist by which the design is formed. And this inner constitution of the materials is the tone (and color) which becomes experience through sensation. It appears obvious therefore that tone is

pregnant with the design of an object. It is therefore an elementary condition of value, and is not an existence in any sense.

We have already shown the application to tone of the concept of cumulation. The meaning of tone is not complete until it is stretched to embrace the entire system of categories of value, and its meaning lies precisely in the continuity of the system, of which it gives, after color, the first clear intimation. There is the cumulative development of tone through rhythm, line, mass, form and design, such that tone appears in its perfection only as an aspect of the design of an object. An isolated tone may be pleasing. But it has no aesthetic value until it is brought into harmony with other factors and appropriated to a scheme as designed in an object. And its aesthetic meaning lies essentially in the relations it bears to other aesthetic elements, as these elements are mutually appropriated to each other in the unity that is individual. Only a whole of tones is beautiful, and tones are made into a whole by the operation of relations to other factors than tones. Tones then cumulatively culminate in an individual, by finding their content of meaning in factors outside themselves which are not tones, but which constitute the enabling circumstance by which they become individual. For it is the principle of individuality that an entity becomes individual when its inner content lies outside it in the circumstance that conditions it.

It is thus that tones individuate in objects that are appropriate. And the principle of appropriation states that, with respect to tones, either the tones may be said anticipatively to determine their object, or that the object is such as retrospectively to determine the tonal elements necessary to individuate it. This relation, as the principle of individuation, is the ground of the harmony which has always been recognized as the primary basis of beauty and all aesthetic objects. It is the understanding of this principle that makes the distinction between the artist and ordinary mortals. The ordinary person can sense the harmony in an object, but it is only the "creative" artist who sees the harmony in terms of elements whose mutual appropriateness conditions the design of an object. And prominent among these elements, and indispensable to the meaningful use of all the other elements, are tone and color.

It remains only to point out that the final governing principle by which aesthetic elements constitute themselves an

object is analogy. All the identities of all the elements are gathered together by the analogy that consummates the object by a final "act" of individuation. This is the act of Passion, the unmoved mover behind all action which negates all action in the completion of the contemplated object. The act is fulfilled; it has become the object. The passivity of primordial feeling is the analogue of the inertia of matter. Their identity is the ground of all possibility, including the possibility of consciousness and thought. It is the cause of all actuality, including the actuality of its own identity. It is passivity in the primordium that is the basis of the contemplative intellect, the assent of which to the existence of objects is the intuition that creates. This is done through the primordial passivity of feeling, which assents to the harmony that makes an object whole, an object that can be known only in the act of intuition by contemplation which ordains "let there be an object," permits an object to Be.

CHAPTER IX

COLOR-TONE

THERE is little more to be said about the relations of color and tone to each other and to the other concepts in the value system, than has been said in the two preceding chapters. But these relations will bear repeated emphasis because of their importance for an understanding of value and its place within the universal scheme of things. It is necessary here to repeat that the fundamental relation between color and tone is one of identity. But it must be understood that the identity intended is not the mathematical and mechanical identity of formal logic and the sciences of nature. Indeed, the formal identity of logic is not even true of the relations within nature in its life phases, but only of the hypothetical physical basis of nature. There are no life phenomena that are related by formal identity, because formal identity is true only of those objects which are designed such as to be what formal identity is true of. That is to say, it is true of formal or hypothetical objects, and hypothetical objects cannot be fully real. The identity therefore which is to be the true relation between color and tone must be the kind of identity relation that can hold of real objects, for if it is not real objects that color and tone adumbrate then there is no possibility that the real can ever come to touch with experience. And if the real is never to be experienced then it can never be a value, for values have their being in the primordium within which experience itself comes to being.

The identity relation that can be real has already been described. It is not strictly a relation of or between objects, for objects are determined in part by the identity relation as it holds prior to the existence of objects. Or, if it is to be said that, as the relation by which reality itself "holds," identity holds between individuals, and individuals are objects, it must be kept in mind that individuals are objects only in the retrospective sense that they are what objects become when their objective is fulfilled, and the urge to objectification satisfied. The "desire" of the object to complete itself in an individual is transformed in the process into that which satisfies the "desire," or ends it. The "desire" itself, that is, becomes the

object, as is demonstrated in moral action. The identity relation, then, holds strictly between or within those entities which are prior to complete objects, in the logical sense that these entities and their relation must be presupposed as the conditions upon which objects can be. In this analogical identity has nothing in common with the "resemblance" which is the basis of the analogy of ordinary formal logic or of inductive logic. Analogical identity is the principle by which the plurality of things is superseded in their unity, while still leaving the individual identity of things intact. It is in this sense that color and tone are identical, that is, as the conditions of all objects that can come to being in experience. It may be worth while to note some of the empirical evidence for the identity of color and tone, keeping in mind that it is not the mechanical identity of formal logic but the analogical identity of aesthetics or real logic that we require. We may take as the empirical test of identity in this sense, or the criterion of identity, the principle that identicals can pass into or interpenetrate each other, or become each other, or so effectively interfuse that they create an entity which has qualities and relational possibilities quite different from those of either or both of the entities that enter the union. It is illustrated in chemical combinations, the formation of an individual by intersexual reproduction, and in value cases by the complete adunation of two persons in the family, of a number of persons in the "fellowship" of religion, or the harmony of different voices or instruments in music. The principle, that is, states that a plurality of individuals may pool their individualities in a single individual in whom all the constituent individuals are fully preserved but yet not identifiable in the expressions of the individual which they constitute. This principle has been demonstrated in my "Forms of Individuality." This principle of individuation distinguishes analogical identity from formal identity, in that the latter assumes that identicals displace each other or are superposable. A color may pass into or become a tone in such a way that the color as such disappears, and a tone may pass into and possess a color in such a way that the tone as a tone disappears. Or both color and tone may disappear or adunate in something that is neither color nor tone, as when the colors and tones of music disappear in and create a form which may be visual or kinaesthetic or purely ideal. Yet they may reappear, that is,

either or both color and tone may reappear after total disappearance as representing the realities which both had before disappearing, or as *being* the realities that both *were* before disappearing, as when music reinstates itself as a harmony of colored tones after having been felt as form. And in some organ tones both the total individual and its constituent individuals can be experienced at the same time, which seems to mean that tonal entities can both exist and not exist at the same time. And this means that the formal law of contradiction is not valid in such cases, i. e., cases involving pure values. Either color or tone can be reinstated as representing the full reality of the other, or either can be reinstated as representing the full reality of both. Colors disappear in the internal synergy of the primordial feeling substance and reappear as tones; or may lapse into the status of latent "energy" and reappear as color. This common matrix into which they can always be resolved is evidence enough that they have a common nature, that is, is all the evidence that theory may require as proof of their analogical or individuate identity. And yet it is possible to point out cases in experience where the identity of color and tone rises to the status of a clearly describable psychological phenomenon. When a high note appears as slender or pink it is the slenderness and pinkness that is experienced, and it is identified with the tone only in the period of transition back into the tone. This re-establishment of the self-identity of the tone is probably due to relations which the tone bears to other tones. But the relation to other tones can only be understood when it is reflected that all tones have their self-identity in their identity *with* color *in* feeling, and the self-identity comes as a suggestion of the cumulative tendency through which the tone has a place in the structure of a musical object. In a similar way the colors presented in a picture or a natural landscape may present themselves as tones, and the poet will have their objects rejoicing or sighing, not in accord with his subjective mood, for they may mock the mood to exasperation, but in accord to the spirit of their own nature. And this spirit is the life of the colors and tones and forms and lines that are there determining the picture to the observer, and is not contributed by the observer. If it be objected that only the poet can see it there the reply is that only the poet can see; nothing is there for those who merely

eat and breed and do business with each other. It is not in ourselves, but in our stars that we are underlings.

But it is not our purpose here to go further into the empirical aspects of the problem. For those who are interested in that phase of the matter, I should suggest they consult their own experience, if they happen to have any. The whole problem is admirably treated of by Hartshorn in "*Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*."

What is argued here is that the phenomena of translation of sense elements of different "fields" indicate a common matrix of them all. And this matrix is the substantial feeling which is the common medium of all quality, and the stuff of which all cultural objects are made. This is the hypothetical substance of the world of life and culture, and the ground of interpretation of all objects that have meaning or value. All thought about values must sooner or later go back to it. For experience it is color-tone, or the amalgam of sense; all the other forms of sense, as smell, touch, taste, are modalities of either color or tone, or of combinations of color and tone. If one cared to go into speculative researches into the question, it would probably turn out that taste and touch would be found to be modifications of visual color, while smell might be found to be a mode of audition and a variation of tone. Naturally one would not discuss such matters with those who explain them by the distinction of sense-organs. More subtle types of sensation, as of sex, would likely be found to be complex modalities of color in fusion with tone, and, as lying nearer the primitive aspects of life, could be regarded as modes of color-tone. A still more interesting speculation might inquire whether or not all sense forms are functions of light, and this would lead to interesting syntheses of the worlds of value and of existence. It would probably turn out that light is the substance of existence, just as rhythm or feeling, under the mode of tone, is the substance of value. Then the rhythm of and in light would be the ultimate reality, and its being and its being experienced would be the ultimate identity that is the ground of all truth. At such a hypothetical bottom it may be that the existential Real is light, just as the ultimate value Real is feeling, and that the ultimate vision is of the harmony of color-tone with space-time as the *Urgrund* of Being. But such speculations should rest upon knowledge vaster than the little that I know or can think, and I must

content myself with the humbler task of showing how color-tone is the primordium of all cultural reality.

It appears to be taken for granted in contemporary metaphysics that Space-Time is the substance of existence, and, as such, the subject-matter of mathematics and cosmology and the so-called natural sciences. We shall argue here, analogously, that Color-Tone is the substance of value and the subject-matter of the "sciences" of experience. It is not proper to speak of these disciplines as the social sciences, at least until the concept of the social is relieved of its hopeless equivocation. And certainly as long as social considerations rest upon the type of psychology and natural anthropology which our "scientists" have been trying to develop, there can be no philosophical treatment of it. For it is not possible, by whatever hocus-pocus, to construct a discipline of the experiences of men upon the mathematical-physical concepts of science. Men do not gather figs of thistles, nor do they find life within the dry bones of physical hypotheses. Before there is a knowledge of life that intelligence can respect, there must be deduced a system of categories appropriate to life in and through which to express life's modes and relations. And appropriateness, fitness itself, will be one of those categories, and not one of the least importance in the system. But the concept upon which the whole system will rest will be Color-Tone, as the elementary category of substance, just as the system of existential categories rests upon Space-Time. Let us see how Color-Tone has been basic to some of the more important of the life interests which have been partly but inadequately formulated.

In morality the very inmost content of the categories that have been developed show unmistakable influences of the color-tone experience. And it is morality we have in mind, not the theory that has been developed long after the forms of practice and of thought have become perfected. It should be emphasized that the central concepts of morality have not been invented by the theorizing mind, but have been, more or less unconsciously, perhaps, worked out of the fixed practices of men, practices that have in part been forced upon men by pressure of external necessity. Thus the concepts good, bad, right, wrong, end, means, etc., have been autonomously forged out of the sheer welter of practice, and derive their elementary factors of significance, as moral concepts, from aspects of the

practice from which they are derived. They have been derived, that is, by extraction of portions of the life-substance from the mass, and their functions have been later found for them and still later refined by processes of abstraction into forms of thought when thought is about life. So what is, in its developed phase, an abstract symbolic instrument of thought, is, in its origin, a chunk of the life-substance taken apart from the whole and used to represent the whole as a concrete factor in the practical relations of men, just as a piece of a batch of yeast is broken off from the mass and used to perpetuate the yeast-mass in the practical relations of baking bread. The same method of origination is common among plants, as a small withe, broken off the tree, will when falling in the mud, become the beginning of another tree. Rose bushes multiply in this way. So our ethical concepts were originally moral realities, and the different functions and types of meaning relation that have developed around them are derived from the qualitative and relational characters of the original bits of life-activity. These characters and qualities become symbolized usually in physical objects used and useful in practice, and the physical object then itself performs the same function in practice that a language or pictorial symbol performs for thought. The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want, thy rod and thy staff—such symbols are themselves hunks of elementary color-tone-sense-feeling, broken off from typical situations and objects generally found in practice to be of marked importance.

This can be illustrated in almost countless ways and from many sources. The poetic moralizations of early literatures are almost wholly made up of images of such bits of life-substance. Poetry is almost entirely composed of successions in metre of color-tone images or eidola with impressive qualities. The beauty of Wordsworth lies largely in the fact that one can see, I mean actually and literally envision, his successions of images and objects come trailing clouds of glory across an actual daisy field. Peter's primrose by the river's brim actually waves and sways in yellowness among the green rushes as a bright bit of the soul of nature. There are no words there, the declensions and inflections literally drip from the forms and movements and colors and tones of the objects you see. It is a piece of the substance of things that furnishes us with our first symbol, and the significance of the symbol in

any case is a memory of the qualities of that piece of substance, however long ago the fact of its origin may have been forgotten. The Christian cross is a piece of the suffering of the Savior, experienced by the devotee through memories of the original suffering, and experienced as the actuality of the original. This bread *is* my body, this wine *is* my blood, these are not metaphors in the vivid experience of the communicant. And it is profanation to refer them to existence and its spaces and times; they are feeling in its modalities of colors and tones.

Now the point of importance here is the fact that the objects, the bits and fragments of life, through which essential meanings are perpetuated, *are* colors and tones. Not, let us hasten to add, the color and tone sensations of the experienter, but universalizations of the colors and tones that are precipitated down from the murky fluid of life and congealed and solidified at the bottom of all experience. These are the hard objects from which the present experienter gets his sensations, and his sensations are mere revivifications of the life-substance that has been immortalized in the universalized colors and tones that are now his concepts. All our experience is made up of such resurrections, Platonic reminiscences, all are at bottom sensory, and in his primitive instinct, if in none of his interpretations of his experience, the empiricist is right. Hume is a failure as an interpreter of experience, but as a senser of things he is among the blessed immortals. And the fact that he preferred backgammon to poetry simply means that to his unusual sensitivity (his great mind) backgammon was beatified as poetically hallowed sensation.

But is it not alone in the rarer forms of experience that color-tone sensations are basic and universal. In the simplest experience of familiar objects every experience aspect of the total situation is simply a mode of color-tone. The pencil I write with, this familiar pipe, this leaf that happens to drift in at the window, anything, everything, is at bottom and in experience a phase or mode of color-tone, and it is such when I put the object to the meanest use just as emphatically as when it is glorified and exalted and sanctified to the most holy. Every concept is therefore a solidified generalization of sensations, embodied and incorporated in some cultural object, and the truth of the concept is in it only and just so long as the quivering quick of life is there to manifest itself in it at every use. And each sensation is some phase of color-

tone, either a color or a tone or some specialized mode of a color or tone such as a taste or a smell or a feel. It is thus that experience is sensory throughout, and any "idea" which hopes to be true must trace its lineage back to the universal color-tone that constitutes the substance of the world as experience.

The structures of a persisting culture are then constituted of objects that are embodied corporations of identities of color-tone, which have been given continuity in history. These color-tone objects are the "habits," fixed but developing modes of action, uniform forms of thought, which have been evoked by relatively unchanging circumstances, complex combinations of habits, thought-forms and action-types embedded in elementary feeling and assuming historic continuity in traditions. But there is no point in the vastness of the complex where a test of its substance fails to reveal color-tone as its elementary stuff, and no possible quality of the structure anywhere that cannot be traced back to the primitive qualities of colors and tones as its arche-type and prototype. This fact is seen perhaps most clearly in religion, where the original experience of the primordium is most vivid and intense, and where change and development have played least havoc with original forms of incorporation. The essence of religion is worship, and the essence of worship is the reinstatement of elementary feeling from the forms and symbols and images and idols in which the elementary color-tone experiences are preserved, the method of reinstatement itself being immortalized in the incantations, prayers, ceremonies and rituals which constitute the body of every persisting creed, and in the absence of which no creed as a conviction or religious attitude and as the embodiment of a mode of faith can survive at all. And in the absence of some form of "show," which probably always represents a combination of play and display, no religious or other conviction can maintain itself against the press of novelty arising out of the change of circumstance. And on the other hand, if a form or structure such as ritual is to perpetuate itself it must do so through the genuineness and living truth of the life substance it incorporates, and this genuineness and life and truth are maintained in the colors and tones of experience.

That is to say, our argument has been intended to show that for cultural reality the ultimate substance is feeling, and that the ground and basis of feeling is the color-tone reality

which gives body to feeling at every point and every instant. This is stating the fact in terms of the experience which every intelligent being feels to be the immediacy of reality for him, and which he must universalize in order to think, must postulate as a background for any continuity his thought may hope to attain. But feeling is all of this for experience and for thought because it is something for itself; it has a reality of its own, fundamental to and in some sense independent of, any experience and any thought, which is shown by the fact that feeling must be hypothecated if experience is to be intelligible and if thought is to have the continuity upon which its necessity and truth depend.

Feeling, as this self-subsistent and self-identical and self-intelligible reality, is Rhythm. Rhythm is identical with metaphysical feeling in the self-identity of Color-Tone, and is itself metaphysically real through the analogical identity of Color-Tone with Space-Time in the constitution of the world. We must now enquire as to the nature of this ultimate fact of Rhythm.

CHAPTER X

RHYTHM

WE HAVE just seen at the end of the last chapter that Color and Tone are fused in reality as Color-Tone, and that as Color-Tone it appears in or as experience, or, rather, becomes the logical and ontological presupposition of experience, the basis and ground of the being of experience. Here we have to describe this logical and ontological ground, and, in this form as elemental Fact, Feeling is Rhythm. Rhythm is dynamic Feeling, and as thus assuming creative capacity, it determines the inertia or passivity of feeling-matter to form, and thus becomes not only the principle of objectivity for pure color-tone formations, but also the principle of discrimination for the forms of art objects. These fundamental postulates we shall attempt to make clear.

We have already in earlier connections noted that Kant's principles of postulation relative to the possibility of experience were limited. Given mere space and time and the idea of creative synthesis no concept of experience is at all possible, and it is highly doubtful if Kant remedied this defect by his adding the presupposition of the Ego, whether transcendental or empirical, or even by his inventing the fiction of the moral will. As a matter of fact the moral will and the ego have no excuse for being except that they are necessitated if Kant is to be able to make up for the failure of the synthetic act to make itself intelligible. The act of synthesis hangs in the air without ground, and the ego is created out of whole cloth to support it. It itself has no ground. At no point does Kant's description go beyond what would have to be called mechanism; it is impossible to overcome the sense of the grind of machinery in the operations by which he describes the processes in which temporal and spatial manifoldness is manufactured into ideas and abstract thoughts, cosmically noble as his performance is. It is obvious that he is under the spell of the Newtonian system, and is doing all that mortal mind can do under those limitations. But this commitment to mechanism is fatal for Kant in that it prescribes for him the psychological standpoint as starting point, for no adequate interpretation of experience is possible on mere psychological grounds; indeed,

for psychology the existence of experience is inconceivable and in any case unintelligible, so that it is driven to the denial of the existence of mind. There is the same tragedy of limitation in Alexander, who sees so clearly the significance of space and time and physical considerations as abstract ontological presuppositions of experience, but who fails utterly when he comes to the interpretation of experience in his discussions of aesthetic questions.

So the postulation of space and time does not provide for the possibility of experience, not even after the addition of the myth of the individualized ego or the mystic moral will. There is necessary, before any concept of experience is possible, the postulates of color and tone and their "synthesis" in feeling as the passive and inert ontological and logical ground; and there is equally necessary the objectification of feeling in Rhythm as the dynamic ontological ground, in addition to space and time and their syntheses, before any intelligible concept of experience is possible at all. Rhythm then becomes the final problem of the objectivity of experience, in that it is the most elementary of the conditions which must be fulfilled before an object can be. In as much as Rhythm thus immediately determines the object, as the last of the object's conditions, it is necessary to come to whatever degree of clearness we may be able to attain as to its essential nature.

We have noted the relation of rhythm to color and tone and feeling. Rhythm is, we saw, feeling in its dynamic aspect, and is the analogue of motion, just as feeling is the analogue of matter. And just as matter and feeling are by nature static, that is, inertia is the nature of matter and passivity is the nature of feeling; so motion and rhythm are by nature dynamic, productive energy is the nature of motion, and creative synergy is the nature of rhythm. It is the purpose of the metaphysic of ethics to work out the analogical identity of motion and rhythm as the identity appears in experience as action; a task which has never been, in modern times, at least, as yet clearly perceived, so there exists no comprehensive thought on the subject since Plato and Aristotle. But it is the dynamic and creative nature of rhythm that we must emphasize here, as distinct from the energetic and productive nature of motion, since it becomes a very important matter later on. But we can here emphasize that the dynamics of rhythm differs in important ways from the energetics of motion, even though

they are in principle identical. Their identity is analogical, and this does not forbid even fundamental differences of nature so long as the ontological position of their similarities is assured. The distinctive feature of the energetics of motion is the fact that motion has an abstract historic ground, that is, motion is predetermined in the conditions that precede it, necessitated in spatio-temporal structure, conditions that are cosmologically prior to the occasion of the motion. This may be imaged by saying that motion implies a *vis a tergo*, although such an anthropomorphic or animistic form of imagery is misleading, since it implies a mystic cause or power, and has been responsible for the breakdown of theology. The concept of motion can only be formulated in pure or abstract logic, and any psychological attempts to clarify such a logical concept always leads to misconception.

The characteristic mark of the dynamics of rhythm is the eschatological ground upon which it rests. This is the point of essential difference between rhythm and motion, and the basis from which one must deny any relation between rhythm and time except the relation of derived analogy, that is, it is an analogy at the second remove, an analogy mediated indirectly through the analogy between space and tone. But the relation to time will be taken up later. The dynamics of rhythm have an eschatological ground which we could indicate, in misleading imagery, by saying that the motivation of rhythmic occasions operates from the future. But this is totally misleading, since it assumes a mathematical or physical relation between rhythm and time, while the relation is purely analogical. As such it is difficult to state, since it must be couched in terms consistent with pure logic, and in especial in terms of pure value logic. On the analogy of the energetics of motion we may say that rhythm has an eschatological ground in that it is *prae*-determined (determined from futurity, before) in the conditions that follow it in time and follow from it (logically) by virtue of the design which those conditions adumbrate. That is to say, rhythm is a dynamic factor (maker) because of the design which is inherent in the conditions upon which rhythm itself rests, or within which it takes the measure that determines it. And this determination does not involve motion, and so not time. Any set of circumstances will by nature be conditioned upon each other, mutually conditioned, merely by the relations that chance to hold among

them; these relations *cannot* hold in the absence of an element of design among them, if we take design in its simplest literal sense of the figure the relations make through reference to each other; some elements of form and structure are inevitable where there are a plurality of relations, however abstract they may be assumed. Now, given such simple or static or structural design, as a mere interrelated set of relations, what, in the *end*, *can* be as an object *is now* prefigured in the designed conditions, and we may therefore say that the object that is to be is dynamically operative *now* in the conditions that are to create it, and operative upon those conditions in a way that may change their incidence upon the object. This is design in the sense of intention, a purposiveness with respect to an end that is not now apparent or operative as a purpose. It is in this way that the dynamics of rhythm rest upon an eschotological ground, and is distinguished in essence from, if identical by analogy with, the dynamics of motion. A rhythmic object need not then be in motion, or manifest motion in any way. The prefigured fact of design in rhythm is proved on the principle of cumulation; hence the relation of rhythm to design can only be made fully intelligible through a development of the entire system of value categories, where the principle of cumulation is observed running all the way through and laying the basis of whatever aesthetic relations there may be, including this between rhythm and design. This designed rhythm becomes, as we saw, the principle for the distinction of art forms, which will occupy us toward the end of this essay.

With this statement of the metaphysics of rhythm, which would have to be developed much further in an exhaustive treatise, we shall pass on to some of the specific problems of rhythm.

The relation of rhythm to quantity and numerical determination is important, especially from the practical point of view of the production of cultural objects. It is useful to know the quantitative aspects of the forms one is creating, since the most convenient way of controlling materials and processes in the production of forms is through the numerical representations of the lines and spaces and masses of which forms are built up. But that rhythm is determined by these quantitative considerations, or is involved in them in any way, is by no means evident. It is not possible to say that a rhythmic object

is created by giving its matter determination by quantitative or numerical attributes; rather, the object is created by design directly, and the quantitative aspects accrue to it from the existential element, by analogy with which rhythm gives it form. So quantity and number apply to value objects only indirectly and through the existential phases of the objects; and the fact that they are accurate representations of the object is due to the element of identity there is in the analogy relation between the existential matter of the object and its value-matter or feeling. In this same way certain aspects of sensation in psychology can be measured and can be said to have the attribute of intensity; but intensity applies to the *sensation* only through the analogy between the experience content of the sensation and its physiological form, so that in reality it is the physiological process that is measured. And the accuracy of the measurement is a partial statement of the metaphysical analogy between mind and body, to which it ultimately refers for the basis of its truth. But it would not be true to say that the intensity or its measure were attributes of the sensation, just as it is not permissible to say that quantity and number apply directly to a rhythmic object. What is true is that quantity and number apply to the existential element of the analogical identity, but not to its value element, and only by indirection do they apply to the identity as a whole.


Rhythm is not in any special or unique way a factor of music. Nor is it a matter of time, as has been almost universally assumed, perhaps from the analogy relation between time and tone. Rhythm is not, in the ordinary sense, a characteristic of tone; it is not, strictly, a characteristic of anything; its relation to tone is through the analogy-identity between tone and color. Rather it *is* that identity. In fact, rhythm is not an attribute of anything, not an attribute at all, but a substance in his own right, in and by itself. And, strictly, it does not "stand in" the relations that are relevant to it. The relations are rather in it. It is the substance which gives meaning to any relation that may be referred to it. It is the substantiality of the identity of tone and color, and is known in experience as feeling. Of course it is true that rhythm is closely "related" to music and time, in that music and time are aspects of rhythm, and we must try to see what the relations are. But it is essential to begin with the denial that the relations are

simple instances of the relation of substance to attribute, which we have already seen is the methodological relation of appropriateness or fitness. And we have seen that the relation of rhythm to music and time is in no way one of appropriateness in the sense in which we have defined this relation. As to the general relation to music, the question is simple. Music is a characteristic value-object form. It is an object carved out of the substance of rhythm. As such it has a content of primordial feeling, and a structure composed of the existential references of feeling, the latter being represented as tone-relations. These tones are, collectively, or by fusion, one of the terms to the identity which we call, in its substantial aspects, rhythm. It is thus in this indirect way that rhythm refers to music, and we shall see that by a similar method of indirection it refers to each of the other value-forms within the aesthetic field. Thus it is evident that the relation of rhythm to music is special in no important way, but is an instance of a more general relation of rhythm to all forms of value objects.

As to the relation of rhythm to time, the question is a similar one in that it is due to misapprehension as to the status of time in the scheme of things. Even if we treat time here as psychological time, or time as it is experienced, there is serious doubt whether it is in any way specially related to rhythm, and certainly not identical with it. In any case this will confuse rhythm with beat, and beat is obviously not an element of time at all, but a phenomenon of quantity or at best of series, and has nothing of the inner sense of movement which time involves. For the essence of real time as it is experienced is lapse, better, the insurance term, lapsation, only there is no feel, in the time lapse, of cessation, but only the feel of the lapse or transition with no hint of a *terminus a quo* or *ad quem*. But this pure transition is pure mathematics and purely a quantitative thing, and has nothing of the life and verve and urgency of rhythm. Mere time lapse is as dead as a door nail, mere abstract mathematical series, while rhythm is often confused with life itself with possibly understandable, if not good, reason.

The reasons thus for confusing rhythm with time are mostly inadequate logical analysis. Its real relation, let us keep in mind, lies in the fact that rhythm is a constitutional identity of color and tone, and tone is the value analogue of time as the one

term in the identity of existence with color, the analogue of space, as the other term. Its relation is, therefore, a second degree analogy relation, a relation of cousinage, as it were, and is vastly more complex than the simple relation of substance-attribute with which it is often confused. Even the first degree or direct analogy relation, such as that of time to space, is vastly more complicated than is the relation of substance-attribute. It is sometimes supposed that rhythm is somehow a function of the order of tones as the order is determined by time relations. But this perhaps misapprehends both time and tone, since if tones are to be subject to pure order then we must keep in mind that a pure order of tones would leave tone without quality, since a pure order is without content, and if it were without quality would become identical with abstract time. But pure or abstract time is itself unreal, since time has reality only through its relation to space. So that if rhythm is a character of pure tone order, and if this order reduces to abstract time, then if also as reduced to abstract time the order is rhythm, then rhythm is meaningless except it be brought into relation to space, which is the only way to realize time itself. What confuses such an argument is the misrepresentation of the nature of the relation of time and tone; this is not a mere direct relation of mathematical identity, but an analogical relation of identity of the second degree, time and tone are merely cousins, since tone comes into relation with time only through its analogical identity with color and through color with space. That is, the way between time and tone is round-about through color and space, through the relation that time has to space and that tone has to color. It may be illustrated thus



where the relation of time to space, and of tone to color, each is an immediate identity by analogy, where the relation of space to color and the relation of time to tone are relations of cousinage, relations of second-degree identity, and where the relation of color to tone is immediate analogy again.

There is no point therefore in attempting to identify time and rhythm simply, since there is less immediate relation between the two than between rhythm and several other things.

Anyway, the attempt to identify rhythm with anything, or the attempt to make it an attribute of anything, are unjustifiable assumptions that rhythm is not a reality on its own hook, but must attach to something in order to justify its being. Instead of this we see that rhythm is real in itself, a substance not reducible to anything nor attachable to anything as a quality or attribute, and is such by its being the reality of the identity of color and tone when that identity is objectified independently of the immediacy of experience. Within this immediacy the identity of color and tone is feeling; and feeling and rhythm together constitute the identity of finality for all objects of value. Rhythm is thus the identity of color-tone in analogy to the identity of space-time in motion. It would therefore be much more nearly true to fact to attempt to connect rhythm with motion than with time or sound, since the analogies upon which the connection would depend are much more direct and are more easily followed in experience. Rhythm is not uncomplicated in its own nature, and cannot endow sound or anything else with a pure quality; besides, there are no pure qualities, nor is anything in the universe pure in this sense of being unrelated, since relation is the basis of the reality of all things. Rhythm is of course a time "relation" in the kinship sense, for everything in the world is a time relation to everything else in this sense; and it is true that the relationship between time and rhythm can be accurately traced; but this fact does not demonstrate a direct dependence between them in either direction. The only thing in the universe that is "pure" is the virginity of ignorance and simplicity of the imagination that tries to represent a relationless entity within its own vacuity. Rhythm is the substantial identity of color-tone in its objectivity; it is a direct analogue of motion which is the substantial identity of space-time. It is analogically identical with feeling, as motion is analogically identical with matter. Motion and rhythm are the dynamic identities of matter and feeling. Matter and Feeling, Space-Time and Color-Tone, constitute the universe; matter and feeling constitute the universe in its matter existentially and inexorably; motion and rhythm constitute it in its form for better or for worse.

Rhythm then is the objectivity of feeling, and the exteriority of all experience. It is then experience made universal, and objective in the sense that it becomes the content-stuff of

all objects within the realm of value. It is therefore ingredient to all sense, or rather that to which all sense precipitates, that in which sense universally finds its object and completeness or fulfillment. It is that toward which sense strives, in which sense finds its ennoblement. It is the "happiness" and joy of the religionist, the satiation of the aesthete, the living calm and repose of the saint and the philosopher. In rhythm every sense process finds, not its end as a process, not a limit in the reaching of which the process is annihilated, this is death; but every sense finds its end in rhythm in the sense of that which it would become, that which it has in it to become, the fulfillment of its being, in short, its harmony or harmonic integrity as an individual. Every sense process is a *nisus* toward rhythm. Each sense process *means* to be the perfect process of its type; each vision the perfect vision, each tone the perfect tone, each taste the whole meaning of taste, every smell all the joyous odor there can be. *Then* each *is* rhythm. They are the rhythm of life, the vibrant vitality that endures, that constitutes the continuity of the historic world; and they prevision the world that could be, the world that would be if all sense were perfect, the world that eternally is in the ultimate design of the last beauty; they "allure to brighter worlds and lead the way."

It is then in rhythm that sense through experience becomes Life. And life is the end of beauty. Not only the end of beauty, but its material, its process, its technique, and its purpose or design. We shall have to see later that beauty presupposes life, and is, in its highest forms, merely instances of individuation of life. Beauty we shall see is the life of richness and abundance, life in its ideal perfection of harmonic rhythm, life that cannot live. There are revelations for us when we come to the final statement—the last judgment of the Beauty which we seek—but we are not prepared for that here. What we must now see is that rhythm, as the Life which sense by the principle of cumulation evolves into, is the content of the various art-forms, or at least an element of that content, and that it is the Life-Rhythm, or design in rhythm, or Designed Rhythm, or rhythmic design that becomes the principle of discrimination among the art forms, and also the standard by which the aesthetic value of any art object is to be judged. The hierarchy of the arts, that is, is built upon this principle, and the degree to which any object

expresses aesthetic purpose is determined by its application. We here note the form of the principle of designed rhythm in some of the more important art-forms. Later we shall apply it to the great art-types, e. g., Beauty, Sublimity, Tragedy, Comedy, to determine the aesthetic significance of each and of the system which they constitute.

Music is the art of the rhythmic design of tones. This does not imply an order of tones, nor do the possibilities of juxtaposition of tones have anything directly to do with order, nor does order have anything directly to do with rhythm. Order is a mathematical form, and attaches properly to existences and their space and time relations. As a consequence perfection of order involves regularity, mechanical fixity of relations and space-time positions. But this sort of construction will not make music that lives in its rhythms, that vibrates and pulses with vitality in its every melody. Rhythmic design is then not order, and the "order of tones" belongs in the musty categories and laboratories of the scientist who only knows. In truth, the principle of rhythmic design or designed rhythm prescribes disorder as often as not, and the rarest and keenest effects may come from the ripple of tones that shortly is to crash into beads of colored gayety over a glassy crag. Nothing is sought more devoutly than to avoid the stiff strides of regularity and primness of form, and the form that best pleases may be the contourless form of formlessness itself. A gnarled twist of tones in a tangled thicket of shadowy shapes gives design to the rhythm of life where a carefully manicured and dolled-up show lies helpless and dead to all beauty. But design is there where disorder has life, and the disorder is the very stuff of the struggle that gives life significance, and the purposeless purpose to be beauty wanders into perfection of form where the staid determination to be orderly gropes blindly to confusion. The demand for order and orderliness comes from the inadequate conception of design which we cannot correct until we come to that conception in a later chapter; and from the confusion of rhythm with the mechanical relations of time and movement which we have already noticed.

Painting is rhythmic design in space and color relations. It is the sense material as precipitated in feeling that after all selects the variations of design which constitute the different rhythmic wholes, and the fact that painting is dealing with

space and color makes it the first of the arts in vividness and clarity of external form, just because vision is our most intimate sense. Tone seems to some persons as the most intimate, but this is confusing intimacy with inwardness, and we have this preference for inwardness from the training and general cultural influence of the past two or three centuries. It is an aspect of the general scepticism which the subjectivist tradition has forced upon us, and will be overcome when the hollowness of that tradition is observed. Painting is nearer to the real life we live than music, for the suspicion that music is the very substance of life comes from our diseased or deceased imagination, which pictures our life within us—the sublimely gross egotism we have inherited from the individualistic tradition. When we have discovered the wholesome fact that our life has its substance in the market and the theatre and the cathedral and the factory, and not in our pious pretenses and holy prejudices and bilious convictions, then life can be beautiful. Painting is the first of the arts of beauty because it shows us that the elemental rhythms of life, the rhythms that are life, even the life in us, are *there* in the forms which our senses picture to us, *out* there in the world in objects, the products of original design. Music is of course great; but when it is regarded as essentially inward and spiritual it is the form that life takes when it withdraws, when it retires into the valley, because there is nothing it can do, when it is defeated and recognizes defeat. It is the symbol, the ritual of renunciation, and accepts the hopeless task of building a world on the sands of sentiment and ignores the solid rock of sense and its ritual of matter by which a world permanent in beauty could be created. But this inwardness is not the essence of music, for music has its own exteriority form.

Painting and music are the two basic arts of beauty because they represent the outer and the inner of the objective world in its essential and elemental rhythmic designs.

Sculpture is rhythmic design in line and mass, architecture designed form actualized in form and objectified in design. They are modifications of painting, the beauty of color. These forms are all primarily expressions of externality, and they carry the immediate impression of reality. Poetry and song are variations of music, the beauty of tone, and have the same inwardness as music although modified to some extent through compromise with color and externality. In many ways the

most perfect of the forms of beauty art are dancing, pageantry, drama, ceremony, in which the combinations of color and tone structures are worked into permanent rhythmic realities beyond the inwardness of subjective life. In the choir and the orchestra even music is recovered and retrieved from its somber inwardness, and is lightened by the colorful forms which external relations set it in. There is thus a sense in which dancing is the highest form of beauty art, both for the individual life and the public life of the outside world.

What we are interested to emphasize is that it is rhythm (feeling) that is uniformly and everywhere the objective substance of beauty and art. Each of the art-forms shows this. Rhythm is the substance of Life, which is the subject matter of all art and the end of all aesthetic experience, *is* life and experience when they are presented in their aspect of exteriority, and it is this elemental feeling which becomes the matter of every aesthetic object. In rhythm therefore we have discovered the principle of objectivity for aesthetics, the principle both *essendi* and *cognoscendi* of the aesthetic object in its final logical and ontological form.

What we have now before us is the task of showing how, and by what logical means and techniques, the principle of rhythm determines the aesthetic object, what, that is, are the categories by which the contemplative intuition, as the active function of living rhythm in thought, grasps the individuality of the aesthetic object. This is the problem of the "deduction" of the aesthetic categories, and will be simple because we shall profit by Kant's mistakes. Instead therefore of finding the categorial principles, or principles of the determination of the concepts of intuition, within the abstract hypothetical *acts* of the intuition, by an analysis of its forms of judgment, we shall assume that the principle of categorization will be objectified and exemplified in the various forms of object which the intuition recognizes, and that the individual categories will be exhibited to us in the universal and characteristic qualities by which the sense-forms of those objects are determined. It is then these qualities which are typic or archtypic of the beauty object that we now seek, and we are seeking the beauty *object* expressly because, when we have the beauty object in principle, we have the final principle of aesthetic determination.

We shall find then the categories of beauty in the typic characters of beauty objects.

CHAPTER XI

LINE

I. WE SHALL begin with a description of line as a simple mathematical fact of space discrimination, and go on to show that it is also a condition-principle of space discrimination, in so far as space, in its general categorial form of extensity, or mass, or in the idea of mass as the universality of space, becomes one of the determining concepts of value theory. Space is not a category of objects in the aesthetic field, but an intuition of objects in the existential field. That is, space, as a thought-form or an intuition-form, determines objects within the sphere of existence, or nature, and not in the sphere of value, or culture. Its analogue in value theory is color. In its simpler or more literal mathematical sense, line, as an elementary value category, is the first step in the definition and determination of an object; and there is no form of art object, or any kind of value object, which does not show it as a prominent feature when contemplated in thought. It thus becomes one of the constitutive principles for every value object, and is the first and simplest of the categories of value logic in that it is a direct implicate of color-tone-rhythm when these immediate sensory concepts are to be considered in relation either to the formation or the comprehension of the value object. That is to say, color-tone, as objectified in rhythm, and operating through the principle of cumulation, anticipates the object through line. Line is then a necessary implicate in, and inference from, color-tone as experienced in rhythm. This means that color or tone or rhythm can be experienced *only as* retrospectively or extroitively determined by line, and can be regarded as elements of objective fact, which they openly claim to be in rhythm, *only as* satisfying the spatial conditions which line implies in its literal meaning. With respect to objects, then, line implies mass, and the implication is real in the sense that either line or mass can be thought as real only as implying the other. Line determines mass and mass makes line determinate, so far as both refer to objects. Its cumulative implication of mass is therefore direct, and it connects mass with color-tone-rhythm when that complex is apprehended in direct experience with the subjective quality of

feeling. It thus results that line has its locus in mass, which is now mass not abstract but mass *of feeling*; or, mass is the substance within which discriminations of line are made, which indicates that lines are directly felt, or that line is a primitive form of contemplative intuition, one of the forms of thought-technique through which feeling is made a part of intelligible experience. It is thus a category of contemplative thought for the feeling experience, and renders the feeling experience intelligible in a way analogous to that by which the intelligibility of "sense" is provided in the concept of cause.

Thus the essence of line as a value concept is its feeling quality, which is its substance. And its feeling quality is, objectively, its relation to rhythm. But this feeling quality or substance can no more be isolated for description than can the causal relation or material substance. In fact line *is* what it in feeling discriminates, what of *difference* it presents within the infinite given whole of feeling when feeling is apprehended as the synthesis of color and tone in rhythm. But it must be carefully observed that line, as thus a conceptual principle of contemplative discrimination, does not presuppose that feeling can act, or that line is the discriminating instrument when constituted and activated by feeling. What is meant is that intuition cannot act without line. It is within feeling as substance that intuition through line discriminates, feeling is the mass or *quantum* within which line makes distinctions. Line is thus, as a contemplative function, an instrument of the act of the cognizing intuition, and is a form *of* or *for* feeling in the sense that it actively gives form *to* feeling. It is related to feeling, or is a "quality" of feeling, only in the sense that feeling is presupposed as the material condition within which contemplation can and does draw distinctions. It is supposed that, since rhythm is the objectivity of feeling, the terms rhythm and feeling can be used, in general, interchangeably, and that the meaning of line lies in its reference to them.

As thus implying feeling-mass as its substance, line is literally a reference to the color (space) ingredient of feeling. But in that it evidently does involve the tonal (temporal) elements of feeling, it will have a pronounced figurative use in value discussion. We shall discuss at some length both characteristics.

The color-value meanings of line, or literal meanings, which are analogical references to space, may be then repre-

sented in terms of the more important features of space. And for our purpose we may connect them with those characters of space which appear in experience as (1) mere abstract or mathematical differences, (2) direction, and (3) distance.

(1) It has already been indicated that line is a condition upon which color may become concrete in experience as a primary determining ground of objects, since a determinate space is necessary to the perception of color. As such, line cuts up space, as the abstract sensory basis of objects, into geometrical contours, and these contours become the limiting conditions of objects, when filled from the inert substance which is the general medium within which all mental activity takes place. This medium is feeling, which thus becomes the material presupposition of the existence of any object as a value. That the primordial feeling should give us objects is, as its simplest condition, because of the elementary contemplative activity which we represent to ourselves as line; or line is the primary active condition of the possibility of the existence of objects as values. In this sense line is the pure concept of distinction, difference discrimination, the simplest elementary form of the activity of the contemplative intellect. Line then is the simplest and most primitive of the logical concepts that determine value objects, because it first represents to the contemplation the feeling substance as differentiated about a locus, the locus itself determining the form, direction, etc., of the line. In the simplest literal case it is the primary fact of distinction between colored masses or masses of color, as figuratively it is the distinction of tonal masses. Abstractly, line is the principle of distinction itself, and it has its "origin" in the processes of contemplation when dealing with immediately presented sensory material. It represents the first and primitive act of intuition in cognizing what is presented, and the act appears, objectively, as the distinguished qualities related to each other by what appear to be their elementary differences.

(2) *Direction.* But this meaning of line which we have just derived is purely abstract. Line has a meaning which is literal and abstract in its reference to space, and yet concrete in the aspect of direction. It is necessary to point out first that direction has two meanings (derived from the ambiguity of meaning of line) which must be distinguished, not that they may be separated but in order to see that by their synthesis

they constitute line. (a) Direction may refer to a determinate part of the whole of a given presentation in feeling, and the part is made determinate by the fact that direction distinguishes and sets apart aspects of the given whole as different positions or loci. It is on the basis of these abstract spatial positions as thus distinguished by direction that the balance of color masses can be represented in a painting, and that, in the figurative meaning of direction, the various tone-masses or volumes are represented as in abstractly different positions in music. In the sense that line implies direction in distinctions of quality, and that direction involves position, we can say that line is the elementary constitutive concept for the more literally spatial forms of beauty experience such as architecture, and that line furnishes the *schema* of consciousness by which directly felt tones are fused in melodies. And inasmuch as any real value will finally be experienced as an object, this static and structural aspect of direction, in which it merely determines positions relatively to each other, will always be a discoverable feature in any beauty experience, and in some will be a dominant feature. It is the objective basis of the attitude of repose and satisfiedness in the contemplation of a beauty object. It is also probably what gives aesthetic attractiveness to mere decorative forms, and it would be unjustifiably limiting the meaning of beauty to fail to include in it such forms.

(b) Direction also involves that feature of line which, while it always distinguishes positions and masses, points out, or shows the way to, a designated point taken as base. But this fact that direction of line from one point to another thus gives emphasis to one of those points in terms of the other, inevitably suggests a sort of material purposiveness, a blind "purposiveness without purpose," or a sort of generalized intent, as the relation which the direction prefigures. The one point thus appears as that *meant* by the other, it certainly is presupposed by the other, and this is difficult to comprehend except when one of the points may be conceived as anticipated by the other as its end. It is thus that the elementary lines of distinction between color masses in a painting all tend to center in one object or item in such a way as to balance the picture as a whole, and this point or object *as* the center of the whole is thus the *objective* at which the painter aimed. But the balance of the whole is certainly the intent of each line as it points

to this central figure, and if we are not allowed to regard this figurative representation of line as its real meaning, it is difficult to attach the character of meaning to anything. It is of course true that the relation between the central object and the lines that determine it is mutual in the sense that the value or meaning of the object is relational rather than qualitative or dependent upon the qualities of the object, since the qualities of the object may be so indefinite as to carry no meaning. The object both determines the lines that establish it and is itself determined by them. It would have little or no significance except as emphasized by the lines, and the lines would have little or no meaning except as leading to it. And, as determining the lines that converge upon it, the object gives meaning and weight to the color qualities and perspective and arrangement qualities which the lines themselves determine. And all this is true in spite of the fact that lines, when considered literally, are nothing but abstract veins of distinction which control the contrast and combination of colors and forms that make up the subject-matter of the picture.

Thus line inevitably compels the interpretation of the value object in terms of a sort of blind purpose, but this purposiveness does not as yet involve any anticipations about the "life" of the art object. It merely means that line as a factor operating through anticipations of mass and form becomes an element in the design of an object; or, in other words, it illustrates the principle of cumulation, to the effect that all of the concepts of beauty depend upon each other for their meaning. And the connection with line here emphasizes the fact that the cumulative relation begins with line, and is determined by line into a definite direction toward design. There is a logical necessity which ties together all the concepts involved in the perception of beauty, and it is this logical continuity and unity of the beauty object that is meant when the object is designated an individual, or is said to possess individuality. A line is meaningless except as determining a form, or distinguishing masses, or designating an object the line relations to which give to masses and forms what significance they have. This elementary connectedness of all constituent parts within the whole of value, which the object of art is, is the special topic for elucidation in connection with the concept of design; but it is necessary to indicate here that the primary

meaning of design, as the final and highest category of value, is prefigured in the interpretation of line.

(3) *Distance*. Line also carries with it the idea of distance, or the idea of a position outside and beyond the position taken as point of reference, and separated from it by intervening positions. Position here is, in general, mere distinctness or otherness from that which has been distinguished. These intervening positions place the distant position where it is with respect to the base, and, as filling the space between them, determine the structure and texture of the total object. These elements of texture and structure, as constructs of distances and directions, are readily perceived to be of first rate importance in determining the nature of the object as a whole. It is through such characters that the more or less independent masses within the object are fused into the whole body of the object, and it is this body of total significance through which the specific characters are endowed with their peculiar part in the meaning of the whole. The art object through which such textural and structural characters are "bodied forth" is said to have distinctness of form and character, and it is to such effects of distance that we must attribute such rhetoric as "psychical distance," which is sometimes said to be the meaning of the beauty object.

It is thus that distance exhibits the duality of meaning that we have observed in connection with all value categories. In a somewhat literal sense, relative distance of positions within the object determines the general effect of proportion, and this is a literal and mathematical equivalent of balance or harmony. It has been determined that architectural and statuary and sculptural forms obey very closely the laws of mathematical proportion, and this fact is conclusive proof that the line structure, in its variations of difference, direction, and distance, constitutes the literal body of every plastic art object, at least, and, with appropriate modification, perhaps of all kinds of art objects. It seems obvious that the foregoing description, which has been expressed largely in terms of color and space, can be stated equally well in terms of tone and time. What is true of painting is true, and in the same terms, of music. We should in any case argue that there is this literal material structure present in any object that manifests beauty; it could hardly be denied when it is recalled that it

has furnished the main ideas of interpretation of beauty since Plato.

There is, also, a confirmation of this function of distance as a factor of line in the determination of beauty in the widely held doctrine of empathy. The elementary apartness of the factors in an object, which is due to the function of line-distance, has much to do with the mass or massiveness with which the object impresses the receptory feeling. This effect is felt as effort, or an inner expansiveness of feeling, which appears designed to equate the perceiver quantitatively with the object, as in the case of the high mountain being perceived in terms of the anticipatevely felt effort required in climbing it. The tall and slender spires of the cathedral "uplift" us in the sense that we feel the significance of spiritually "high" things in their presence. But this literal biological interpretation of empathy seems too much of a conscious carry-over of association, that is, it appears to be due to a conscious effort to make or find an analogy that would express feeling in intellectual terms, reflective rather than contemplative. But the perception of beauty has the same quality of immediacy as any other perception, and does not require an intellectual demonstration. We are never called upon to explain our object in terms of the neuro-muscular mechanisms involved in ordinary perception, and it would seem that the resort to these mechanisms has even less place in the perception of beauty.

This is not intended either as an adequate statement of or refutation of empathy, but it does seem to dispose of that aspect of the doctrine that involves line in its character of distance.

Also, if we are to be driven to metaphor, there seems less reason to seek metaphorical interpretation in terms of biology and the literal physical qualities of the perceiver than in the psychological qualities, which at least suggest an objective, while at the same time avoid a physical, status for beauty. But since both the biological and the psychological metaphors have been pretty well exhausted, they may be abandoned to make way for an explanation which can make use of both but which will regard neither as quite adequate. In fact, it is in part the failure of these methods to furnish any reasonable interpretation of the concept of line that drives us to seek a completer view in the logical interpretation, not of the perceiver, but of the beauty object.

II. *Line As a Logical and Experiential Factor.*

This logical interpretation involves the figurative meaning proper to line. We have seen that each phase of line, considered as a visual fact, will sooner or later, in response to the principle of ambiguity, compel us to interpret it in terms of its figurative meaning, in terms, that is to say, of symbols which have no resemblance to the fact or object represented. Line then becomes a pure symbolic meaning, and in its proper aesthetic use has an analogical relation to the line which, as a mathematical fact, determines the literal or existential forms of objects. Nor is line in this figurative or aesthetic sense merely an arbitrary symbol used to represent a psychological act, or an act of mind considered as interpretable through functions of the organism. It is here not merely the perception of e. g., a difference of colors, not a simple act of distinction between perceived objects that are qualitatively different. All these psychological processes, even physiological processes, are presupposed, not in the direct consciousness of line, but in its aesthetic explanation; they are presupposed, that is, as part of the historic sequence that issues in aesthetic line; but they *are* not that line, nor do they constitute the explanation of the meaning of the line. All these psychological processes are facts to which intelligence can attach a meaning. But in the case of aesthetic line the fact for which a meaning is to be found *is* the meaning, there as a part of the objective world, and the existential factual aspect or basis of the meaning need not appear in the experience of it as meaning. When therefore we speak of the fact of aesthetic line as symbolized to us we do not mean that the symbol appears in consciousness first, and then there follows the consciousness that the symbol which appears represents a meaning. What we do mean is that the meaning appears immediately, and the organic and psychological processes which presumably mediate its appearance do not come into consciousness at all when the experience is a genuine aesthetic experience.

Line then as a pure aesthetic concept is the direct and immediate intuition in contemplation of a whole of meaning as expressing the fact of perceived differences. The perceived differences may be of any kind or kinds whatsoever, and in their nature not limited to the physical qualities of the object as vicariously represented in the previous experience of the

type of object involved. It is thus not the existential object which appears in aesthetic perception, nor is it its perceived qualities, but the wholeness of meaning which these facts and qualities constitute. Line is then not merely the mathematical symbol which represents difference, direction, and distance; this is its literal or existential meaning, and is only the structural half of the aesthetic concept of line. The other half is the fact that difference, direction and distance, as generalized type-characters, immediately constitute a meaning, *are* a significant symbol and directly present a meaning in contemplation which does not require to be mediated *to* contemplation by any specialized psychological devices. They are directly presented in intuition as logical forms. This fact is perhaps what is meant in most aesthetic theory by intuition. But there is no point to making a mystery of the intuition in aesthetic experience. The only thing required is to recognize the two ways in which the cognitive function may work. Its reflective method is through ordinary perception, which presents the existential object and which is explained by analysis of the perceptive act in terms of its physiological and its psychological processes. This is the reflective cognition, and its dependence upon analysis commits it to the assumption that things to be known must be isolated or unique particulars in existence, that only one thing can be known at a time, and the possible relations of things as known are managed somehow after the things are known in severalty.

But there is the other form of cognition which we call contemplation. This recognizes that the interreferent manyness and mutual variety of perceived fact are as direct and original in experience as the isolated, in fact, it insists that it is uniqueness and isolation that are abstractions, and that they never directly appear in experience at all, but are produced there after perception is completed, by some special modification of the knowing act. The wholeness of meaning of aesthetic perception is therefore a direct and immediate experience, and it is only when, for reflective or theoretical purposes, we retrospectively go back to it that we find it possible to discover its atoms. Then this deduction of the concept of line is a reflective process, but the aesthetic concept of line has no reflective meaning as directly applied to a work of art outside aesthetic theory. We explain the constituent features of line when we want to show that the aesthetic con-

cept has a determinate relation to existence; but its existence is one thing and its meaning is another. The meaning is the immediate and underived wholeness which comes to consciousness without inner distinction, the mere bulk or volume of significance which in contemplative experience is the cognitive or noetic core of every feeling, that in every feeling which makes it capable of being felt or of appearing in consciousness or being experienced.

It is this voluminousness to which line cumulatively or by anticipation leads that is the point of continuity between line and mass, and we shall see that the meaning that appears first in line gets a fuller significance when developed in the concept of mass. But we may here summarize the aesthetic significance of line: it is the figurative use of the mathematical or existential concept, which in its aesthetic use refers to differences of masses (figurative) in terms of value significance or import. It is thus the principle of distinction among value elements, and perhaps the basis of all choices among value objects and types of value objects. It is then a principle, a fiction, a figure, it is a meaning as well as a standard of meaning, the *fait normatif*, a particular which instances the universal, a type which appears in a particular, in short, an individual. As such it is best described by illustration.

IV. *Line In Illustration*

(a) Painting

We have just noticed that line completes its meaning in mass, by defining and discriminating masses. Here mass appears as the synthesis in contemplation of mass-feeling considered as the import or total significance of an immediate consciousness. In painting the masses synthesized and contemplated are, of course, color-masses, but we must take color in the very broad sense as including all visual qualities. Line then is the first and simplest condition of an object being a whole, since without the distinction of color-masses no object could be a whole of color. But the significance of line in painting is not limited to its capacity for distinction. Its peculiar significance here is in the general function of direction, since it is the control of attention by line that gives unity to a picture. This will be true of the existential lines in a picture and also of the value lines. Actual lines of distinction are drawn in paint by distinction of color-masses, to divide off

from each other different object-forms. Also, value lines, as mere cognized differences among masses or forms, separate these masses and forms by contrasting or comparing them in attention. And the figuratively drawn line in the one case, and the line of attention in the other, both establish directions toward a goal, an object whose significance is in nothing but the fact that it is the point of convergence of these lines, and, as a center of reference for the lines, the center of balance and harmony for the picture. The lines, both literal and figurative or ideal, thus conspire to concentrate the picture as a whole, and they do this because of the characteristic of direction which is inherent in line whether literal or ideal.

But so far as we appeal to direction in the existential or literal sense, we merely have explained the picture as a structure and described its composition. If we now confine ourselves to the symbolic or figurative aspect of lines we shall find that the picture, if a "work of art," will require us to carry our interpretation beyond the literal colors and the literal masses, and to construct for the picture a meaning that is common not only to all "good" pictures, but to all other art forms. This common meaning is usually described in somewhat vague rhetorical terms, such as "objectivity," or "individuality," or the other stock phrases of criticism. And any of these phrases will serve, provided it is understood that in the entity they attempt to describe there is nothing that goes beyond the control of the categories of contemplation except the synthesis of those categories, itself a category of a higher order in metaphysics, thus recognizing that the intelligibility of the aesthetic object is the meaning of determinable categories. It is not necessary for us here to be dogmatic about the specific name or number of these aesthetic categories, but, whatever the list, it will begin with line as the simplest synthesis of sensuous matter for the formation of the aesthetic object, and will recognize that the original matters for the synthesis are colors and tones and rhythms, all of which must appear in an object which exhibits the aesthetic quality. The *prima facie* character of every object of beauty is that it is delineated, "lined out," and it is clear that, in the absence of this character, the more complex categories of Form, Design, etc., would be meaningless.

(b) Music.

A few suggestions will suffice to show that a similar treatment of line is possible for other types of beauty object. And we take music, overlooking the common superstition that music is so "spiritual" that no structural interpretation of its meaning is possible. It is difficult for one who knows nothing of music, except what he feels in its presence, to speak with confidence about its categorial structure. But he may be able to offer something just because of the necessity to invent concepts as he proceeds. Perhaps it will be granted that a certain type of inter-reference of tonal elements and relations of technique is possible; but, this granted, a structural, i. e., categorial interpretation of the deepest meanings of music is called for at once. For, given any degree of relational stability, a degree of fixity of quality follows. We shall be prepared to argue then that line, as a stable relation, is not only a literal element in the structure of music, but that it appears as a necessary qualitative ingredient in the subtlest of musical meaning and figure. Even at the point where imagination, under the force of fine music, feels its freedom of choice in selecting imagery for the meanings furnished by the music, the choice itself is clearly dependent upon the principle of distinction involved in line if it is to get any kind of expression whatsoever. We may pass then directly to the consideration of line as a category applicable to the meanings of music, that is, to the demonstration that line in its symbolic and figurative sense is one of the conditions within the general basis of any meaning in music, and thus a category for the contemplation of the highest values of music.

If we begin by recalling that line in music, as we use it, is the principle of distinction of tone-masses, we can, with a little reflection upon our previous results, exhibit the point of our argument without further difficulty. Line, let us say, is distinction of tone-masses. But we have shown that the aesthetic interpretation of such terms requires that they be given a value content. But tone-masses are ideal meanings already, since the quality of mass (volume) rescues it from existential intension, or physical intensity, or psychological loudness, and the only task remaining to us is to show that, by the distinction of tone-masses by line, higher forms of tonal value are created, and that line becomes the principle of structure of these higher

from each other different object-forms. Also, value lines, as mere cognized differences among masses or forms, separate these masses and forms by contrasting or comparing them in attention. And the figuratively drawn line in the one case, and the line of attention in the other, both establish directions toward a goal, an object whose significance is in nothing but the fact that it is the point of convergence of these lines, and, as a center of reference for the lines, the center of balance and harmony for the picture. The lines, both literal and figurative or ideal, thus conspire to concentrate the picture as a whole, and they do this because of the characteristic of direction which is inherent in line whether literal or ideal.

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value forms. It may be said, after we have the intuitive image of value structures composed of tone-masses and principled by lines, that these structures will manifest the features of difference, direction, and distance that we found in the meaning of line. If this is thought to spatialize music, then it is to be remembered that tone-forms as such, and because of their place in the constitution of rhythm, "have" color, and that color we have found to carry a necessary implication to space if a value object which manifests it is to have existence as the condition of being perceived. And if it is said that it is only by a metaphor that we speak of color in connection with tone-harmonies, our answer is: Exactly so. This we have accepted, and metaphor, figure, symbol, has become the instrument for the interpretation of value objects as real. We insist that this metaphorical or analogical relation *is the reality* in cases like the color of a tone or the tone of a color; only, this does not permit to metaphor its literary use, which deprives it of stable meaning. Analogy, and the real relations it connotes, have meanings determined by fixed principle, and that is all that is required in the interest of truth. Through the implication of color and analogical space in tones, the quality of pitch belongs to them, and it is through this quality of pitch that music, as a form of value object, is endowed with capacity for existence. In the absence of pitch and the analogy to existence, music would be nothing more than the abstract rhythm of the imagination, a synthesis of intuition in abstract imagination, before there has been furnished to the imagination a means of expression, which seems to be the notion of all beauty as held by the intuitionists and expressionists. But what music would be in the form of an abstract imaginative plan, or as a pure inward spasm of spirituality, and before it is given existence in tones and lines, etc., is hard to imagine.

But with tone-masses as structured by line the various factors of a musical composition form a meaning-whole, an object with all the characters of existence and value that are possessed by any other object; and music is as objective as any art, despite the rare "spirituality." And in the formation of this object line has a large share and stands as the first category of objectification beyond color-tone-rhythm in music as it does in painting. If it be asked just what is it that line does in the creation of music, the reply seems to be that line *determines the direction of a melody*, perhaps by

controlling the distance, position, etc., relations of tones. Tones are after all set by lines in the position where they function by their essential relations in rhythm, and as this rhythm *is*, as experience, feeling, the same relations determine the conditions of perception. And as the meaning of line is essentially relational, it becomes a constitutional principle for all value structures.

(c) Architecture.

Here we have line determining masses in color-tone as in the case of painting, and both the qualities of color and tone are represented in their figurative meanings, that is, their qualities are referred to their analogical identity in rhythm. The lamentation that color is not a feature of modern architecture is therefore hardly justified if we can agree to accept color as including all perceivable light phenomena. If color is not a feature of contemporary architecture the fault lies in the fact that there is no rhythm, that is, no value- or art- or aesthetic-being in it. But there is an occasional rhythmic structure, which needs not be plastered over with pigments to give all the color its value constitution requires. Where there are real spaces, I mean ideal spaces, there can be no want of color, for space, when genuine, expresses its own color, which is its aesthetic value. The tragedy of our ignorance here is exemplified in the fact that we paint concrete, smear it with pigment! And, characteristically, we paint it a foul sickly yellow which makes it look like queasy old rotten cheese. But there will be no objection to tone as a quality of architectural objects when we remember that "frozen music" is precisely the type of object to which color and tone in their reality-meaning properly apply, the meaning being what we have designated the figurative or metaphorical. Architecture therefore gives us strong justification for insisting upon the ambiguity of all aesthetic concepts, and for emphasizing our claim that it is the neglected or unrecognized metaphorical meaning that is the real signification of these concepts. Perhaps modern architecture is not colored in the literal sense precisely because, when it is art, it can carry any or all possible colors in the metaphorical sense, and it would indeed be a limited imagination that would perceive a beautiful structure in none but the color which it actually "has." This does not mean that one must see the structure as of any

distinct color, but it does mean that unless he sees it with the feeling of the possibility of its being colored with definite hues, and with this possibility directly presented as actual, he probably does not see it aesthetically at all. The smoke- and dust-grimed dinginess of an old building does not destroy its aesthetic value if it has any, just as it by itself or any other surface modification could not give the building value if it did not have it. Our whole argument rests on our assumption of the prior reality of the metaphorical meaning of sense values, and we shall leave it at that, with the reminder that no object would manifest the character of line as an aesthetic quality, as architecture so nobly and emphatically does, if it did not possess the characteristics of color and tone.

But architecture certainly possesses line as one of its chief characters. And perhaps the most prominent feature of line, in this form of art object, is that which we have designated direction, and which in this connection we are to take in the sense (here literal) that line suggests the plan of the structure through cumulative relation of parts to each other and to the whole. In this sense it points forward to design (in the literal sense), in which it synthesizes the intervening categories of mass and form. But also as taken figuratively, convergence of line (in meaning) shows the total purpose or meaning of the structure, and, taking this in connection with the literal meaning of line, we have, perhaps, in the architectural structure, the most perfect representation of design in its full aesthetic sense. We might distinguish the design of architectural structure as objective, as contrasted with that of sculpture as subjective, in that the latter shows a design (subjective) as formed or objectified in the matter of the figure, while the former manifests the objective design in the formal intent of the figure. But here enters the curious relation to the sublime in architecture which we can not explain until we have worked out the theory of the sublime. But we can say here that it is not size, or "fear," or any of the traditional qualities of the sublime that is suggested by good architecture.

The element of distance in line suggests color-tone-mass relations in elementary physical feeling and psychical interest, or intent, or purpose. Here lines are pure values in the figurative sense that they present an object in the form of pure feeling, where the physical or literal character of line subsists as pure hypothesis or presupposition of existence without be-

coming a part of direct experience. Your castle in the air may be more divinely perfect than any in existence; and it is by so much the more real. This separation of pure value from its existent base, or the superseding of existence in the realization of value, occurs at the perfection point of all the fine arts, and is accomplished by the element of line in its structure. In so far as line is the *literally* prominent feature of an art its best expression is in sculpture. In this form line tends to obliterate itself by cumulative emphasis upon form and mass, and thus to approach pure design in objects in which the two meanings of design are best distinguished—lines in their fullest meaning execute the meaning of an object in structure and purpose.

Line thus is clearly the most elementary of aesthetic categories. But it emphasizes, in their simplest primitive states or stages, the characters of all the other categories in such a way as to establish the principle of cumulative continuity and mutual implication by which the aesthetic object is determined by the categories, and by which the aesthetic categories are united in a logical system. It is by virtue of the interconnections of categorial characteristics in an experience-situation that objects appear, and it is this anticipation of the object, which the presence of line establishes in all aesthetic forms, that determines it an objective category; and it is the fact that the reference of line to the object is mediated through the other categories that a definite order is established among the categories; and it is the specific type of categorial order among the aesthetic categories that determines the aesthetic object as different in principle and species from other types of object. Next immediately following line in the aesthetic system is mass, which we proceed to discuss.

CHAPTER XII

MASS

The simplest and most direct element of connotation of mass is exteriority. For experience things are out there before they are qualities or relations. We do not even require any notion of space as distinct from the notion of externality in order to get the impression of a something distinct from our feeling of immediate consciousness, and it is at least possible that the notion of a something beyond the immediacy of what we feel is prior to the idea of space. It may even be that space, as the idea of something objective, is derived from the more elementary notion of exteriority. But whatever may be the way in which we must finally envisage mass as a common-sense conception, or even as a metaphysical conception, it has a meaning in sense experience that is possible to describe with some degree of completeness and precision. And it is this latter meaning in sense experience that we require for aesthetic purposes, and we may proceed to inquire in that direction.

Like all other concepts of sense experience, mass has a double meaning, two distinguishable kinds of meaning, and we have stated this general truth as the law of ambiguity. Mass then has a double reference, gets its meaning from two universes of discourse, which, as we have noted in connection with other concepts, are the universes of existence and value. As the aesthetic object is in every case an instance of valued or valuable existence, or of existing or existential value, it must, if it is to have its meanings categorized, find those meanings such as to lie consistently within both these realms at the same time. And, as language is adapted primarily to the description and categorization of existence, the working the pure value meanings into the forms of the existential is a task of some difficulty. Another difficulty comes from the fact that language apparently has historically taken it for granted that only one of these realms, the existential, is real, while the other is illusory and unreal and its objects suitable only as means of entertainment and delectation. As a consequence the very language in which values came to be expressed also came to be regarded as having no reference to reality or truth

reference, so that the language of form or figure or imaginative representation was not supposed to be true or to have any relation to truth or to be taken seriously. As a consequence the aesthetic object, in any case the aesthetic use of language, was accepted, perhaps still is, as merely to please the fancy, and pleasure in terms of the excitement of the sensory or imaginative life was accepted as the essence and purpose of art. And while artists continue to create, so long as they are not bribed and bludgeoned by the commercial lunacy in which we moderns live, the theory of the object they create, or of the method by which they create, has no relation to that object or method, but refers to the hypothetical inner capacity for pleasure, which we have seen to have no relation to values or to the reality of values at all.

What it is therefore that is ontologically implicated in the existence of an aesthetic object, or in the existence or occurrence of the experience of an aesthetic object, becomes a serious and crucial question. Our answer to this question, in this chapter and under the limitations of its subject, is, that the substantial stuff of the object, as it can be identified in a concrete experience, is mass; and we must proceed to explain. The first step in the explanation is to restore the ideal truth of what we have called figurative language, as based on the dual nature of aesthetic reality, which we have formulated as the principle of ambiguity.

Mass, then, is a generalized reference to the element of exteriority as the exterior appears in a concrete experience. It is what is out there *for sense perception*, and as such is distinguished from matter, which is externality only for the theoretical or reflective intellect. Matter is thus a concept of existence, refers to the world of space-time and motion, and has its place in the system of existential concepts. Mass is a concept of value, is what, in universal terms, the primordial feeling *is* in the experience of a concrete object. Hence it is a mode of color-tone-rhythm, and its relation to matter and existence is one of analogy. There is therefore a necessary reference to existence in the experience of mass, but the reference is mediated in every case through the analogical relation. So that when e. g. the volume of a tone-structure is mentioned, there is by necessity an implication of intensities, tensions, motions, etc., and other modalities of existence, in the vague idea of the instruments producing the tones; but these im-

plicates are indicated as only and merely *there*, supplying a sort of neutral background against which the value aspects of the volume are experienced, but having nothing to do with either the process of the experience or with the determination of the object experienced. The volume as the essence of the object experienced has its stuff from the realm of color-tone, with the qualitative characters of colors and tones in the background, but nevertheless quite obviously furnishing the expanse of voluminousness from which the concrete experience of volume is as it were cut out or derived. It is thus clear that the idea of mass in the concrete as a volume of tone has no direct or reflective relation to existence, but is a pure construct of value or color-tone. And, as a construct of color-tone, its substance is quality in that aspect of quality, viz., exteriority, which is analogous to the aspect of extensionality in existential or space-time relations. When we say that the substance of the object *is* quality we are not falling into contradiction, as we should be if we were thinking on existential grounds. The principle of contradiction does not allow of the identification of opposites; but only of their abstract or reflective synthesis; but the principle of appropriation, according to which opposites are identified when their essential differences are complementary, enables us to regard the reality aspect of an object as either substance or attribute, and which it will be in a given case will depend upon the nature of the total complex of value relations in which the object has its locus. Thus I may speak with perfect consistency either of the soft brilliance of a colored light, or the brilliant softness of the light, and the preference of the one as against the other will depend upon what aspects of the aesthetic whole it is that I want to express. Poetic images are poetic because they can and do exchange their raw substance for their more engaging quality, as the personality may dissolve into a smile, or the jolly colors of the sunset may stiffen into the substantial gloom of darkness.

Mass then has two kinds of meaning, and the duplicity of the term is not a symptom of logical weakness. It is the source of the fundamental strength of the term that it can carry implications of meaning of differing and contradictory types; in fact it is this capaciousness that is characteristic of aesthetic terms. And while there is, because of this character, a certain affability to not ill-intentioned dissimulation in all aesthetic

concepts, it is just the expansiveness and contagious generosity of the elementary feeling substance, here called mass, to which they are giving expression in this character. Through their duplicity, that is, they give expression to the substantial quality of value. Both kinds of meaning are aspects of aesthetic concepts, and in spite of the fact that one aspect refers to existence, both are aesthetic characters in that the meanings which they carry are meanings within the sphere of value, and while some of the terms in which they are expressed are normally terms of existence, yet their meaning-direction is determined for them by positions established by the concepts and relations of the value-system. So when we speak of a great fear or a monstrous passion or a gruesome sound our adjectives may carry a reference to the world of size, shape, etc., yet it is to a size and shape that are capable of being felt, or rather a size and shape that can only be felt, can only, that is to say, be represented as substantiated color and tone. A long list of terms that ordinarily have a purely existential reference have this aesthetic use in spite of their literalness, such as those expressing size, shape, space, volume, density, and such terms express the literal meaning of mass in aesthetic connections. But in addition to this there are a lot of terms, ponderosity, weight, density, inertia, importance, significance, etc., which express the more figurative meaning of the idea of mass.

Mass is therefore the aesthetic matter of concrete sense-experience, feeling with its essential attribute of exteriority, the stuff which represents all the possibilities and potentialities of sense-experience, and is capable of developed expression in two distinct but related directions.

But not only is mass given to us in the immediacy of sense. In a metaphysical sense it is implied by all qualities and relations, and in so far as quality and relation are regarded as having their being in the thought-aspect of the world, mass becomes the postulate of a stable background upon which thought in an important sense depends. For quality and relation, for thought, require a basis in which to inhere. At this point the metaphysical implications become logical implications, and with this change there emerges the further fact that mass is implied by all categories of thought, not only all aesthetic categories, but all categories of whatever kind. In this sense mass has its meaning largely in its retrospective refer-

ence to feeling, and there is an interesting question here as to whether all logical implication is or is not merely a generalization from the uniform psychological fact that all meaning lies in a throw-back from a presented or imagined given datum to the substance created by the historic succession of givens which appears, in conscious form, or as consciousness, in feeling. But this we may leave for the logicians to work out after they have learned that for every term there must be a reference to reality somewhere and of some kind that can be translated into terms of consciousness if it is to be known. But in any case mass enforces itself upon us, intrudes in every experience with the claim that it *is* what experience is *about* in every case, is the stuff to which all empirical attributes belong, and this means, aesthetically, all possible attributes. It is then the ground of all distinctions, relations, etc., in aesthetics, and at least a ground of all distinctions of any kind, even such elementary distinctions as we make within the fundamental identities, as space-time, color-tone, motion-rhythm, passivity-activity, etc. It is then the medium in which all the analogy-identities hold, and in this backward aspect of cumulation, ties all previous concepts together in the continuity of value-being. We shall see as we take up other concepts that its cumulative character also runs all the way through the continuity of concepts in the other direction, which makes it a sort of pivotal concept around which all other concepts revolve, a sort of sun to the value categorial planetary system. Viewed from the point of view of this methodological relation of cumulation, mass is the Ground of all aesthetic distinctions.

In this backward reference to more primitive categories, its relation to line, as the next more primitive, is peculiar. For, the relation of appropriateness is immediately suggested, by which the identity between line and mass may be regarded as an implication in either direction. Line may be regarded as prior to mass, and to determine it, so far as the concreteness of any object is concerned. On the other hand, mass may as well be regarded as prior to line, and to determine it, since line presupposes masses to be distinguished. It seems necessary for lines to assert priority by cutting the realities of objects out of the postulated mass; on the other hand, it appears as necessary that mass should prescribe to postulated lines the object types which it is to be possible for them to cut out of itself, which objects, that is, they are to be permitted to create,

and this permission, it seems possible, could always be denied. The volume of a tone will predetermine the melody lines and their directions, which can be erected upon itself as a basis, and thus determine the tonal objects that are to be made out of its substance. Similarly, a color given in terms of mass will predetermine the relations that are possible between it and other color facts, and in controlling these relations will draw the lines that determine the types of color objects that are to be made of its substance. Lines that are to be possible in these cases will depend upon the original masses, and it seems that there is a sense in which line is a mere mode of mass regarded as its substance. But looked at the other way, in order that there should be a given mass of color or tone, there appears the prior necessity that, when given, it is to be distinct from other things, must have its individuality defined, and this definition is the work of line. It is because of this ambiguity that the expression "mass of color" is equivocal. "A mass of color" is not the same as "the color of a mass," or "the mass of a color." "A mass of color" indicates a color-quality with certain of its categorial relations determined. "The color of a mass" indicates a color as a pure quality regarded as belonging to the mass. So that the better expression is that of the analogical identity, "color-mass," in which the pure cumulative relation is indicated between the two categories, and also their relation of continuity in both directions within the system of value categories. Consequently, the implicative relation as used in reflective or existential logic is hardly adequate to state the nature of categorial relations among values; there seem to be elements of meaning in the value categories that escape the net of ordinary logic, even if in the argument by which this fact is demonstrated the existential logic is fundamental. And it would be a valuable thing to do, given the opportunity, and the capacity, to work out the logic which demonstrates the relations, and the distinctions, between the logics of existence and value on this point. It may be suggested that this is the logic of metaphysics, the demonstration of the integrality and analogical identity of the system of categories which show the identity of thought with its object, with the system of categories which show the identity of intuition with its object, and thus combine the ordinary logic with value logic in a logic of metaphysics in a way that completes both. I think it could be further ven-

tured, if more timorously, that this ultimate logic will resemble the logic of aesthetics. But it all means that little is yet known of the directions of signification which are wrapped up in the function of implication. Incidentally, if the "logisticians" can calculate these directions in the abstract symbolisms of mathematics, they will have done perhaps the first sum in the calculation of reality; but it must be impressed that this first step is purely methodological and is not yet even on the way toward the goal which all thought and all experience ultimately seek, viz., that all constructs should ultimately have or make sense.

One thing that aesthetic mass does not mean is physical mass, although there is a relation of analogy to physical mass. I have no clear idea as to what mass means in physical theory, but there is obviously that involved which implies substance. And it is through this implication of substance that a relation of analogy holds to aesthetic mass. What is probably clearer is that the concept of mass carries a reference to objects in both cases, and the suggestion comes from the fact that what is ultimately "there" is a complete or whole object. It is probably an effect, realized in advance of its existence, of the prospective influence of individuality, toward which all concepts of both the existential and the aesthetic system look as to that in which they will be objectified. That aesthetic mass has this *nîsus* toward the whole is shown by the fact that the principle of cumulative continuity is universal and pervades the entire system. And, for all we know, this principle of cumulation may be an expression of the existential essence of time as time functions within the analogical identity that appears in experience as mass, and as such becomes the principle of individuation for all value objects. If we can then say that this tendency toward the whole is fundamental, there will follow strong reasons for rejecting a type of theory which is characteristic of our shallow thought upon aesthetic questions. I refer here to the theory that aesthetic experience is an interpretation of the superficies of objects as represented to us in the physiological and physical processes of sensation. The aesthetic "object" is the "surface" of things as represented to sense, and consists, apparently, of nothing but abstract physical qualities. But this can lead no further than a superficial psychological aesthetic, since no reality can be found in the experience except the mere mental processes by which

abstract qualities are represented. How feeling comes into contact with the essential meaning of things on such a view is a mystery, since by the ordinary psychology sensation and feeling are regarded as different in elementals. And as a consequence aesthetic reality is necessarily subjective in the sense that there could be no actual sharing of an aesthetic object by different minds. And a further consequence is that the experience could never express itself in judgments, except upon narrowly epistemological assumptions as to the nature of judgment, which reduce judgment to some sort of association of ideas. But such a judgment is merely accidental and "empirical," and lacks the character which makes judgment the subject matter of logic, viz., necessity. The concurrence of such psychological judgments could never be proved, and would have to be accepted as merely an interesting but not very important fact.

It seems clear that the aesthetics of surface is itself superficial. And the prevalence of such attitudes has unfortunate consequences for the arts. Unless the aesthetic experience involves somehow and somewhere the solid objects of reality the arts will suffer from shabbiness and hollowness. And this genteel slovenliness seems to be the dominant ideal in many of the arts. Architecture puts up a bold front, but its inner substance is often so insubstantial as to constitute the whole a fraud. A thin veneer of flashy surface material often covers the coarsest of inner substance, and a flimsy "frame" structure often wears a dress like Solomon's lilies. The aesthetic quality runs all through a genuine aesthetic object; it is a quality of the mass of the object; the painter of the human form must know the anatomy of the form, and can not hide a muscle that isn't there with whatever graceful lines and gaudy colors. Many a building "looks good" only from a mathematical point from which its surface pretence hides a horror, and if you move an inch from position the sickening truth is jammed into your face by a pile of brick-bats or a wall of petrified pancakes. That this sort of thing is wrong can be imagined by wondering just what would be the effect if the other side of the moon were really green cheese.

What would happen to the light if the moon should wobble in its course one shudders to contemplate. A surface that is not backed with solid objectivity may throw a flash, but a flash is not the function of art. Ruskin is so obstreperously

right on this point, and his criticisms of the world of shallow sham are final. One need not make his mistake and jump at once to moral conclusions, although his instinct that aesthetic reality and moral reality both rest upon the everlasting hills of metaphysical mass is sound.

It may be that we have here the secret of the force there obviously is in "cubism" and the tendency to an ugly sort of realism in literature. Behind the showy appearances of things there is the massive substance; and it is art's function not to polish the smudge of a thing until it belies its nature, but to show that in its very grotesque uncouthness there is the substance of a solid beauty which is not supposed to be visible to him who will not pay the price of understanding. And while this does not justify the commercial artist's principle of filth for filth's sake, it does mean that the realities cannot be shirked in the interest of art, but will confound every sham and fraud that are imposed upon them.

Mass as individuated by line is the essence of painting. Colors are unintelligible, aesthetically, when represented as mere depthless space. Unless determined toward individuality by the distance and direction effects of lines, colors appear as the sides of a barn, and their thinness betrays the very qualitative effects they hope to produce. Colors can have no fundamental relations to each other except through the substantial ground they express, but stand merely juxtaposed with primarily none but contrast effects. Surfaces will not fuse, and real mixtures are effected only through the body which the colors share in common. And in the absence of the suggestion of depth they give no expression to the demand for the object in which they can appear as real; they have no meaning except in so far as they help to constitute that body.

And in music the whole burden of meaning is expressed through the voluminous mass of tones. Tones light in volume are themselves significant largely as lines which help to define masses. And there can be no rhythm in a vacuum. Only as there is substance behind the tone quality can the tone quality be embedded in a melody, and every relation among tones must be seated upon a mass, in order that it may have a medium in which to reverberate. And the whole structure of musical beauty is built upon a foundation of simple volume. The rare quality of organ music rests upon the eternal rock of continuous volume which gives it the effect of ponderable

grandeur. Even the violin has its bowelly weight, however lightly its tones play about the stars, and the music of the spheres transcends sound in the dignity and majesty of an infinite ponderable space.

And to take the most difficult example, dancing has its solid substance in the very instability of the motion and the rhythm with which it creates its universal forms. It is true that in realizing its mass, dancing, like every other art, with the possible exception of those expressing sublimity, transcends its massive basis in the grace it converts it into, but the mass is there still to give its forms permanence and thus to enable them to express design. And the more perfectly it accomplishes this transformation the nearer it approaches to a representation of the pure rhythm which is its substance. This is perhaps the significance of the element of grace; its fragile reticulations are the more expressive in that they represent their basis in mass in terms of the motion which is the analogue of rhythm; and rhythm is the substance of life in every art form.

It has already been noted that mass by line anticipates form. Form is, too simply stated, only mass fashioned by the discriminating effect of lines. Mass is, dynamically, that which contains within it the cumulative promise of design, and, the design fulfilled, the mass is formed. It is with the concept of form that we pass from the material categories, or from the categories which possess some element of matter or inertia along with their dynamic and active nature, to the categories of pure activity. All the previous categories have given evidence of their ground in the material passivity of feeling; all have been aspects, in some way, or modes, of the being which has not yet become; and all have had some share in the transition through which the primordial feeling passes from abstract being to being-with-form. Line has begun the process of pushing mere being out of its fixity, and has made the first and simplest distinction between what merely and abstractly *is* and that which is and has or *is form*. Mass has hastened the process of transition until being is suffused with active agency throughout, and in some artistic connections, as in the case of the organ and the 'cello, mass has approached so near form that the weight of the very tones itself becomes active and filled with designs upon design. At a point that cannot be specified in language, but which is easily recogniz-

able in any good music, the distinction between the volume of sensuous matter in color and tone, and the matterless empty potency of the form of their arrangement and structure, is entirely lost, and form and mass disappear by fusion in the design that creates. The same transition of mass into form is a prominent feature of painting; the volume and weight and ponderosity of color become transformed into airy structure, which floats away into a spaceless realm with a constitution after its own kind, where lines are no longer boundary marks but ties that bind contrasting masses into flawless harmony. And what is true of music and painting is true of all art; for they are the two sources of all aesthetic structure; the one the wizardry that creates life and individuality out of the nothing of raw color, the other the genius of mere formless tone to become the expression of the very life of individuality.

But at this point already form is Design. By the principle of ambiguity form is structure, in the literal sense construction, and represents the framework or skeleton which has no capacity but to receive the flesh of color-tone from the hands of the *Ursache* Rhythm. Form here is essentially shape, and refers in the most plebeian literal way to the contoured modes of matter as they exist in ordinary things. And without this form no aesthetic effect would ever be possible, for it is the literal source of the sensations whose fusions are the primordium out of which all aesthetic reality is made. It is the "material of the arts." Not only is this literal form the point of origin for the feeling, but it is also the beginning of the active agency which culminates in design. Design comes into being, in both its literal and its real or figurative sense, when my hand traces its first expressive line, or when I pass my hand over the curving body of a vase, or when I take in my hand a good woodworker's tool. No rational being can remain without an essentially aesthetic purpose while he holds in his hand a good hammer, and no man can be coarse or crudely rough who adapts his body to a good saw or adjusts himself in position before a good set of drawing instruments. In such cases the form which is as yet only possible in the conditions has prescribed the design and its direction of intent. And when we approach the phenomenon of figurative, that is, real, form, the distinction from design is largely theoretical in the sense that it cannot be perceived but is known only as the necessary implicate of presented conditions. Here form is, in so far

as it can be anything perceptible, arrangement. And the types of arrangement are as many as there are aesthetic situations, which means that ideal form is individual. So there is mere arrangement of things in space; but the mere presence is itself aesthetic when the things arranged in space are furniture placed in a room by the hand of a woman of taste. The arrangement of tones in a melody, of colors in a mass, of movements in a dance, of lines in a statue, even of thoughts in discourse, and of images in poetic figure; these are the forms that are real in the aesthetic object. How subtle this may become is seen in the delicate traceries in abstract designs, and the incomprehensible ideality of the "arrangements" of tones in complicated music.

But there is still a more evasive type of form. The pure qualities of colors and tones, when taken singly and by themselves, have their unique forms, born of their mass quality. The form here is the self-identity of the quality itself, and so far as it has any origin or explanation, it is the rationale of the cumulative continuity of the aesthetic concepts as they exist in the color or tone as yet only as the quality's promise of ultimate design. The meaning of the whole aesthetic structure of the world is latent in color and tone, and this is its meaning as color and tone. For one who has no feeling for this aesthetic structure of things "a primrose by the river's brim a yellow primrose is to him"—that is, there is no yellow for him who can only see yellowness in yellow, and does not see the primrose in the yellow with the universe it helps to create. Unless there be in the color perceived the forms of the perceiver's hopes and aims, his aspirations and desires, even his food and warmth and pain, there is no object there for him, no world is presented either in perception or idea. A "plain" color therefore has a "form" as a shaped pigmented mass, but it also has a form in the structure of the world it is its function to help create. And this is the meaning for which we have been trying all along to find statement for the principle of cumulative continuity within the system of aesthetic categories. Each category possesses all the meaning of all the other categories; form tells us that each possesses this meaning in its own unique and individual way, expresses the meaning of the whole from its own unique and special position. There is therefore no mystery about the form of an idea or of a mathematical function or symbol; its form is the relational system

it intends or in which it expresses the meaning of the whole. And in abstract cases the form is nothing but the conceptualized relationality of a system whose terms are all themselves relations. That is to say, the only mystery there is to form in these cases is the mystery of thought itself; and it is at this point where the reflective approaches near the contemplative form of thought; in fact contemplation is nothing but the thought that has gained such self-control that it can entertain realities as they are and as they present themselves without pick-and-shoveling them beyond recognition as reflection does its objects. The reason that can assent to the reality is the reason that will and can know reality as it is, and this reason is the faculty that is operative in contemplation. It is through form as the spirit of mass, then, that thought attains oneness with its object, the discovery in aesthetic experience that there are objects whose form is identical with that of the thought which knows, whose form *is* the form of the thought that knows. And the discovery that in this ultimate noesis the reality of the world is discovered to be present in our life, becomes pictured in our poor minds in the feelings we have in the presence of beautiful or true or good things; this finding the reality at the point where the search began in the first self-questionings and inner quiverings of feeling—all this is accomplished in the simplest apprehension of the commonest sensible thing.

The mass of my feeling is then the origin of the world, and its destiny. It is its origin in that it points backward to the beginning of all that is worth in the primordium of color-tone. And we can make our way back to this original because the way is made straight and narrow in the intervening categories. Feeling-mass is the world's destiny in that the inevitable onward surge through form to design is plotted and planned when mass is discriminated by lines. No longer are we limited to the dead and the inert, what can only be moved. Mass creates itself form, and anticipates the design which becomes the world's first agency. Henceforth the realities of feeling create their own world, and culture in the realm of values becomes autonomous.

This active principle begins to take uniqueness of form, that is, individuality, with the aesthetic concept of form, to which we now turn.

CHAPTER XIII

FORM

WE WERE obliged to discuss the essential meaning of form in the consideration of mass. For, so ingredient is the principle of cumulation to all categorized aesthetic objects that no concept is a clear-cut individual in the exclusive sense. Yet all concepts are individual in the real sense. Each concept, that is, has its inner content of meaning made up for it by the other concepts and their systematic relations, and this principle by which an entity has its essential content outside itself within the system of essences that constitute its environmental circumstance is precisely the principle of individuality. Form then, as an aesthetic concept, has, for a specific meaning, the meaning-totality of the whole system of aesthetic concepts; and as part of its meaning was given in connection with mass, the remaining part will be given in the discussion of design. As a consequence we are free here to consider form in its larger philosophical and historical connections, for we have assumed throughout that all aesthetic distinctions have their ground in general philosophical relations. This is the more necessary since it is common to find form recommended as the ultimate concept of aesthetics, and whether this is justifiable can only be determined by a survey of the philosophic questions involved.

Form considered as the final category of the aesthetic world is too often treated as wholly static, and if form means nothing except that its object stands eternally as a paragon of perfection from which a meaning flows unceasing and without change, then its object is without status and is nothing. If the meaning or significance of form does not represent more than the superficies of the beauty object, and if the meaning is nothing more than an aura reflected from the hard immobility of the object and is unreal in itself, then form certainly does not represent the whole, or any considerable part, of the meaning of beauty. Yet fixity is an essential part of the meaning of form. It is here argued that form is not wholly passive in nature; no aesthetic concept, within the logical system, is that. But there is an element of fixity in it which is not overcome, and cannot be overcome, until the conceptual

structure of the object has transcended form. So long as the object is thought of as only a form there is an element of unpurified and unredeemed matter in it, and while the aesthetic object will never throw off its matter, which is as necessary to it as its form, the matter must be developed out of and beyond its materiality in the direction of pure design. The block of stone is no less material stone because it has been given the form of a statue, but the shaping and designing has given it a different sensible appearance, a different set of qualities, and, *aesthetically*, a different internal structure. The object is now transmaterialized. If the statue of the human being were cut in two, you would expect to find, not the mere particles of stone, but the viscera of a man, and you cannot see it broken without the sense of pain and loss; *its* pain and loss, it is *it* that is hurt, not you. A group of tones is no less a group of physical processes because they are woven into a melody, but in hearing the melody you are not aware of the physical processes; there are no tones in a real melody. The real form then of an aesthetic object is internal and organic to its matter, structured there in fixity, and not a separate quality which by some mystery is merely added to the matter. The explanation of the way in which the form becomes the inner constitution of the object is the statement of the theory of design.

To argue therefore that beauty or the aesthetic reality is significant form (Bell) states nothing at all as to the real meaning of beauty. We might as well say beauty is meaningful beauty, or form is important form. The whole question of beauty is precisely why form is or becomes significant, just what is the ground and basis of the significance or meaning that is universally attached to beautiful things. In short, the question is one of just what there is in the nature of certain kinds of objects which leads to their universally being given the adjective beautiful. And the answer is that objects of these kinds are determined and constituted by and of the aesthetic categories; it is the task of aesthetic theory to "deduce" and exemplify these categories; since they are logical ultimates they cannot be proved or explained. We have stated the grounds of objection to the subjectivist assumption that beauty is a mode or attitude of the mind that experiences it. But when we reject the simple psychological solution for the question and insist that beauty is an integral constituent of the

objective world, we are accepting the burden of proof, and realize that the problem is involved and difficult. If our system of categories is not this required "proof," then some other set of categories is; the problem is one for logic, and not one for psychology. The significance of form then lies in the entire categorial system through the instrumentation of which the beauty object is determined and the experience of it is made intelligible, and is not to be expressed either in the lingo of psychology nor in a catalogue of appreciative adjectives which show the emotional quality of the mind that is aware of beauty. We cannot explain significance by saying beautiful things about beauty, or by finding adequate word outlets for the gush of our emotion. Whatever beauty is, it is not the emotion that is expressed or felt in connection with the attempts we make to explain it. So we cannot say that beauty is significant form and then explain the phrase by writing poetry. We repeat that the significance of form is objective fact, and the fact is the system of aesthetic categories in their appropriate relational structure, and as such expressing the meaning and essence of an individual object. The significance of form is the cumulative system of categories beginning with color in its analogical identity with tone, and running through rhythm, line, and mass, where form connects the whole with design in an object which is individual. And the feelings I may have in connection with the experience of form and its significances are accidental and of no substantial relation to the reality of form. They vary from moment to moment with me, and from person to person in the social *milieu*. They are accidents of the mind that experiences, not of the object experienced, nor of any abstract knowing relation of the mind to the object; thus much of truth realism has always with justice maintained. The feeling that becomes substance for all aesthetic objects is a part of the objective structure of this world; what is mine or yours in connection with those objects is abstract particularity, and is real only in its relation to the objective feeling as universal. This relation is expressed universally in the aesthetic judgment. It is expressed as an individual in the act that creates, and in the act that apprehends, beauty.

Santayana tells us that beauty is a "divine essence" which is "not separable from some intuition of form," and then goes on to say "this divine beauty is evident, fugitive, impalpable, and

homeless in the world of material fact; . . ." The essence may, apparently, be a single instantaneous flash that may never re-appear, in the mind of the person to whom it is "manifested." In which case there seems to be no argument possible, no discussion, for the essence that is beauty could not be communicated; there would even be no sense in the beneficiary of the divine intimation trying to describe his experience, since any quality he might communicate would have no substance in the mind which is supposed to receive it. Unless there is a form of *the aesthetic object*, there is no way of describing it nor arguing about it; it is therefore confusing when Santayana insists upon its form and then proceeds to argue, in effect, that the form is unintelligible. We shall have therefore to come back to our original criticism of all such theories; so long as beauty is nothing more than a private and isolated state of feeling within the experience of an individual there is nothing else to be said. There do not exist the conditions upon which a judgment can be made. For either such states are so vaguely general and indefinite that they may blankly stand for any possible thing, or they are so uniquely particular that they can have no intelligible relations to anything. In either case they are nothing, however much the poet may enjoy his word-pictures and imaginative fantasies of the negation they can never identify. Perhaps Kant set the fashion for this sort of thing, although not for the beautiful language, when he forces all aspects of beauty within the inner subjectivity of the mind.

Croce is equally unsatisfactory. If "expression" could be taken in its simplest of literal meanings, as most would perhaps expect to take it, it would mean that the form of beauty involves its manifestation in some mode of exteriority. Neither outer regular contouredness nor systematic inner relationality, which seem to be the essential characteristics of form, can have an intelligible meaning in the absence of the relation of part outside of part, where things are differentiated by an elementary distinction that appears to be a necessary condition of thought under any circumstances. And this relation of apartness is precisely what the idea of externality, or better exteriority, depends upon; in fact exteriority is the concept of this relation as universal; and there are strong reasons for believing that the same relation is essential to the idea of space in any logical connection in which the term space can be used. Expression, I say, ought to mean just this manifestation or

representation in exteriority of the meaning that is to be expressed; and there are cases where Croce appears to be using the term in that sense. But when we are told that the entire process of expression is within the intuition, and is identified with the intuition, and so long as the intuition is regarded as peculiarly a mental function, it is hard to make out what meaning the famous term expression actually has. One begins to fear that the term is to be taken as an abstract symbol for any meaning beauty may be found to possess; but in this case it is itself the expression of the pious faith that beauty is a thing of great meaning. The meaning of beauty does not lie in the assertion that beauty has meaning.

There is this other fundamental objection to the use of expression as the one "category" adequate to the whole meaning of beauty. There are few certainly, and probably none, of the forms of reality that are categorizable in one concept. It requires more terms than one to portray the complex and multiform meanings of beauty, and when all these meanings are forced into one term the term itself becomes so equivocal that it cannot be said to have any genuine meaning at all. For meanings are relational, and where there is not a plurality of categorial forms there are not the conditions of relation. A systematic whole of relations connecting concepts of different connotations, in short, a conceptual structure, or a system of categories, is necessary to represent the meaning of anything real, and in the absence of this elaborate framework whatever meaning of expression is sought for will fall flat in subjective uncertainty. It is often forgotten that anything can be a state of mind, and that to be a state of mind does not qualify or distinguish anything; does not even identify anything, not even the state of mind itself. There is thus no escape from the necessity to find a set of concepts that are capable of such relational organization as will make them categories definitive and determinative of an object; and the type or sort of concepts we require are first suggested to us by the empirical qualities of the object as given in sensuous intuition. Suggested, I say, for the characters as first suggested to us are lacking in that relational adaptability which concepts must have, and there is long and arduous work necessary to refine these original sensuous suggestions before they can be fitted into a categorial system. There is also a certain schematism of method necessary for the construction of the

categorial system that is to explain beauty and the aesthetic quality, and this scheme must be expressed in devices which differ from devices used in other connections. Such is our system of methodological value concepts, appropriateness, ambiguity, cumulation, and analogy. A set of such concepts is necessary before the definition of a constructive or constitutional concept can be formulated, and their relation to the constructive concept is that of methodological presupposition.

The meaning of form is then statable only through a complete system of categories, completed in the sense that they give, in the constitution of their system, the *a priori* definition of the object in the interest of which they were constructed. The deduction of this system of categories is the determination of the object and the delimitation of the place the object has within the system of reality as a whole. Form is the constitution of the system of categories that determine an object. And while the system that we are here deducing for the determination of the beauty object may not be right in all detail, *some such* system, with some such relations and categories, is necessary if the experience of beauty is ever to become intelligible. For all I know our four categories may give way for ten, or for a different set of four, and it may be that each of the four may spawn its three, as happened with Kant in accordance with his principle that *alle guten Dinge sind drei*. But categories there must be, and they must constitute a system if they are to make an object intelligible. Form is the concept of a system of categories necessary for the determination of an aesthetic object.

And there are historic grounds for our system. Plato's form was a mathematical figure before it was an idea, that is, it was perhaps one of the simplest of physical images, in contour, for the type of mind that used the word. And there is good reason to believe that yet, for the mind which has not been sophisticated into too much of the falsity and sham of culture, the elementary thought forms are themselves image-replicas, i. e. universals, of the simple things of experience. This, I suppose, is what the psychologists are trying to say in the theory of imagery; but it will be better if we can avoid the profundity which they have created by discovering differences which are not there in the facts. And although Plato, like a good poet, gives the forms wings and leads the hosts of them into the heavens, it is difficult to think he was as much de-

ceived by his own playful fancy as his fancy has deceived so many of his critics. He was merely trying to express universality to minds as hard and sordid as our own. For Plato can show that a form may inhabit the *Empyrean* without becoming christianized out of all its reality-characters, as happens to the ideas of his modern critics; when it goes to heaven it does not go sans eyes, sans teeth, sans everything; the relation of the form to its universal or substance is a case of the analogical identity which we saw to hold generally at the bottom of all value objects and relations, and it holds between the sensuous aspects and the constitutional structure of the object. In fact, this identity by analogy becomes the ground of all value relations, and when Plato speaks of the forms of things he means, I believe, simply that the things should be referred to their original identity in the universal by virtue of which they are things at all or have forms. And this does not involve the burden of transportation to another realm where things cannot be what they are; this necessity was unknown to Plato, and was invented to explain the necessity for grace made abundant to a being who was already deprived of its reality in the contradictory determinations of religious zeal and fervor. The calamity therefore that befell Plato's thought from the ignorant zest for personal adventure or from unhallowed fear of an uncertain real world for the future of culture, did not come from weakness in Plato, but from the weakness of ignorance in those who tried to make practical use of a conception they did not understand.

Plato's forms are then determinations of exteriority which apply universally to things of a kind. And they are themselves determined by the position which they, or their Prototype, occupy in the relational system of categories by which things get their kinds, that is to say, get the universal characteristics which mark off the elementary distinctions upon which things as real in the last resort depend. The "heaven" of the forms is therefore merely the system or host of the forms by which any individual form is created and maintained, the general formal matrix within which the individual forms are crystallized out by the intersections of the sustaining relations. The "heaven" merely means the self-sustaining self-sufficiency of the system of the forms, the interdependence of them all and the mutual dependence of any one upon all the others. And the fact that these conceptions were translated

into the slush of private psychological hopes and fears and lusts by a people who were too primitive to know what Plato was talking about is not a weakness in Plato; it was in fact a weakness of the coming man the prevision of which strongly suggested to Plato to retire under the shadow of the wall. But exteriority and real determination outside of the mind that experienced them, Plato saw, must be the basic characters of what is real, and the characters which met these conditions for him were the contourization in design and the self-sufficiency of inner relational system which are precisely the characters necessary to make defense against anything which could intrude the subject into them. It was just in defence against this far-off heaven that he selected the characters that made the forms self-sufficient and independent of everything except their own formal relations. And to do this he discovered that the real meaning of exteriority rests upon its being a content of that for which it is external; a kind of dependency relation which does not imply insufficiency in either of its terms, but leaves them with identical status. This is the relation of analogical identity which we have already had occasion to use. Aristotle gave clear expression to the relation, and St. Thomas did all a saint can do, but in vain, to make it mean something to the "new man."

We avoid the question whether the forms are independent of mind in the universal, for this leads into metaphysical depths which do not concern us here. But it is obvious that the concept of form is independent of any and all relation of dependence upon the individual or private mind, and it is from this assumption of dependence upon the perceiving mind that the aesthetic difficulties regarding form all arise. Form as an aesthetic concept is a categorizing function, and its function is itself conditioned upon a system of concepts all interrelated by the principle of cumulative system. It is this system of concepts that defines and determines the object which is beauty.

It may appear superfluous to pursue this question further, but as the question is crucial for all value theory I shall consult the master of those who know. Aristotle saw the necessity of making clear the distinctions which Plato's poetic mind intuited directly and fretted under the delay occasioned by attention to detail. The system which holds the categories in relation, and which Plato pictured in abstract related symbols, is itself objectified and exteriorized in the structure of

the object to which it refers, that is to say, the categorial system is objectified in the structure of the object it is the purpose of the categorial system to determine. This is a statement of the principle of individuation as self determination, and may be called the principle of self-sufficing form; it refers to an object whose principle of being sustains it in reality by virtue of its own internal structure. Form here is pure act creating the body through which the act is made real, its own body. Form is thus the primary source from which all "motions" originate; it is then the cause which is not caused, the agency that is immediately consequent upon the being of an object which is realized through its own inner constitution. It is here that Aristotle touches bottom in making Plato's form intelligible. Here form is related to structure not in terms of dependence, nor derivation, either way, but by the relation of analogical identity, which means that whatever relations there are between them are mediated through the object which they together form. Structure, body, matter, is related in no direct way to form, and form is related in no direct way to structure; such relations could only be the abstract identities of mathematics, and can hold only of abstractions; but there is a relation of identity between them in the object which it is their common destiny to design, and this relation is real, is the reality. It can then be said that the object *is* the identity of *a* structure with *a* form, where the structure and the form can each be described, in general characters and specific qualities, independently of each other, and without reference to their common object. But such descriptions will remain relative and imperfect, and are just such descriptions as psychology gives of mind and physiology gives of body, where neither can state the problem of the relation between the mind and the body for lack of the fundamental principle by which they constitute an individual object. All relations of mathematics and science are thus limited to the abstract and unreal.

Aristotle's theory of form has been variously stated and frequently misstated. Form is sometimes interpreted as *the* form of the structure, or some accidental quality of it. This is materialism, of course, but many who would resent the name have been guilty of the error. It is equally erroneous, if less common, to say that the structure is *the* structure of the form, but neither is what Aristotle intended. Both structure and

form are determining characterizations of the object which they identify, or in which they identify, but neither is anything of the other, nor is the object anything other than their individuate identity. The mind, for example, is not the form of the body, in the sense that it is some kind of product, some emanation, or even some mathematical structure of the body, nor is it in any sense a function of the body. It is not statable in any way in terms of the body, and is totally independent of it, so far as the ordinary existential concepts of relation are concerned. It is "immortal," intelligible only in terms of the object in which it *and* body are identified. It is equally fantastic to argue that the body is a product or derivative of the mind, or dependent on mind in any sense; the two are related by a certain form of identity—*sub quadam specie identitatis*—in the object they together constitute, analogous to the way in which two characters may belong to a substance under a certain form of identity without having any dependence upon or any other direct relation to each other, and this is what is meant by identity through analogy. One of the important consequences of this conception is that it gives the ground for a positive interpretation of the idea of a negative relation, of the absence of relation, and of a positively negative relation, a relation considered as a minus quantity. These ideas are unintelligible on any other ground. But it is not the place to pursue them here.

This conception of identity, which, I think, must have been what Aristotle had in mind, and is fundamental for Spinoza and Leibniz, will also give the premises from which the explanation of the mysteries of the "unmoved mover" and the "thought of thought" can be derived. It is the one of these problems that led Spinoza to attempt to make the philosophical concept of God concrete. The other is responsible for Leibniz' efforts to make the individual real. The two systems are responsible for what is really important in modern philosophy. That is to say, with Aristotle, motion and thought can each be given a structure as an elementary background against which its functional aspects can be clearly stated. And both motion and thought can be identified in the self-identity of these backgrounds. Motion is hard to conceive, and is inconceivable, perhaps, except when thought of as a moving from a base; but when motion is universalized it is removed away from any base, with the consequence that it

seems to be suspended in nothingness. But with the notion of an identical structure as pervading the motion itself, and not merely as that from which the motion starts, the motion becomes self-sustaining, as it were, and can stand on its own ground while its specific characters, as well as the motion as a whole, has a point of reference in this identical structure. Thus the mathematician plots the curve of a motion, and while the plot is not true *of* the motion, nor has anything to do with its essential nature, yet it enables the motion to become intelligible both as to its general form and specific nature because of the stable reference that is given it. And the series of events, which is the object of both plot and motion, *is* the essence which the reality of the motion presupposes as its substance, and as such can be conceived as *really* continuous. In an analogous fashion thought constructs itself, i. e., creates for itself a structure, against which its details of process and its objective characters may be formulated in such a way as to elucidate the principle of its own being. Motion and thought both therefore become objects to themselves, because they are such as to permit of their structures being exteriorized, at least ideally; and the important consequence of this is that they can deduce their own principles. I mean each can deduce the principle which formulates its essential nature and thus can give to itself the plan of its own being. To such an extent at least the discussion of form cannot avoid a reference to metaphysics, and it would be interesting, in another context, to follow out these implications. But they go beyond the logic of value theory, to which we are restricted here.

The conclusion to be impressed here is that to regard form as a merely accidental feature of objects, or a superficial or surface character of objects, or as any kind of psychological or mental phenomenon whatsoever, is childish in the extreme, and fails altogether to apprehend the problem.

That our interpretation of the Platonic form is plausible can easily be shown by following for a little way certain developments that grew out of it. It seems to me that the doctrine of form as essence, as developed among the medieval thinkers, is of extraordinary value in the search for principles in value theory. It at any rate provided the basis upon which form in the Aristotelian sense could be demonstrated in actuality, for a way was found through which form was really objectified, became the principle of genuine objects.

This is best seen in religion and religious art; and while a competent discussion of the subject would presuppose more knowledge than I possess, a few suggestions may prove useful. It is clear that a modified Aristotelianism became the dominant motive of religion, and that the doctrine of form proved to fit in with the religionists' conception of spirit as the principle of the constitution of the world. And whereas the earlier conception tended to ignore the "world" and the objective conditions of life, a more mature thought showed that life, to be realized, even the life of the "spirit," had to come to some sort of terms with the conditions under which in this world life is lived. As a consequence of the changed point of view, and perhaps from a rather stark naturalism which came into the religious institution with the newly converted peoples of the north of Europe, the Church found itself taking somewhat seriously the "things of the world." The problem was then to sanctify the world, which meant that spirit had to come to some kind of terms with material things. The Church as the representative of the spirit assumed responsibility for political life, and, as the basis of political life is, in a large sense, property, this institution and its control became one of the larger factors in the functions of the Church. In any case, the Church found itself dealing with things, things that were objective in the primitive sense of physical.

The important matter for us here is that in taking responsibility for "things" the Church had to spiritualize them. The consequence was that much property came to be used for purely spiritual purposes. Money and land were devoted to the care of the poor, and charity, in the form of property institutions, came to be thought of as the objectification of Christian love. Objects became sacred as the embodiment of the religious purpose. Land was set aside for the religious order, and as a consequence of this (and other things, doubtless) nature was brought into close communion with spirit. As a result the earlier doctrine of withdrawal from nature was modified (or if the doctrine remained intact the practice soon belied it), and the basic point of view of religion on this point changed. But as now physical things may be the instruments of the spirit, they are soon discovered to be objects of interest on other grounds than religious, and the Church develops an interest in art. It is the assimilation of beauty and its object that we are more particularly concerned with here,

since beauty and art came to be an important factor in religious life. The art object is now identified with the spirit that informs it, and expression through artistic forms becomes the typical religious activity. Worship became rich in forms and ceremonies, and there is reason to believe that it was largely through the appeal to the natural sense of and for beauty that the greatest successes of the Church in Christianizing the European peoples were achieved.

It is a case then where feeling (presumably religious) realizes itself in objects, and the unity and identity of form with its matter was demonstrated.

Form then, as perfectly objectified, becomes the instrument of design, and from the moment this was accomplished, assumed the directing control of the destinies of the religion and of the institution in which it as a life-motive was objectified. For better or for worse; but the fact was established. Form now is completely at home in its appropriate objective expression, and the religious life was now artistic creation. We are not arguing the question whether "mummery" is the proper form of religious expression, but the fact is that it became so. And as long as the objectification was taken for granted, the thing worked smoothly; difficulties came from the attempt to make religious form identical with the truth of doctrine, and from this came the revolt to subjectivism. How much of this revolt was due to the effort to prove the "truth" of form, and in just what way it was to develop in the rising interest in nature from the point of view of truth as was being formulated in the new science, would be hard to say. But the search for truth, originally an effort to find the *doctrines* of religion true, and to prove them true by demonstrating their consistency as expressed in perfect forms, as it developed in science later, came to be a disintegrating influence, and the art that was hallowed by religion was hounded to destruction by science. For the objects of nature were in science supposed to be self-sufficing, real without reference to their form, and their spirit passed out of the picture. The scepticism of science thus had its origin in this separation between the material of science and the thought through which the material got its form. This forgets that logic and science both have their ultimate origin from the aesthetic form which the Greeks began to impose upon nature in the creation of the arts of poetry, drama, sculpture, architecture and music. The fated

and fatal step in the apostasy of science was the appeal to experience, and the experimentalism that developed proved disastrous for religion and art equally. It has since brought catastrophe to the remaining foundations of culture. Let us see how this came about.

Bacon was interested in the "forms" of things, as no doubt were the other scientific-minded persons of the time. And it was in the interest in discovering the forms of things that the new science developed. But the appeal to experience as the test of truth, as developed in the experimental method, came to be a purely subjective test, and each man's private nature, as revealed to him in his inner consciousness, was accepted as the principle, since the state of the investigator's mind was accepted as the form of the thing under inquiry. The old forms had been true independently of experience, were true when they contradicted experience or were contradicted by experience. But everything had to be subjected to the new test, and the result was Protestantism and the new science, the hugest price the mind of man ever paid for its own error. Experimentalism destroyed the objective ground upon which truth had rested, and change, process, transition, finally, *the change, or whim, of the individual's mind* became the shifting sands upon which the truth was to find its ground. Experimentalism is the apotheosis of process. Or, perhaps better, the catasterism of process. The old forms implied process realized in the divine plan, where change and process are *aufgehoben*, as we now see change and process transcended in the flights of insight of the mathematical physicists. But in the new day of science the attempt was to realize form in individual inner purpose, where form was confused with psychological motive, and what is real as an individual was misinterpreted as private. So subjectivism; where reality is a state of mind that is false if it is objectified and empty and hollow if it is true; where morality is buried forever in private intention, without benefit of the grace of form; confusion and diabolism and formlessness, industrialism, and democracy. Objective design prostituted becomes subjective motive. The fatal blunder here is the confusion of subjective motive with objective design, with calamity as result.

It would be interesting at this point to speculate upon the probable effects of the recent development of a new formalism in science and logic and the study of linguistic expression, but

there are as yet no premises upon which inferences can be based. The concept of fiction is not such a premise, being self-contradictory, since it appears to assume that the principle of truth is falsity and the significance of form its emptiness. Perhaps one may be permitted to hint to the "logisticians" that the form of reality may not be confused with the truth or falsity of a particular doctrine, however "successful" the doctrine may be. Also, the form that is empty is an empty form. Selah!

The developments in human culture during the past three or four hundred years seem to show that no stable life can be built up around the assumption that form is capable of an existence independent of an appropriate object. This is the basic assumption of the subjectivism of modern thought and culture. It is false. Under this illusion, life has aims and hopes and fears and interests and intentions; but no objects or objectives. It is formed in formlessness, without design. For there can be no design or objective purpose where forms are abstract and subjective and without appropriation to adequate objects. The problem, then, that is to be squarely faced by our contemporary culture is the problem of the reality of form; the problem of determining the conditions under which form may be realized, objectified in appropriate objects, in which the actuality may be realized in adequacy of form. What is, and what is to be, the function of life in the cultural structure will be discussed in a later connection. But the problem is one as to the relation of form to the real. Form that is real, that is, form that can be realized, is, in aesthetic terms, and aesthetic terms serve here for metaphysics, a formed mass of primordial substance; a mass that is formed or contoured by lines; lines that are discriminations within the massed feeling, a feeling that is the rhythm created in the identification of color and tone. Form has two kinds of meaning by the principle of ambiguity. In the one direction it is shape and surface and contour and delimited space, with all the meanings that pertain specifically to existence. It in this direction contemplates the categorial system of reflective logic, in which it designs the objects as existential ground of values. In the other direction, which we have designated the figurative, as contrasted with the literal or existential, form leads by the principle of cumulation to design and the individual, where form is designed in the real object, or where design is given perfection of form in the Individual. Form becomes design, and it is to this concept that we now turn.

CHAPTER XIV

DESIGN

WITH design we come upon the concept which represents the accumulated whole of the meanings of all the other aesthetic concepts. Beyond it, to which it immediately leads, is the concept of Individuality, which introduces at once the problems of metaphysics. Meanings are the kinds of things that become whole. They grow into each other by definite principles that are possible to discover, and we have indicated, in earlier connections, how one of these principles works. The principle of cumulation, we have seen, represents the gathered tendencies toward ends of all the concepts, and it weaves these tendencies into a strand of continuity about which the diverse concepts collect into a system such that the total effectiveness of the whole is creative of the structure of an object. This structure of the object becomes the body within which the conceptual system functions as "soul," and this structured soul or ensouled body becomes the objective, in the sense of the principle of objectivity, for all values. It is in this permanently embodied form that values are perpetuated in the world of culture.

It is the peculiar connotation of design to represent the meaning of this object, or, preferably, to represent this object as a meaning. It was noted in the preceding chapter how design is related to form, how it is merely form at the stage of its development in which form transcends itself. This character we have noted to belong to all categories; the tendency to emphasize their peculiar content of meaning to the point where the meaning is reconstructed and transformed in another conceptual object. Tone sounds so much, intonates itself into color, puts so much pressure upon tonality that it becomes color; color colors so excessively that it appears as tone; lines extend and direct until they become masses, where they sing as hues; and masses amass themselves into forms. Forms form designs, and design forms. Design designs an object, and here we have the core of reality. The end of development in this cumulative growth, this stretch of continuity, is in the object where design turns upon itself and effects the identity complete of form and structure, by finding

within the plan of its own nature the end toward which its striving is directed. This object is thus individual.

By the principles of cumulation and ambiguity design means two kinds of things, has two types of meaning; and since in design the design is the meaning, there are two designs, the design of form and the design of structure. Together they create, that is, they are, the world, for creation merely refers us to the being that can Be, that has, as Aristotle says, its origin in its form. There is no point at this stage of our journey in putting too much effort into the description of the various instances of design, since the idea is already developed in connection with earlier discussions. Design as structure includes the whole objective universe, from the iron-work in a bridge or skyscraper to the lines of purpose in a poem or a prayer; from the bony framework of the body to the pulsing throb of its conscience. Wherever there is body and order there is the design that creates, *is*, that is; this is the realm of existence, for existence is structure. And here time and space and motion and matter and cause are the categories which effect the world of things. I mean they constitute the world of things, they are that world, they create it, and they create it body. Every object in the universe, then, exists, and time and space and motion and matter and cause are constituents of it, constitutional to it, can be found supporting its nature and unceasingly causing it to be. For to be is what all of these categories mean—they and all the groups of subcategories and auxiliary methodological concepts that have been found necessary in the constitution of the universe. It is in this categorial system that is to be found the concept of the “materials of the arts” which is so vexatious to many people. The literal meaning of design then includes every reference that every object makes to existence, and therefore all the categories that express existence in any degree or aspect are categories of material design.

In painting, e. g., there is the paint and the canvas and the rest of the tools. There is the muscular and nervous effort of the artist, the effort of the hill to rise, and the loose abandon of the cataract to fall. Coherence, gravitation, inertia, enter into the existence of the picture, and we are not making any distinction between what is represented and what is expressed, what is there, and what is suggested. If a mountain rises it rises, and it exists, whether it rises in a

picture or on the eternal hills. Rising, that is, and the mountain, and all that is directly connected with them, are references to existence, and only existential references will state what they mean. Length and breadth and thickness are features of everything in the picture, and there is in it no element so "spiritual" that it can dispense with its right and its necessity to lean on some arm of existence. If there is a human form in the picture there is flesh and bone and blood, and it is there however soulful the look in the eye or innocent the cast of the countenance. Even the soulfulness and holy innocence are created by and through and out of existences, for the soulfulness is an effect of physical light and the innocence largely of light against hard matter. The smile on the face of the dead is put there by the hand and not the heart of the undertaker, the same hand that accepts money for the "service." And a Botticellian face is a physical fact, as is the virgin purity of the madonna, and the valor of a St. George or the divinity of the Christ. There is no escape from existence, therefore, as long as our purpose is aesthetic, and, I should add, so long as we are dealing with values of any sort. Reality is fated with existence, and art makes the most of it.

In music, too, there is no phase or factor which does not refer to existence in some way peculiarly its own. The sound itself is existence and the air and the instruments are existences so obvious as to require no mention. But the tones have length, and height, and width, at least thinness and slenderness, and where will you stop. The low tones of the organ are soft and loose-textured and spongy, some of them clammy and porous like boiling paste, or waxy and stringy like half-melted cheese. And they turn about each other like the tendrils of the grape vine or Laokoon snakes, and they embrace each other and kowtow like daisies in the wind, They move and writhe and dance and explode and tumble over each other down the inclines of cadences, and they mount and heave and rage and swear and billow and surge and sigh and despair and die. Every expressive feature of tone is effected through existences, and it is futile to explain that these are vicarious expressions by way of "suggestiveness," that they are "metaphors," or "figures of speech," and that the real music is "spiritual." There is no music except that which is there in the tones, and there are no tones except those which are there in the sounds, no sounds that are not there in the vibrations

of air—no music except as it is realized through existence. It therefore has a literal form and design in the sense of structure, and, in the absence of structure in the sense of order and spatial distribution, music cannot be imagined to be. The whole complex of a piece of music is spread out literally in time, and time is erroneously but generally given as expressing the nature of music. As well say that space is the nature of music, for music is spread out on a spatial frame just as literally as it is stretched out in time, and there can be nothing in time which is not also and in the same sense in space. And space and time are existences; so that music is existential at heart, just as any and every other aesthetic expression is. In fact there can be no *expression* of that which is not effected in both time and space, for there can be no design in such things as cannot *be*, or *are* not, which is the way to say it, since being is both spatial and temporal in elementary nature. What is not in, or, better, *of* space and time does not exist, and what does not exist is not. It is folly or ignorance or sentimental excess which insists upon the pure spiritual quality of music; it has existence or it has no design, and it has design or it has nothing.

So in the same literal fashion are all the other arts expressions of design—design in the sense of structure and existence. The most “spiritual” form of art, the one nearest to pure designless intentionality, nevertheless has its existence, and is one that is difficult to handle descriptively, for the very reason that our descriptive techniques all depend upon a direct and literal reference to existence. Dancing, as pure rhythm, in so far as anything can be pure, depends upon the total annihilation of motion by overcoming it in rhythm, motion and rhythm are fused in pure form ideally designed. This is accomplished, of course, by the very perfection of motion, in which motion destroys itself by fusion with rhythm when its mission is fulfilled, as Tess is hanged when her love becomes perfect. The light may become so bright that it blinds, that is, destroys all light; the prayer so earnest that it swoons in silence; the music so musical that it is a picture; the picture so toneful as to sing. In the same way the dance through motion obliterates the motion in grace, solidifies the motion and then shatters it to nothingness, just as the sculptured statue may freeze a poise of grace into eternity where grace and poise and motion are nothing—but rhythm. But all these features of the dance depend directly upon existences

and their order and distribution, they are characteristics of literal or structural design, of the same design as that by which the builder builds a bridge or the draughtsman prospects a machine. One would like to see God in the frisking lamb or the swaying birch or floating diaphanous butterfly, but the frisk and the sway and the float are aspects of ungodly existence, however much and powerfully they "allure to brighter worlds."

In the other aspect of design, the figurative design by which ideal values are represented and expressed, adequate means of description are still more beyond avail. But what is meant is simple, to anyone, at least, who ever had a genuine feeling, scarce and few as they are in this world where feeling is dammed and damned by the obese inertia of practical men. By design in this sense we refer to the element of objective intentionality which is present in every object in the world, just as there is a feature of structure in every object. The daffodil *means* to dance, has intended it through all eternity, and announces in every moment of her existence, by every instant of mien and manner, that dance she will and always will. To be a daffodil is to be dancing and it is truer to say that the daffodil dances than to say she exists, for she transcends her existence in the dance, and becomes an eternal rhythm. Even the rough stone block which sustains the railroad road-bed, or holds up and upholds the cathedral, even though forever hidden in the ground, still intends to be a Hercules and sustain a world of values on his broad shoulders. He designs a world. That such an intent is ineffective in the world and produces nothing is inconceivable. To limit the effectiveness of intention to the subjective motive, where of all places it is without effect, if ever, is childish beyond comprehension. And that a massively huge oak must see its intent frustrated, and a morally imbecile man succeed, is the tragedy that is too trivial to happen, and cannot even be pictured in the imagination. It is only the strong that can fail. But in a world where the ultimate intent is to identify the existent with the valuable, both success and failure are meaningless, since they presuppose the petty intentionality of the private individual, which is false in essence. The oak becomes the roof-tree of the cathedral, while the man is buried in the churchyard. And while the man is safe out of the storm, he has purchased his safety with his soul, has surrendered the

key to his eternity which the oak out of his sturdiness cannot give up. It is this invincibility of intentional design that endows the man with moral courage; but then when he accepts his design and it is graven on his character he forgets himself, allows his petty privacy to slink out through the shadowy corridors of oblitative memory. It is this rod of intentional design that runs through all the universe, giving to the elemental forms the permanency which is eternalized in their ends.

This element of design is quite obvious only in the aesthetic sphere, and it is in the aesthetic object where it comes to perfection. It is therefore in the arts that it is easiest and best described.

In painting the intention is to escape space by hiding its existential structure in color, and every device of line and mass and form are employed to that end. But this does not mean that the attempt is literally to annul space directly, but to use it to its own destruction in that which is more space than space itself, to overcome space by overwhelming it with spatiality as expressed in its analogue color. So that line, which in the literal sense divides spaces and defines masses, here leads spaces beyond themselves into immensities of significance which only color can express, and confuses masses with interferences to each other until they cease to be, as masses literally, and become enormities of meaning in the general tone of the whole. The one obvious intent of every item in the picture is the inevitable *will to mean* with which they unite in the harmony of the whole, masses and forms indicate lines of significance toward that quality around which the whole revolves, and design precipitates the unity out of the very multiplicity and miscellany of detail. Directions which in literal connections distribute elements throughout space, here gather them together in a space that disappears in color. And color itself is led to disappear in the color that represents the depths and distances of skies until space is overcome with pure light, which speaks the language of significance in shadow. Time as existence disappears in rhythm by the witchery of tone, durations as particular are expressed in the tonalities of specific hues, instants as beads of tone become drops of color, and the temporalities of the wrought colors stretched in massing in the harmony of the whole as the voices of rainbow-vested choristers. Design in painting is, then, in this figurative and real sense, the concentration of meaning toward an

individual, and in this case the individual meant is the ideal individual in whom the structure is completely hidden in the perfection with which it performs the function of indicating the whole. The structure is not dead, but risen.

In music the intentionality which is design is more evasively obvious still. The deviousness with which tones point to order by clothing their own structure with design, and thus hiding the mechanisms of harmony in the significance of melody, is difficult to describe, because the language of description presupposes color and space. It is for this reason that the meaning of music is supposed to be inner—that is, because we have no language in terms of which to project it into the outward object. But this is overcome when we realize that the exteriority of the object itself is not the mere externality of space, and that the object which tones create has an exteriority after its kind. The object which music seeks is that in which temporal existence is superseded by tonal value, where tone-lines draw distinctions between tone-masses, where tone-masses are formed into the design which is individual. The intent in each specific element, tone, line, etc., is to be significant in the whole which they mutually create, and the intent or design of the whole is to make its world musical with meaning. It is not necessary to try to describe how these cosmic results are got finally out of the antics of tones in simple melodic relations, where line furnishes direction toward the whole and suggests and estimates the distance and coaxes the tones with bribes of grace into massed sinuosities of rhythm, until at the end the eternal gates of significance are crashed by mere overwhelming form in a diapason of color. Thus a direction of intent is inherent in the combined effectiveness of the elements of tonal beauty, and this ultimate effectiveness is just the design or will of tone to beauty. It is to be emphasized that the design is a function of the relationality of the aesthetic concepts as applied to tone, and is the cumulative whole which all these conceptual meanings constitute.

The difficulties of design in painting and the color arts and in music and the tonal arts are increased in dancing, which is in a very real sense a composite of musical or tone art and painting or color art. This results from the fact that dancing undertakes to deal more or less directly with the rhythm which is the identity of color and tone. But as attempting to approach rhythm directly it finds it necessary after all to ap-

proach rhythm through movement, to approach color-tone reality by deviation through its analogue space-time. As a consequence the dance involves a linear distribution in space, and at the same time a serial distribution in time. The problem of the artist is then so to use spatial and temporal relations as to sink and absorb them in color and tone effects. What adds to the difficulty is that the color qualities that are available or suitable are limited, for the most part, to pure lights and shades, that is, to the most universal of visual effects, and that the time characteristics that are suitable are limited, for the most part, to pure breadthless series in the barest and most contentless aspect of time. But as a consequence of these limitations the dance attains form more directly and more purely than perhaps any other art; for the simple reason that the pure formal dance qualities are not burdened with extraneous content. As a further consequence, the way to design in the dance is shorter and more direct than in either music or painting, and it is perhaps for this reason that the religious dance was the mother of all art forms. The primitive is closer to reality in the raw than the highly developed, and is the basis of all the development which the "higher" forms attain. Again, because of primitive simplicity, the abstract design of the dance can be stated mathematically, and numbering can with some precision represent the pulses of rhythm. That the design of the dance culminates in a whole of exquisite perfection of objectified rhythm goes without saying, and that it creates the individual is equally evident.

We have now to sum up with some generalizations. We have seen that design precipitates the system of aesthetic elements in a whole which is individual, and this individual expresses the end of art and the aesthetic motive. This individuate end is an object, and by an object we mean an entity that by itself is constituent to the universe. The object as individual has a number of characters which we now note.

Design creates an object that is individual. There are two types of theory as to the nature of the individual. One of these is here regarded as false; the other as true, but it has never been adequately stated, and is, perhaps, under present conditions of thought, not adequately statable. The view regarded false contemplates an individual that is incorporeal, structured within its own internality, as having a form of objectivity determined within the subjective conditions of indi-

vidual human experience. True, criticism has recently forced a modification of this view on the point of individual incidence, but the assumption that the object is of the nature of experience still persists. But there is no competent analysis of experience which might decide the matter, and there are cogent reasons for believing that no analysis of experience, however exhaustive or careful, can justify the assumption of objectivity within mere experience. The appeal to experience we saw to have arisen from the necessity of experimentalism in science, and the supposed necessity of correcting a false formalism in religion. But both overlook the fact that experience is a detail within the content to be objectified, and can therefore not serve as a principle for determining what specific position and function experience is to have in the object. And the making the part a principle for the determination of the whole is open to serious criticism on strict logical grounds.

I said that the acceptance of individual experience as principle of objectification had been modified, more or less effectively in scientific connections, but with little effect in religious thought. In science experimentalism, particularly outside of rigid natural science, and in the cultural fields, has succeeded in avoiding individualism pretty largely only by multiplying the number of individuals whose experience is to be taken as principle. In religion, the attempt to avoid individualism has appealed to the "social." But in the one case there seems to be no appreciation of the fact that, *as experiences*, a million of them are, so far as experiences merely, of no more cogency than one, and less so, where the one has a basis in some form of objective fact that can be stated in non-empirical terms. And in the other case, the appeal to the social has merely exalted some of the more dubious characters of the individual experience, where it has not become a form of wild mythologizing. In any case "social" theory has for the most part rested upon "social psychology," and this has been bad psychology where it has not been rhetoric.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the appeal to experience has been the getting away from all aspects of the real world. If experience is the test-principle, then everything has its reality from experience, is to be formulated in terms of experience, and the reference in any case is to those aspects of experience that are most characteristic. But these aspects are those which have the least areas of contact with nonempirical

fact, and the consequence has been the acceptance of what has come to be called subjectivism. That in experience which is characteristic is that which is most internal and uniquely private, and the reference of fact to this as standard has merely succeeded in forcing upon the facts, whether appropriate to them or not, the characters that are most distinctive of experience. It is because of this that human interests have been interpreted as "spiritual," and the distinctive feature of the spiritual has been its wide divergence from independent fact. In religion this has meant that there is to be no contact between experience and the world, that life and its interests and ends can be perfected and realized in total independence of fact. It is inner and spiritual, and has no dependence upon the world of fact. The same holds in aesthetics. Aesthetic reality is a form of experience, so the theory states, and there is no possibility of finding objective principles. And even in science, and the pseudo-philosophy built upon it, everything is "points of view," "perspectives," or totally independent universes of discourse. This is subjectivism, and our assumption is that it is false and mischievous.

And for aesthetic purposes the consequences are disastrous. I have no interest in reviewing the accepted theories. All of them, even "realistic" theories, seem to recognize no obligation to possible logical or metaphysical implications, but content themselves with psychological analysis of mythical "values," and inventorying experience on the peradventure, apparently, of stumbling upon the experience which will give the key to the mystery and stop the search. It would be fruitless to go into a further discussion of this. In fact, if aesthetic reality should turn out to be a state of mind, I, for one, would feel cheated at the discovery. But the result for aesthetic theory is fatal, and the effect upon art tragic. For the result, finally, in both theory and practice, has been complete formlessness. And what is formless is void—of design—and there are no solid objects anywhere.

To meet this difficulty of formlessness there is required a more significant principle of individuality. Subjective "principles" are vain. The aesthetic reality must *be* an individual, not possessed by an individual, must *be* an object, not a quality of an object or a "subject," and this means that it must be an entity in its own right, and the "right" is to the function of a

constituent of the universe. Aesthetic reality is not an appearance.

And this means that it is incorporate, resident in a corpus, a body. There are two characters of this body which we desire to describe briefly. The first is that the aesthetic reality has a content that is objective. It is an object whose inner content is made up of what is exterior to it within the circumstance that determines the object. This, we saw in an earlier connection, is a contradiction from the point of view of the logic of inclusion-exclusion, but is not contradictory under the principle of analogical identity. The individual "object of art" is a synthesis, or identity, of elements of content which lie outside the object, and the relation that holds them together is the relation of analogy. The content of a picture is the synthesis of circumstance exterior to the form that is given it, and is so integrated with the form that it expresses design beyond itself. The content of a piece of music is the color-tone that is ingredient to the universe in the primordium of feeling. So the music is an object that is there, independently of any particular experience, to be contemplated by those who have the power to feel. And so of all real aesthetic objects. It would require a metaphysical treatise to do justice to these matters in principle and detail, and there is no place for it here. But it is implicit in the categorial system which describes and determines the aesthetic object, the outline of which we have already given. The aesthetic object is a corporate individual, an object which by virtue of its categorial constitution does its part in the determination of the universe. The stuff of this object is feeling, rhythm, and its primary modes are color and tone; just as the existential object is of the stuff of existence, or motion, and its primary modes are space and time. What is genuinely objective is an existential object and a cultural object, and as a synthesis of both is the real, and the real is individual.

The other character of the body which is the corporate aesthetic object is the fact that its structure or constitution is internal. It is this principle that is vaguely felt in the assumptions about "experience" and the "spiritual" quality of the object. But the experience and the spiritual are not independent of the corpus, but identical with it on the principle of analogy. The "material of the arts" and the "material of beauty" are the objective structure or constitution of the ob-

ject of art or beauty, and are determined from the content of feeling by the categories. Not *derived* from the content, for this would assume a stuff of time and space alone, and these alone constitute existence. They are determined from the content, which is objective feeling, by the categories in the sense that the structure is inherent in the content, created there by the designed linearity of the content. And the operative design is, we saw, the cumulative effectiveness of the categorial system. This involves the stuff of color-tone lined into masses that are formed by design, the whole being an individual, the sort of object that does not become, since becoming is within it, but eternally is and "worths," *valet*, as an element within the constitution of the universe. When the wisdom of Plato as formulated by Aristotle is fathomed, this will not appear as the absurd mystery that it perhaps does to our sophisticated psychological shallowness.

The corporate individual then does not have meaning but is meaning. If we are to regard forever the reality of meaning as a floating adjective, an unattached and inattachable attribute of nothing floating disconsolate within the indefinite blind plasma of psychological withinness and bodiless spiritual experience, then beauty will remain a hidden god to be worshipfully adored and celebrated in myth, but not understood. Meaning is of, or belongs to, nothing. Value is real *an sich* or not at all. Beauty lives as the object it informs, or it is dead. And beauty is life. It is self-created and self-sustaining; as an existence it is, as a value it lives.

With this development of the categorial system and the formulation of its principle in the individual, which now appears as an object corporately endowed with life, we have come to the point where the statement or formulation of the concept of beauty in principle is possible. It is to be described as a living individual in the next chapter; but before the description begins it is necessary to forewarn against too loose assumptions about the nature of life, and to advise that judgment be withheld with respect to the simplicity of the conception, and also with respect to the value that may come from deductions from the principle. Our deductions in later chapters will be disappointing to many, perhaps, and wholly satisfactory to perhaps nobody.

CHAPTER XV

BEAUTY

We have seen that, in general, and as a matter of principle, the real is an object, and is individual. And we have noted that the terms object and individual are not identical as to connotation, that their relation is one of identity with cumulation. Individual means more than object, not in terms of completeness and precision of logical structure, but in terms of elements of material content and quality. There is a sense therefore in which the abstract object is more perfect than the individual, that which contemplates the object as pure form and structure, but this view neglects the fact that perfection must include the factor of wholeness, which carries with it elements of concrete particularity. But the real means all that is included in the object and the individual, and is a category, not of the determination of objects or of individuals, but of co-ordinating their relations under universal principle in such wise as to constitute a plurality of objects a type, and of individuals a species. It is in this sense that Beauty is a category; it does not determine an object, nor has it any part, other than that of abstract principle, in the determination of objects that can be said to possess beauty or be beautiful. This determination is the work of the categories we have described. But it is a *law for* objects as so determined, and states the conditions and criteria to which the constitutional categories must conform if the object which they determine is to be real. That is to say, if an object is to be real *and* beautiful, it must not only be determined by and within the system of existential categories, and by and within the system of aesthetic categories, but it must also conform to certain principles and criteria over and above these categories, in order to determine the type of aesthetic object it represents, or the species of individual of which it is an instance. Above the aesthetic categories of determination of objects there are the categories of law which determine the type of aesthetic objects in general, and these latter are at the same time the criteria for determining whether, with respect to specific objects, they belong to one type or another. Beauty is such a category of law, a category of aesthetic law, which has the function of determining the

general conditions and characteristics of a type of aesthetic object. Beauty therefore passes judgment upon the precise methodology of the aesthetic categories, and arbitrates such questions as whether the aesthetic categories, in the determining of a specific object, have effected the object their design intends, and points out where they fail, if they fail, and why they succeed when they succeed. There are then aesthetic categories of objects and aesthetic categories of law. The system of the categories of aesthetic objects has been considered; it is now time to investigate the system of the categories of law for aesthetics.

Aesthetic categories of law are then categories *for* objects, for the determination of the species and order of objects; categories not *of* objects, not for the determination of the nature and structure of objects, which is the function of the system which we have discussed. The latter determine objects as to their inner constitution and content; the former determine objects as to their systematic external relations, that is, as to the relations by which objects are disposed in types or kinds or species. The one kind of category is constitutive, or as we prefer, constitutional; the other is regulative of objects as constituted. But the two are not generically different. Regulative principles *for* objects are constitutional *to* objects, when the type or species which they construct is considered as their object. That is, the type, as consisting of individual objects which have been determined in accordance with constitutional principles, is itself constituted an object of higher order by the operation of the law that is regulative of the objects as originally constituted. While the distinction of the two forms of law is of profound importance, the two forms of law function as the same law among objects everywhere, and in all connections; there is only one law, and its character as a principle is determined by the type of object to which it applies in a given case. When the law determines an object with respect to its inner structure it is constructive and constitutional; when it determines objects within a system of exteriority, it is regulative of the objects considered as individuals, and constitutional to the system which is itself constituted an individual. These principles are principles of metaphysics, and hold of all objects and individuals as such, and are fundamental for the understanding of "social" relations and the structure and functional organization of human

society, as we have shown elsewhere. They are then basic concepts of culture as well as of nature.

Beauty, then, is a regulative principle for aesthetic objects, objects which have been determined by the aesthetic categories of determination. We have seen something of its nature, and must now look into the manner of its operation. It may be worth while to say, in anticipation of subsequent discussions, that, as a regulative concept, Beauty is constitutional law with respect to the classes or types which include the Ugly, the Sublime, and Tragedy, with such sub-classes as Comedy and the Grotesque, and the Ludicrous as the point where aesthetic meaning ceases. The justification of this classification will be pointed out later, but its exclusion of humor, wit, pathos, etc., is due to the fact that these are not categories of classification, but empirical sub-types determined by subjective qualities. We now come to the problem of the manner of operation of beauty as a regulative concept; and we find ourselves once more referred to the constitutional concepts for our answer.

Beauty determines the conditions of operation for the constitutional or determining concepts. It decrees that the category of color, for example, must conform to certain standards of purity, where purity represents the adequacy with which the hue functions as a mode of light, and demands that its relations to other colors must conform to certain rules. The rules for purity and conformity are set up on a basis of empirical fact, which includes the facts of color-theory in optics and of the rules of color mixture in practice, as well as the rules of psychology relative to the conditions under which color effects are pleasing or displeasing, etc. Color under the law of beauty cannot therefore riot its quality, nor trifle with its relations with other colors or with lines, masses, etc. Similarly, it must conform, in regard to excess and defect, to the conditions by which it is experienced; and, in general, must find its relation of perfect appropriation to other factors within its own type, and factors within all the types it is capable of coming in relation to. As a law Beauty is thus regulative primarily of the external relational conditions which circumstance an aesthetic phenomenon such as color or line, and its decrees are inexorable. A fact may fail to conform to its dictates, but the penalty is that that fact is shut out from complicity in the determination of any class of beautiful things, and is excluded by the rigor of inflexible law. Thus beauty

as law puts the categories in their places and sees that they stay there. In painting color must come to terms with tone, line, mass, etc., all these must adapt themselves to color, in short, there must be a relation of perfect balance and harmony among all the constitutional categories if their object is to be beautiful. In this case, that is, beauty operates through the principle of perfect mutual appropriateness, establishing the condition called, under abstract or mathematical conditions, proportion. This is the factor that has appeared all the way through the development of aesthetic thought as the concept of harmony and while the position of profound importance which it occupies must be recognized, it is not by any means a fundamental category of aesthetic objects, but is a variation, by specialized application, of the methodological principle of appropriateness and is rather a practical rule to be followed by those engaged in beauty production. A still more narrow specialization restricts it to music. It is not of basic consequence in aesthetic theory, except from the methodological point of view.

In general, then, beauty dictates the law of order and serial relationality among the categories of aesthetic determination. It controls the functional conditions by and under which these categories determine an object that can be real as an aesthetic object. It determines the relations of proportion, quantity, position, sequence, etc., among all the categories of the system in the determination of every object, for no object is determined at all, as an aesthetic object, except as all aesthetic categories co-operate. This co-operation is under the regulative law of beauty. Beauty then determines an object through the categories of aesthetic value, just as truth determines an object through the operation of the logical categories. Objects constituted by the system of aesthetic categories under the regulation of the principle of beauty, operating as proportionality or appropriateness, are beautiful objects. Beauty, then, is an object so constituted and determined, an object determined by the aesthetic categories under the principle of appropriation.

The cogency of this conclusion rests upon two or three grounds, which may be mentioned. The first is that our definition enumerates and specifies the *a priori* conditions upon which the conception of the intelligibility of beauty is logically possible. It states the *a priori* grounds also upon which beauty

can *be*, the conditions upon which beauty can be an intelligible entity, and thus the conditions under which beauty can be either conceived or experienced sensuously. But there is the still stronger ground of analogy. The *a priori* ground of course cannot fail, but it never can, in the last analysis, make itself completely intelligible in terms of experience. But on the principle of analogy we have, on logical grounds, necessitated the conformity of experience with the *a priori* by comprehending experience, in its primordial form, within the logical conditions of the *a priori* in general, making experience a necessary condition of the being of an object; and thus we have overcome the difficulty which on other grounds is insuperable, viz., that of overcoming the plurality of universes of discourse. The universe of existence and the universe of value are identified by analogy in the interdependence, in being, of Space-Time and Color-Tone; and, experience is grounded in the fact that the *existence of feeling* is implied in that interdependence. Thus the duality of nature and culture are shown to be consistent with their identity. This we have effected through the principle of analogical identity, which supercedes the abstract mechanical rigor of ordinary logical contradiction, and thus renders it applicable to the absolute opposites which constitute the realities of life and experience. Thus in ordinary logic a fact is either body or not body; in the logic of analogy it may be both, and the rigid 'either-or' gives way to the mutuality of appropriation. This is possible on the assumption of the reciprocity of the respective constitutional configurations of body and not-body, which is analogy stated in factual terms, by which opposites are what they are *as* opposites by virtue of the demands of the relations between them, as a man is *what* he is and a woman is *what* she is *because* of the marital relation between them. Two is what it is and three is what it is because of the five, or six, or the $\frac{2}{3}$, or the $1\frac{1}{2}$, etc. of the relations between them, which means that two and three are defined in, and have their being in, the number system. But, strictly speaking, and necessarily in the case where two and three are concrete or specify objects, this definition in terms of the system to which a term belongs or of which it is a constituent, is definition by analogical identity, and is not a matter of "inclusion," or of part and whole at all. The inclusion relation, or the part-whole relation, is applicable literally only to the conditions

that are dominated by space and time, is questionable under conditions of time, and has no meaning in value relations. The "in" of value relations is always an analogical identity, e. g., "in" love, "in" sin, etc., its connotation is figurative on the principle of ambiguity, and it has nothing to do with inclusion or exclusion, except through the further analogy by which the respective universes of discourse of its terms are brought into identity with each other.

. The beauty object and its principle are further justified on the concrete empirical analogy to truth and the good. Objects constituted by the aesthetic categories are beautiful and their objectivity is beauty, *just as* objects constituted by ordinary logical categories are true and their objectivity truth, or *just as* objects constituted by ethical categories are good and their objectivity goodness. In the same way, and referring to more highly specified systems of categories, we may say, *just as* objects determined by physical categories are physical objects and their objectivity nature. Categories of existence determine existents, categories of value determine values; the burden is on the system of the categories in any case, and falls most heavily, so far as the specific characters of objects are concerned, upon the categorial relations of analogy which bind the categories into a system.

Beauty then is the objectivity of a system of categories, and is experienced as the quality (beautiful) of an object, which quality appears in experience as the analogue of the object's constitution, and cannot be known by direct intuition. What we call beauty, then, in terms of the qualities of objects, is the constitutional system of categories by which the object is determined, as that system is analogously imaged to us, or symbolized to us, as color, form, etc. in perception. And it is only as the history of past experience furnishes us with this categorial system that beauty has meaning for us; not that the categories will be known as such in the case of every individual who experiences beauty, but they are there by implication and in some form, otherwise there would be no experience of beauty, since they are precisely the conditions of the existence of the experience. The knowledge we thus have by symbolisms of various sorts has lately been made the subject of investigation, and it may be that, by the development of proper methods in this field, and by the study of objective symbols, insights into the nature of experience will be achieved which

would never be possible of description by psychology, in which case we should be well rid of that subject because of its place being taken by a logic of symbols. But a logic of symbols is not logic; it is merely the application of certain aspects of logical method to objective psychology, and if it will curb its pretenses to logic it may perform useful tasks for knowledge generally. *How*, I say again, a categorial system, as the constitution of an object and the determinant of the object's universal type, can be represented in direct perception; *how*, that is, the universal is to be perceived in the particular, is a question for a rational psychology of the methodology of perception, and it may very well be that the new interest in symbols will create that psychology by the application of logical methods to the problem of perception. But a science of symbols can never usurp the functions of logic so long as the functions of logic have implications of *reality*, so long, that is, as they rest upon systems of genuine categories and categorial relations. The perception of beauty, and the psychological problems involved in its mediation in experience, are not properly, therefore, questions of aesthetic theory, which is a matter of logic.

Beauty, then is an object determined by Color, Tone, Color-Tone, Rhythm, (Feeling) Line, Mass, Form, Design, as integrated and incorporated in Individuality by relations principled in Appropriateness, Ambiguity, Analogy and Cumulation. It will be noted that four of these categories are modes of Matter, four are modes of Form, and four are modes of relation or Method. The list may not be exhaustive, except that there probably are no other categories of the same comprehension. Each of the material and of the formal categories, or some of them, in any case, are capable of division into a number of submodes, as form can be regarded as comprehending size, shape, etc., and some of the characteristics of color and tone may be found so basic as to be regarded as categorial. But I do not believe that the beauty object can be made intelligible by any less number of categories, or by any other radically different order of them, or when the categories are related by other relations than those given. The examples of Aristotle and Kant in the formulation of categorial systems should recommend modesty if personal considerations were involved; but it is wholly a matter of the nature of an object-type that determines the number and rela-

tional system of the categories of beauty. What is inadequate in the formulation of the system can be developed, and what is wrong corrected; but Nature and Culture conspire to create the object-type, with which it is not in the province of man to meddle.

It will be noted that, in the distinction of the parts of the system, and the allotment of the categories to them, Feeling was left out. But it has been explained that that which in the system corresponds to feeling is Rhythm, and feeling is that mode of rhythm which results from the individuation, in consciousness, of the experience of rhythm. That is to say, as the beauty object is represented in my experience it is the mode of rhythm that functions, it is rhythm as the stuff of the object that projects into my experience, and that in my experience is felt. Feeling is then in me the immediate revelation of the essence of the object that is presented, the essence being, from its own point of view, that is, from the point of view of the nature and constitution of the object, the rhythm that is the analogical identity of color and tone considered as themselves objective cosmic stuff. As feeling when it objectively exists as rhythm in an object, is intuited as life, life becomes the concrete form of beauty principle as it appears in a work of art. Feeling is thus the point of contact between reality and experience, and the contact is maintained through an element that is the fundamental essence of both reality and experience, an element, that is to say, that is common to both and of the essence of both. It is then the identity of feeling, as elemental experience, and rhythm, as elemental being, that explains the mystery implied in the question as to *how* the reality of the beauty object can be fully realized in experience; and it is the explanation, and refutation, of all those mysticisms and animisms and panpsychisms which hope to explain the contact with the real by obfuscation and legerdemain, and without the only instrument that could make explanation intelligible viz., the system of the categories. Feeling, then, which *is* rhythm in the system of reality as expressed in the category rhythm, need not be listed in the logical system, since it is a category of the rational psychology by which the workings of the mind are explained when it is engaged in the contemplation of the beauty object. And when psychology develops a logic of its method, which seems hopelessly remote, feeling will be the head of the corner in the system.

The object beauty is a harmony, to use the ancient term, and there are two basic meanings of this term, as one would expect from the fact that the object of harmony is determined by categories all of which are constructed on the principle of ambiguity. The two types of meaning are (1) Mathematical, or physical, existential, abstract harmony, the stuff of which is absolute form, and its principle existential design. (2) Life harmony, in which the stuff is concrete form, or, as experience, feeling, and its principle is intentional design. The two principles of design are never completely compatible, never quite equated to a common purpose. For the end of mathematical design is an object completed in perfect repose, static, and fixed, eternal, as against any developmental urge. It is characteristic of architecture and to a less degree of sculpture, where existential characters are pronounced, and it contemplates the fixing of form as absolute position with its end accomplished in a form forever present. Its motive is stability, and is symbolic of eternal relations. The life harmony, on the other hand, is mobile and fluid, with its end not in its fixity, but in its fixedness, which is a factor in the persistence with which it pursues a purpose always beyond. Its factors are relations in rhythmic equilibrium, and the whole moves toward an end which its idea perpetually represents in a living perfection. Its urge is toward the end of a designed unity of existence with value, and its form is an ever-present instance of that end conceived as accomplished. And its perfection of form is due to the fact that the end is never accomplished, and the harmony of life is equilibrated about the eternal pursuit. As a consequence the two harmonies, which are always present together in every beauty object, manifest a continuous tendency to fall apart, and this fact becomes the basis of the distinction of the various types of art object.

There are cases, however, where the two designs are completely balanced and unified. But the unity comes at the expense of life, for in the process of unification life surrenders its essential purposiveness to perfection in rhythmic continuity, and there is left of life nothing but its abstract design, its motive reduced to the status of an ideal of which only the universality is represented. An instance of this is painting, which manifests life, but only in the universal and never in a concrete form. Another instance not quite so clear is music, where the rhythmic urge is limited to tonal relations as distinct

from the linear structure, and thus not characterizing the whole. It is for this reason that a complicated production in music can seldom, perhaps never, be comprehended as a perfect individual. And it is the same limitation of life in a painting which enables it to express perfect repose. Life in these cases is perfect and complete, but dead. Thus the unity of the two designs, the existential and the value design, can never be quite achieved except by the limitation of the design of life; the abstract design of existence cannot be limited, because its essence is fixity, and life pays the price of its soul to beauty. The only condition under which this perfect unity can be attained is the absolute control of the environing circumstance as it becomes the content of the individuality which the object of beauty represents. And as the elements of circumstance can be controlled by the artist in painting and music, the individual is formally complete, but its completeness comes at the price of the loss of the living energy, for the reason that in utilizing the circumstances they must be stripped to the universal, and each item of circumstance must surrender its individuality in the interest of the whole. The whole is thus left abstract, perfect, lifeless.

In nature and in the practical life of man this control is never attained, and life persists at the cost of perfection in its individuals. But in persisting in the effort to express itself, and achieving only imperfect individuals, life itself is limited again, and remains incomplete in design, thwarted in will, and dissatisfied and unsatisfied in its feeling content. There is always enough left of life and its will and design to leave intact the hope of possible satisfaction for those humans who do not understand clearly, and life goes on its half-blind unintelligent way. Life is sweet then for the hog, the fox, and the practical man. But for the man whose knowledge of the conditions and limitations of life is even moderately clear, who knows conditions as they are and as determined by existence, life is a troubled dream. It is for this reason that philosophers and saints and the aesthetically competent persist in living in conditions not as they are but as they ought to be; conditions as they are or would be in a world under moral principles and as such directed by aesthetic design; the *meaning* of the New Jerusalem is its eternal Beauty. Incidentally, this breach between existence and value is cosmic, and the consequent limitation it imposes on life is the ground of

rational, that is, moral, action, and action is thus, when rational, principled by the motive to reform. "Practical" action has therefore no moral status.

The final definition of the beauty object is that of an object determined by the aesthetic categories under the condition of perfect harmony imposed by the principle of appropriateness. The appropriateness is, of course, in the first instance, the complete mutuality of all the categories, so that there is never a question of too little or too much with respect to any category, nor any distortion of categorial relations. In a picture or a piece of music these conditions are fulfilled, and we have the perfect work of art, the completed art object. And in dancing, which is an attempted combination of painting with music, there is a third instance almost perfect. But the fundamental difference lies in the fact that the dance is life in the concrete, and therefore the design is limited, while painting and music are life in the abstract, or the pure universal, and hence their design is perfect. There are then, in actual beauty, instances of perfect harmony where life is dead, and instances of partial or actual harmony where life lives the effort to perfection. In another direction, the appropriateness of the categorial principle refers to the degree of fitness of the exterior circumstance to become content for an individual, and here the principle is found never quite to apply, since there is always, under conditions of actuality, a degree of recalcitrancy which cannot be overcome. And as life is the effort to bring value and existence together under the principle of fitness and harmony, life is forever frustrate.

Under the guidance of our definition of beauty, which we take as the criterion and principle of all aesthetic experience, and keeping in mind the conceptual system and the system of principles which it persupposes, we are prepared, we hope, to face the problem of aesthetic types. These will be distinguished in accordance with our principle of beauty, with the consideration of harmony with its reference to life as the final status of the beauty object which we have just described. The types which we regard as fundamental are the Ugly, the Sublime, Tragedy, Comedy and the Grotesque. These are the forms of the Aesthetic object distinguished with respect to Beauty as the criterion.

CHAPTER XVI

THE UGLY

Beauty is that object which is determined in proportion and harmony by the mutual operation of all the categories of the aesthetic system. The determination is governed by certain laws, to which we have given formulation in the methodological categories. Beauty is the standard and criterion of all aesthetic objects and of their types. Beauty is therefore an individual and not merely an object, it is the objectivity of a type of object, an Idea, and therefore a universal, a principle become law. It is for this reason that, in language, the application of the term beauty is adjectival, and where used substantively is regarded as abstract. But as concrete and real beauty is not *an* object, but the principle of a genus of objects. The different types of aesthetic objects vary, from beauty as the standard, in different ways, and it is these variations that we desire now to describe.

The extreme of variation from the standard is the Ugly. The ugly is not the merely not beautiful. For if it showed none of the characteristics of the type of categorial determination that produces beauty, it would not be denominated an aesthetic type. The merely non-beautiful is not an aesthetic object, but, if such an object could be, it would be a blank existent. But such an object is only a conceptual limit, an abstract form of the imagination, and its meaning lies solely in the fact that it expresses the cosmic significance of the distinction between existence and value. Such a concept is necessitated in the idea of pure existence; but in so far as the idea of existence implies a content, it raises the suggestion of the analogical identity of existence and value. And as we have seen that each of the aesthetic concepts carries the suggestion of the analogy to existence, so the concepts of existence all imply the relation of analogy to value. For the analogy, as an identity of the most intimate type, is implicated in the concept of reality, no object being real which does not have its law, and the law of its type, in a formulation of the analogical relation between existence and value. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that every concept, of value or existence, has its core of meaning in its reference to this law.

The ugly is then an aesthetic object, its character as ugly is derived from its relation to the standard of beauty, and it is now the task to exhibit that character in terms of the concepts that determine the standard by showing in what ways its character represents variation from those concepts. The ugly represents the extreme of this variation, and, in the sense that beauty is the perfect harmony, or harmonious perfection, of the object as determined by proportionality and appropriateness of the concepts, the ugly is the imperfect of that extreme degree that may be called the perfectly imperfect. Its imperfection is perfect or complete, it fails in all the categorial characters by which its object is determined, and the contemplation of it has, as an experience, qualities that are the antitheses of the contemplation of the beautiful. But the experience of the ugly is still an aesthetic experience, in that its very imperfection is mediated through aesthetic concepts. But the mediation involves the analogical reference of the aesthetic concepts to the concepts of existence, and the existence in this case is the inertia or passivity of feeling. The essence of the ugly is the recalcitrancy and resistance of the existential import of feeling to the forming graces of line, mass, design, as mutualized by the categories of method. If a color is ugly, it is ugly because it is an ugly color; that is, it is only as color is considered as an aesthetic category that it can be considered ugly. We would never speak of an ugly space, but only of an ugly space-form. But properly speaking we should not call a color ugly, for the same reason that we refused to call a color beautiful. For, taken as such, a color is not an object, even though it is a substance, and what is not an object, that is, what is not categorized by definite relations, is neither beautiful nor ugly. It is only as color is itself a category that we connect it with the characterizations beautiful and ugly, but we think of these characterizations as aspects of an object whose constitution is in part determined by color. So the character ugly can only be applied to an object which possesses a categorial structure, to an object, moreover, that is structured by aesthetic categories, and we must turn to an examination of that structure.

The ugly represents a variation from the typic beautiful in the aspect of its relational structure. The proportionality of its categorial relations is disturbed. And the disturbance runs all through the object, because of the cumulative continuity of the system. In an ugly object the lines do not deter-

mine masses in accord to design. The design is crippled in the faulty fusion of colors or tones, or of color and tone elements, or in the imperfect delineation of masses, such that the form is made internally disproportionate. The ugly is an object, then, in the sense that it is structured by categorial determination; it is an ugly object because its categorial determination is faulty. Its determination is faulty because its structural or logical categories are not mutualized by the categories of method. The object is real because its logical categories are ontological categories in their analogical reference to existence. It is an aesthetic object in that the categories which enter into its faulty determination and provide it with its distorted constitution are aesthetic categories. At any point within its structure where the categorial relations are warped, there will be the source of the distortion of the whole. And the distortion of the whole follows because of the principle of cumulation. The distortion is complete, the ugliness perfect imperfection. The Greek notion of "deformity" expresses the situation exactly, so far as the essence of the object is supposed to be its form. But as form is not the symbol of the complete totality of the relations that constitute the object, the term does not express the final meaning of the ugly. For we have seen that form itself has the inner ambiguity which points to an analogical identity beyond, and this final identity we found to be expressed in the convergence of the two aspects of design in the individuality of the object. The object as individual then closes the categorial system because it gives final expression to the law of cumulation by which the categories are related. It is thus anticipated in each of the categories, just as its own nature in some aspect looks backward to each.

Any kind of defect, then, in any determinant, will affect the whole, and the object is awry. It is not necessary to distinguish between the categories and their relations, since the categories are relational, and the relations categorial, in nature. But where it is necessary to emphasize their relational nature this is done by interpretation in terms of the laws of the system, which are themselves statements of the universality of the relations of which the categories are constituted. A defect or deformity which makes an object ugly affects the object as a whole, and the degree of deformity determines the degree of variation from the standard beauty and thus its type as an aesthetic object.

We may note a few instances of ugly objects. Faces are sometimes ugly. A face may be ugly because of the element of color. This not only may mean a variation from the normal in quality, but a confused combination of colors, or of colors wrongly placed. A red nose, or Plato's instance of an overpainted eye, throws the whole out of harmony, and thus disturbs the design of the whole. A face with irregular or misplaced colors may give the effect of an ugly "color scheme." Combinations may be such as to preclude proper fusion, and to involve contrasts which are disproportionate. It is true that a black face is not ugly because it is a departure from the white regarded as normal, nor is any color among the possibilities ugly for that reason. In fact a black face may be supremely beautiful, as may also be a face of any other race. But a black face distorted by efforts to mimic the colors of a face of another racial character may be supremely ugly. And it is a common thing to find among faces of persons of mixed race a grotesquely ugly instance, while other racial combinations may be beautiful. A face may also be ugly from distortion of mass. The huge protruding jaw of the cartoonist's caricature of a pugilist is grotesquely ugly, as is the wattle-jowled mask of the "successful" man. So is the bullneck of representations of another type, and the defect is at once interpreted as a symbol of ill design. I do not mean design as an expression of personal or moral character, although this would be pictured by some defect of mass which spoils the form and suggests the defect of design in the character. But it is design in the aesthetic, not the moral sense of the term, that we mean here. Defects of mass are shown through the control of mass by line, and are not necessarily expressed in deformities of size or shape. An ugly face is often described in terms of the lines that present its structure, and this is a common trick of the novelist, who must get his effects through words.

Another good instance of the ugly is the "dump" where trash and rubbish are thrown away. Here there is a landscape composed of fragmentary objects, giving defects illustrative of every distorted aesthetic quality. Colors are smudged or jumbled together or are confusedly fused or in jarring contrasts. These confusions naturally distort the line qualities of the scene, mixing grace of curve with splintered jaggedness and roughly broken contours. Masses are consequently be-

devilled into all sorts of crazy shapes, sizes are juxtaposed in bewildering monstrosities, forms gnarled and twisted into formlessness, with the design of the whole suggestive of the condemned hosts of paradise lost. The thing is altogether what should not be, not on moral or any other representational or symbolic grounds, but merely and simply as an object that is aesthetically irrational and offensive to contemplation. And yet there is a vantage point for observation which gives the thing a sort of weird attractiveness, a certain doleful suggestion of form, just as the bedlam of noises in a city street may, from a certain distance, percipitate in something resembling a tone. This is, it seems, evidence that the dump object has its aesthetic character in spite of the universal distortion, and may be described as an instance where defect, by virtue of its multiplicity and variety, tends to defeat itself and to calm itself down into a mitigated perfection. The ultimate design has something of the effect of a cloth of "broken" colors; it represents the attempt, at least, however far its goal may be missed, to attain a harmony within the chaos, covering the multitudinous void with a semblance of form and vaguely suggesting a shattered hope of design in the end. Its arrant ugliness overreaches itself in a sort of dismal beauty.

The cases we have noticed are all of them interpreted in terms of the literal intent of the categories. And the types might be easily multiplied almost indefinitely. Ugly buildings, business blocks and stove-foundry churches, are common enough to symbolize the sickening design of our civilization; uncouth landscapes abound, and bill-boards teem like maggots in the decaying debris of progress, picturing a prurient culture in the benign visage of a contented cow. These are instances of the ugly object turned inside out, as if a man should go about with his bowels wreathed about his person. Existence is literal with its litter. Objects of the more abstract type give instances of the ugly, on the other hand, in which the categories have their figurative meaning uppermost. The case of the ugly moral character can be given. In this the defect may be one of color or tone, the stuff of the object being distorted. There seems to be a weakness inherent in the very marrow of the typical villains of literature, and there is near enough approach to the same in many an actual person. Caliban's education merely teaches him to swear, and Satan's virtues of strength and singleness of purpose lead him to

revolt against the all highest. The spirit is often willing where the flesh is weak, the flesh may will too strongly for the spirit, and the weakness of the flesh, or its excess of strength, seems a decree of doom. The matter refuses form because of the very defect or excess of the stubborn inertia by which it accepts form; the granite will not become the statue because the chisels of form cannot cut into it, even though its hardness would endow the statue with immortality if it could be formed. This inertia of the color-tone stuff appears as the "destiny" which rules the characters in tragedy, and in the cosmic interpretation may be the mother of fate. The color-tone stuff may have just this cosmic habitation and yet appear in the guise of a personal character in the circumstance which overwhelms Tess, in spite of the eternal loveliness sculptured in color in her mouth. Line and mass are capable of interpretation in this way in the ugly moral personality, in fact, it is only in terms of aesthetic categories that many fundamental aspects of morality can be expressed. This may be due to defect in the system of moral categories; or, it may be due to the ontological dependence of the moral system of categories upon the aesthetic system. A defect of mass appears in the self-will of ambition, and is sufficient to overcome the urgency of the principles of identity and proportion in their effort to lead the way to rational design. Lines of intent by their distortion twist the character askew, and by the confusion of direction create a moral monstrosity. And design is imperfectly balanced where any other feature is out of plumb.

There are also cases of ugliness in which the literal and the figurative meanings of the categories are bewilderingly intermixed. Ugly weather displays literal color with figurative color in a way to produce the most indescribable effects. Masses are blurred or unduly sharpened in outline, and lines jump from literateness to figure with an agility that cannot be followed. This may very well be the basis of the effect of depression felt by one who has not attuned himself to the sombreness of a gloomy day, or of the inexplicable sense of jollity that bids one go for a walk in a snowstorm. Slushing about in the reeds and grassy sludges of a swamp for the mere fun of the discomfort, the dread in which you face getting out of intimately uncomfortable clothes wetted in every thread and stitch, such effects may very well be the results of

the combined literal and figurative meanings of the categories through which they are so variously if unconsciously represented in intuition.

There is perhaps no need to dilate upon the *experience* of the ugly, for in the aesthetic object experience qualities and objective characters are identified. But it must be emphasized that an object's ugliness does not depend upon the psychological states it may induce. Psychological states are states of the perceiver, and the perceiver is not the object of inquiry here. The study of such states can be pursued, it is true, in connection with any type of object, and would be much the same, presumably, with all kinds of objects. There is, however, a larger question which is interesting and important for aesthetic theory. We have already said that existence and value come together in identity, when they identify, in experience; but it is not the private experience of the individual. And as the private experience of the individual is what is ordinarily meant by experience, it is best to avoid the term when the problem concerns a direct reference to what is objectively real. In this objective sense, or the sense in which experience is taken universally, or as a universal, it is expressed perhaps best in the common word *life*. We saw the necessity to refer to *life* as the objectivity of experience in connection with the definition of beauty; we found that *life* comes nearest to expressing what is experienced as real in a painting or piece of music, where aesthetic objects approach completion or perfect realization. And it is this objective completeness, or completeness in the object, that suggests *life* as ultimate aesthetic stuff and as the usual and proper designation of the meaning of the individual. But we were forced to recognize the fact that while *life* is complete or perfect in the realized instance of the aesthetic object, such as the painting or piece of music, its completeness or perfection is formal, and there can always be question whether the full intent of design is present. Formal design of *life* is present in its completeness, and the object is a finished existent. But that in the picture or music, design, in the sense of the intent of *life*, is present, and present in that completeness of which no further demands can be made, is not obvious. There is therefore a defect of design in the beauty object, *if* the object is contemplated as one which can be described as self-created and self-maintained, which seems to be necessary in the case of an

object in which the universal principle of life is the law of its design. This demand comes near being realized in the most characteristic beauty of nature; but even here the individuality of the object carries a reference beyond itself, as shown by the fact that the object must be perceived as limited by definite contours in order for the principle of individuation to identify the object in terms of its inner content.

As a consequence of these facts it is necessary to say that the life of the beauty object is formal and abstract, and fails of complete individual identity when interpreted strictly in terms of its constitutional law, viz., its inner structure and constitution. We expressed this in connection with beauty by saying that there is indeed life in the beauty object, but that since the life is purely formal, an abstract universal, the life that is there is abstract and dead. It is because of this defect of principle that, after the object is complete in contemplation, it manifests defects in the way of persistence in self-identity when subjected to judgments of reflection. At any rate, the problem of the ultimate distinction between the beautiful and the ugly is one as to what precise meaning is to be given to the term life as used to express the substance which grounds the manifold relations that constitute the object in either case. If the characterization of life in the beauty object as abstract is correct, and we seem compelled so to regard it by the intricate theoretical arguments that appear to necessitate it, we may say that the imperfection of variation-forms from the standard beauty is due to the fact that the object, in these cases of variation, *has a concrete content*. We then have the two interesting propositions, that what is concrete aesthetically is imperfect and lacking in some aspect of formal completeness, and what is complete aesthetically is abstract and lacking all individuate concreteness. But if the concrete is the real, then the real is imperfect, and the imperfect would appear to become the criterion of aesthetic objects. But what is concrete is individual, and the individual can only be a criterion for itself, and not even for its type, for it is itself the type. The escape from this situation that has been resorted to most frequently in the history of thought is the appeal to the forced identity of the individual with the universal. But here the appeal to the principle of identity is necessitated only by the acceptance of the reflective postulate of rationality, the consistency that is accepted as the principle of the reflective intellect.

But the identity is sometimes treated as not a matter of the reflective intellect, not a matter of intellect at all but a principle of immediate apprehension of a sort which is usually expressed as represented in experience by emotion. This is the mystic method of approach to the problem of identity. But this method presupposes emotion as an active agency of apprehension, in which case it seems not effectively differentiated from the cognitive activity of intellect. Identity is then reflective and dogmatic and is accepted as itself the final postulate in all points of view. But it is self-contradictory.

Either, then, we are faced with a principle of identity which becomes contradictory to the intellect, or an identity in emotion that has no ground. But there appears to be a way out of this impasse if we reconstruct the principle of identity along the lines used in developing the principle of analogical identity. This will enable us to conceive and postulate an identity which does not statically end in a purely homogeneous and undifferentiated universe, with the alternative of irrationality, and at the same time enable us to avoid the appeal to the dubious assumption that feeling is active. These are then our assumptions: The principle of identity that can hold in the real is that of analogical identity, and the principle will apply to the real when the real is conceived as actual under the postulate of the passivity of feeling. Feeling here is not an individual experience, but is yet concrete and universal in the total life, the eternal Pathos which is Ethos, as the substance of the aesthetic object, in which it is known as rhythm as the identity of color-tone. It is thus not an individual experience, but an individuate experience, experience as an individual, and so self-consistent.

With this restatement of postulates we may return to the problem of the distinction of the ugly from the beautiful, and, more expressly, to the completer explanation of the meaning of the ugly.

The ugly, let us now say, is an object constituted by the aesthetic categories, in which object there is a defect in the operation of the principle of appropriateness, such that the abstract and ideal formality of the "life" of the object, as given in beauty, is overcome, and life in the ugly is rendered concrete and actual in the substance of feeling. The object is completely individuated, and real, while the beauty object is individuated in pure universality, and is a pure law, and so

ideal. This life that is concrete in the substance of feeling is irrational when viewed from the view-point of reflective intelligence; it is real in contemplation, and appears or is manifest in the cosmic effort to bring to perfect identity the two aspects of the real—existence and value. This last statement constitutes the definition of life; life is the cosmic effort toward complete identity, in an individual, of existence and value. Life forever fails; but its failures are individuate in the objects of art. This eternal effort is sometimes substantiated in the postulate of will, but by the reality of will is meant nothing but the assumption of the eternal effort or urge toward identity of existence and value. Here is the aesthetic ground of ethical theory. Life then is the postulate of the possibility of the analogical identity, which is here the ontological identity, of Space-Time-Color-Tone as the ground of all meaning for Reality. Life is concrete and explicit in art, each object of art being a corporate individuation of a life-failure.

It is at this point that the ground is laid down for moral values. The urge toward identity of existence and value, in the individual of the human species, is will and its expression is action. Action characterizes the individual as possessing the capacity for projecting the identity of what in the present is given as diverse into the future as ideal. Action is then the assumption of the possibility, objectified in an ideal and contemplated as end, of the identity of existence and value. As I have written elsewhere of action and its categorization in value objects, discussion is not called for here. But it is obvious that with this conception a basis is laid for the "practical" life, and the conditions provided for its rational explanation. And it is equally obvious that aesthetics furnishes the basic theory upon which all the practical disciplines are to be constructed.

The ugly is then an object individuated out of the life substance by the variation from the standard—beauty—of aesthetic categories, and is real and concrete, where the beauty object is ideal and of the nature of law. It is the characteristic object of the actual world as known in contemplation, being *real and actual*, where the beautiful is formal and abstract, or *real and ideal*. It is the object that can live in reality, where life is the effort or urge toward identification of existence with value. It is thus the principle of the reality of

aesthetic objects. The substance, which we have described as Space-Time-Color-Tone, can now be designated in terms of experience as Life, and as such will be the basic concept for the distinction of the different types of aesthetic object, to the discussion of which we shall shortly proceed. The principle of beauty is thus the criterion for the individuate or corporate structure and constitution of the aesthetic object, and, by extension, of the constitution of all types of *value* objects, as individual. But the principle of distinction of *types* of concrete *aesthetic* objects, is that of the ugly as expressing life. All objects, therefore, that are constituted or incorporated about the principle of life are variations of the categorization of the ugly. We have already named them as the Sublime, Tragedy, Comedy, and the Grotesque.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SUBLIME

IF WE regard the beautiful as the perfect in balance of categorial structure, and the ugly as any variation from this harmony due to defect or excess in any categorial relation, then the sublime is closer in nature to the ugly than to the beautiful, and the principle of the ugly becomes the maxim for its explanation. It may be premised that the ugly has nothing to do with the hateful and the aggressively displeasing; no aesthetic object depends in any way upon its relation to pleasure in the percipient, and where these subjective effects are pronounced, they are due for the most part to moral or other reasons. A drunken filthy hoodlum or a slimy smelly fisherman may be painted in a picture, and the slime and filth are superseded in the eternal imperfection that lies at the root of life. A beautiful whore is beautiful regardless of her moral depravity; her beauty raises her above moral distinctions, elevates her to a plane where moral authority is powerless; the design of her being is not preformed within the moral sphere, her existence is aesthetic and beyond morality. I am not here celebrating her whoredom, but describing her beauty, defending her against a charge that is cruel and unjust and implies an offence of which she is totally innocent. We hate and loathe the prostitute, but it is for moral reasons and not because of defect in her beauty. It may be regretted that beauty and depravity are combined in the same person, but saintliness and hateful sin have fellowshipped in our being from the beginning. When therefore we say that the sublime is near in nature and constitution to the ugly we are not passing moral judgment, our judgments are true or false within another universe of discourse than the moral. The realms of morality and aesthetics lie close together, but their categories are not identical, in fact the basic categories have nothing in common except the universal relation of both to value. And this relation is differently circumstanced in the two cases. By the reference of the sublime to the ugly we mean that it is the principle by which the ugly is determined that also determines the sublime, and we must see with what changes and modifications the principle operates in two cases.

It is worth while also to recall the nature and structure of a principle. A principle is an ordered system of inter-related categories which constitute a type of reality. Obviously the internal relationality of the system is modifiable to some extent without essentially changing the individual constitution of any one of the categories within the system. The limits within which actual modification is possible are determined by the categorial structure of the larger system within which the system under consideration is itself a unit and a single category. It is this mutual inclusiveness of categories that is formulated in the principle of cumulation.

The ugly involves a general disharmony within the entire categorial structure of the aesthetic object, such that each conceptual character will show defect and deformity, due to modification of the internal relations that constitute the structure of the object. Its defectiveness, that is, is principled; it is in its determining principle that the ugly is what it is, that variation from the perfect that leads design to miss the absolute beauty at which it aims. The ugly is then defective all through, perfectly imperfect, beautifully unbeautiful, divinely deformed. It is in this that the sublime varies from the ugly; it is not perfect imperfection, but an imperfection which can be readily detected in its object because it manifests itself as distortion in the object's most prominent feature. The sublime object is an aesthetic object that is imperfect in mass. The imperfection is characteristically one of excess of mass, but there is, theoretically, at least, the possibly sublime in terms of deficiency of mass. To take the usual illustrations, the storm, the mountain, the starry heavens, etc., these are the aesthetic objects they are because there is in each an over-emphasis of mass, and in the most literal sense of the term. The defect is in the object, not in my feeling of fear or awe, but within the constitutional relations of the object, and "caused by," that is to say, is, the disproportionate mass. The disproportion is between the mass and the other categorial characters, not between mass and my powers of sense or imagination. The *storm* is vast, the *mountain* huge, and the starry *heavens* illimitable. The sublimity lies in the disproportion between the mass and the other categorial features of the object, which are otherwise regular and suggest beauty. So the mass promises beauty, pretends to supply line and color-tone and form with the substance they require, and then over-

whelms them with such a surplus as to force them beneath the standard of their own perfection. But they persist, line and tone and rhythm and color and form are present in the storm and carrying each its urge to beauty, and their success in determining the beauty object is prevented by the one item of excess of mass and the litter and clutter it occasions. There are more space and size and expanse of color and thunderous tone and dazzling light than line can reduce to any definiteness of form, although a hint of form is there in the effort of line, so that the design appears confounded in the impossible task and wanders furiously aimless whither a drunken destiny permits. There is more space in the heavens than the divine grace of color and form can encompass with line, and the resulting uncertainty of its design fills the mind with obfuscated wonderment. But the starry relations sing and the bluey distance caresses with solemn warmth; they would make beauty if the eternal spaces would but withdraw just far enough for them to commune with one another in symbols of form.

But it is not size in excess that alone determines the sublime. Nor is it always mass in the literal sense of space and volume and bulk. The mass of ideal objects is itself ideal, and where the stuff of an object is composed of relations the mass has almost innumerable aspects. And in many cases the stuff is extremely thin and impalpable, present to the contemplation seemingly only in terms of the contemplation's own stuff, with the object diaphanous and evanescent before the touch of sense. But the suggestion of sense must be there or there is no objectivity at all, no substance from which an aesthetic object could be made. The mass lies often in such relations as moral significance, and the heroic deed and the effort vainly directed toward some impossible goal may have the character of sublimity. The sparrow who in defense of its young flies into the jaws of the dog, the patriot braving certain death in defense of he knows not what, the Spinoza facing the mob whom he must know will howl him off the earth, as they effectively have done, the Jesus climbing the hopeless hill of human insensitivity knowing its perdurable inertia will at last crush him, all these objects are sublime in the fact that the stuff of which their "beauty" is made is overdone in quantities sufficient to break the harmony of their conceptual structure, and we have for beauty the forlorn defeat deformed within an uncertain design. The lines of intent in any case

cited point in no concerted direction and to no clearly defined goal, the form is void, because the color-tone content of raw significance is there in masses that defy their power to harmonize themselves and to curb the excess of mass with proportion. We are not of course interested in these cases as instances of moral value; they may be of the highest morality or of the lowest, but they are aesthetic facts in that they are determined by aesthetic categories. And they are the sublime facts they are because of the relations of these categories in their systems.

The sublime may also be illustrated in cases where the mass is defective in the minimal direction of deficiency. Simple Simon is sublimely dumb, and his stupidity may mount to the point of great art in a *Don Quixote*. The bigotry of the privileged, the effrontery of the coarsely rich, the impeccable stolidity of the respectable ignoramus lovelorn for the lost past, these are beautiful instances of sublimity in reverse, objects whose massive masslessness dissolves them in sloppy obfuscation. But they have their aesthetic quality just the same.

The sublime is then an object that fails of beauty because of defect of mass. The defect may be either in excess or deficiency. Wherever an object that is determined by aesthetic categories is prevented, by defect of mass, from that harmony which is beauty, there is a sublime object. This of course does not mean that everything huge and monstrous is sublime; the emphasis is upon the qualification "an object determined by aesthetic categories." Things big as immensity itself may have no aesthetic value, and the morbid bigness of some aspects of our contemporary life is itself aesthetically condemned, just because of its horrendous hugeness. A thing may be too big for any form, there are distances and heights and depths and significances that lines cannot traverse, designs that can never be quite conformed within their own proportion. Size, shape, bulk, are, after all, aspects of sublimity only in certain instances of physical objects, and while the physical is a category, however remote, in the relational substance of every real object, it is an aesthetic category only within the meaning of mass, while the meaning of mass extends far beyond the physical and includes many non-physical and ideal elements. The mass in a moral situation, considered as an aesthetic object, or in an act, which must be carefully distinguished from a movement, is a mass of value significance,

and has its substance in a complex of relations connecting all sorts of things—perhaps literally all sorts of things. Mass, that is, has many figurative meanings, such as the importance of an event, the weight of an argument, the burden of proof, the preponderance of evidence, the hope instilled by a kind word, the doom pronounced in the doctor's opinion, the joy of the reprieve of the condemned, all these are materials whose very excess lies in their significance, or their significance lies in their excess of meaning, and the object is in any case made sublime by them, and can be cut in stone, or carved in tone or molded in color. The whelm of grief has become a sublime object universalized in a type of literature, and gives formless form to the wild color and tone that represent its weird design.

The experience of sublimity gets all the description that can be adequate in the development of the object of sublimity. It is perhaps possible, and for certain purposes might be interesting and important, to work out a relatively exact account of the psychological states involved in the experience. But such an account is psychology, and has nothing to do with aesthetics in any intimate way. As was indicated in connection with the discussion of color and tone and sensation generally, and of the possibility of identical fusions of sensation, and of the transfer or transformation of one sense element into another of different "sense field," in all these instances psychological investigation may give us empirical evidence for what we all know better already. But they can discover nothing, nor can they give an adequate description, to say nothing of interpretation, of the aesthetic object. Psychological investigation can locate and designate the sense feeling material of the aesthetic object, as we saw in discussing feeling. But it gives no hint of the aesthetic structure of the object, and it is upon this framework as skeleton that the flesh of beauty is draped. An object determined by or within the system of aesthetic categories, with distortion in the mass aspect, is sublime, whatever may be the psychological processes involved in the apprehension of it. The object has a logical structure, and is known through that structure, and is presented by that structure in the contemplative intuition. One may know the physics of sound, but will know nothing of tones by that knowledge. For tones are essentially relational in nature, and the nature of relations is not accessible to scientific method. So is the constitution of an aesthetic object relational in nature, and is beyond the

reach of science, at least in its empirical form. Even Aristotle attempts to treat the sublime in terms of the mechanics of feeling, and the results are not very convincing. It would be tragic if the aesthetic reality in the sublime should depend on the poor efforts of sentient beings. There are people whose psychological equipment does not enable them to apprehend the sublime; there are also people who do not know beans. And the presence or absence of a capacity to know in the individual, or in any number of individuals, has nothing to do with the reality of the sublime. It is true, of course, that the logical apprehension of the sublime object is mediated, in some obscure and remote way, through the equipment of the mind that apprehends it. But food does not nourish because of the processes involved in its manufacture, even if mistakes in the process render it incapable of nourishment.

If our account of the sublime is correct, then a discussion of historical or traditional theories is not necessary. Such theories are for the most part irrelevant. The sublime is an object, determined, both in existence and in knowledge, both as an ontological entity and as an epistemological phenomenon, by a system of categories that give it a peculiar and individuate corporate structure, so that its essence is logical. This is the system of aesthetic categories, and the character peculiar to the sublime is the specific emphasis upon the category of mass. The sublime is an aesthetic object disproportionate in mass.

CHAPTER XVIII

TRAGEDY

IT WOULD clearly be folly, and might very well turn out to be tragedy, if I should undertake a full account of tragedy as an aesthetic form. Such complete account is the task of the critic, if completeness involves fullness of description of detail and plan. What concerns philosophic research here is to find the essence of reality in the tragedy, to state what tragedy *is*, and why it is that as distinct from everything else in the universe. Tragedy is an aesthetic object, a type of object which stands in determining and determinate relations to other aesthetic forms, and together with these other aesthetic forms, determines the connotation of the concept of the aesthetic, as well as its denotational reference to concrete object types. Tragedy is thus an object with a definite structure, an internal design (literal) or plan, and these essential features can be as accurately and as adequately described as can the features of any other object of experience. But this description is not our task; what we want to know about tragedy is the categorial intent of that structure and the analogous figurative (real) design of life which is embodied in that structure. If we can approach this intentional design of the tragic object, or perhaps better, the object of tragedy, or still better, the objectified tragic design, the object tragedy, we shall behold the reality of tragedy, see the stuff which enters into the creation of the tragic, and apprehend the design by which the stuff assumes corporate form and individuality.

Tragedy then is an aesthetic object. And this means that it is an object determined within the system of the aesthetic categories. It is determined as an object by the operation of the same principle that governs the relational plan by which the categories are ordered in the aesthetic system. This principle, we have seen, is the principle of cumulation, whose virtue it is, as operating within a set of categories, to determine the set of categories to constitute an object. This it does through the concurrent operation of the principle of ambiguity. Retrospectively, the principle accumulates, in a given category of the system, the meaning and intent of all previous or earlier categories; and at the same time and prospectively, it antici-

pates all more inclusive categories, for which it, with its burden of intent of all previous categories included in itself, furnishes the content. The operation of the principle of cumulation is subject to emphasis, which may fall upon any categorial character, where it falls being determined by the principle of proportion or appropriateness in the object as anticipated in design, and the character and number of possible pulses of emphasis determine the nature and classification of aesthetic types. We have seen how the emphasis of cumulative appropriateness on mass has determined the sublime, and how, when distributed over a number of categorial characters, it determines the ugly; and we have seen how this is achieved by the negative principle of defect or deformity, which represents a reversal of the direction of the intent of design, resulting in an object with decidedly positive characteristics and determinate structure. We are now to see how our principles, operating under the emphasis of appropriateness, and operating as positive laws, result in an object whose characteristics and structure are based on, and determined in, negation; an object which is the positive objectivity or objectification of negativity. For the essence of tragedy lies in its positive realization, in an object, of the negativity of defect; and the defect is objectified in an intentional design which is by nature incapable of any degree of reality. The very essence of tragedy is itself tragic in character; it involves the realization of an object as unreal and unrealizable, the realization of an object in an objectless design, all this achieved in an object of which we have direct contemplative intuition. Its principle is exemplified in the demoralization of the moral character in an object of positive evil, which is nevertheless a moral character still; and, in most religious traditions, in the dogma of the negative deterioration of the real in a positive satanic individual. But the categorization of the aesthetic object in the form of tragedy is logically prior to both its moral and religious forms, and is the premise upon which the truth of the moral and religious interpretations depends. We have thus in tragedy the difficult concept of real negativity in positive form, and it is perhaps failure of most theorists to realize the true negative nature of the object with which they are dealing that is responsible for so much confusion and uncertainty in the theory of tragedy. The concept of negativity positively objectified involves contradiction, and this contradiction must either be overcome in a logical harmony (reflective)

or superseded in a speculative logic where the principle of contradiction is used as the instrument by which it itself is to be left behind. This supersession of contradiction is achieved in the principle of analogical identity. We have already committed ourselves to the latter, and the application of the logic of aesthetic to tragedy is now our task.

Tragedy incorporates the principles of both beauty and ugliness. It represents both the perfection of harmony and proportion, and the imperfection of discord and deformity. And both perfection and imperfection are in tragedy harmonized and superseded in an object which is the objectification of the negativity which dichotomizes them as contradictories. In the object tragedy (there is unwarranted ambiguity in the expression "object of tragedy" or "tragic object") the principle of appropriateness unifies the categories which constitute the object into a perfectly formed design, at the same time that the categories are thrown out of harmony by disproportionate emphasis upon them as individual concepts. And this does not mean "harmony of the whole with discord of the parts," which is a way the reflective logic has of playing hide and seek with the realities of contradiction, but it means that both principles, of the perfection of beauty and of the imperfection of the ugly, are at the same time and in the same sense principles of the whole with respect to the object tragedy. Unless we can formulate the problem of tragedy *jenseits* the distinction of parts and whole we will forever be caught in the throes of reflective contradiction, and all that can be said of tragedy within this logic has perhaps already been said. And it is not enough. For the reflective logic attempts, after accepting the principle of contradiction, to overcome it in the shell-racket of manipulation of abstract forms. This is the method of our contemporary "positivist" logicians, logicians, symbolists, and of the cosmology of the cosmogonizers. What it succeeds in doing, however, is to impose contradiction upon reality by force and fraud, and merely to leave a choice between a world that is contradictory and irrational throughout, or a world that is perfectly consistent and rational because of the absence of any real content. In its worship of formal perfection it must deny the metaphysical reality even of its own forms, which become a language of brass signifying nothing, and with no possible contact with a world of values or with reality in any form. Whatever difficulties there are

therefore in the concept and the reality of the tragic must be squarely faced, and the method employed must overcome or avoid the defects of reflective logic.

The essence of tragedy lies in the fact that its object is a demonstration, when its design is exemplified in the formulas of speculative logic, of the utter impossibility of any complete unity of value with existence *in life*. We saw that we can have the perfection of value in beauty, but that its perfection is a living death. In a picture the aesthetic concepts may be worked into a perfect harmony, or harmony of perfection, which gives the unavoidable suggestion of life and thus enforces the demand that reality makes that the harmony stand up and breathe. But the breath will not come, even from the divine efflation of genius, and the object of beauty remains to the end the symbol of the perfection that life demands shall be realized in a form that is perfect *and* existent. In beauty therefore there is utter perfection with only the formal or abstract design of life. On the other hand in the ugly (in its ultimate form) there is the utterly formless reality pressing its claim, through life in the concrete, to a formed perfection that is forever denied it. And these two become the irreconcilable elements which tragedy must work into a whole of perfection. We can have life in the concrete without perfection, or perfection in the abstract without life; and life in the actual is the eternal revolt against the limitations imposed by this contradiction. Tragedy objectifies this revolt in the design of its immortal failure. The stuff of which tragedy is made is the primordial feeling in its futile urge to effect an analogous identity of value with existence within the conditions of actuality as incorporate in life. It is this perdurable failure, this elemental negativity, which in life becomes the stuff of reality, the object which, in life, remains forever a mere objective.

The object of tragedy is then complex, compounded out of a variety that is never superseded. In it are all the characters of beauty, all the forms and types and categorial principles of beauty, even the forlorn beauty of death. But its end, the object in which it comes to perfection, is not beauty, its design fails even to intend beauty; beauty is in it but not of it, is not at home and is not its principle, so it can never objectify as beauty. What tragedy as an aesthetic object means, what its design intends, its structure delineates, its mass "wills" and its form prefigures, is the *truth of life*. And that

is not beauty. At its best, at its nearest approach to beauty, life remains sordid, vulgar, brutal, and obscene. For the benefit of those optimists who in the fatuous shallowness of their muddled vacuity remonstrate, I point to the fact—the reality of the world wallowing in the mire of its own filth and prolonging for the moment its futile existence in fevered draughts of its own dripping blood. This the eternal truth of the Christ: the blood is shed.

Thus the categories of life are all tragic concepts. Love, sex, the urge of truth and honor, want, even the impulse to beauty itself, desire, all are instances of the efforts of the life-urge to “overcome existence” by draping its own crudities with the hallowed vestures of worth. The rose puts forth its blossom in its fraudulent claim to be what it is not, in the hope that through the sex attraction it may become, in another rose, what now in its own imperfect existence it only means. But its present meaning is a mere hope to mean, as spring hopes eternal in the human breast. Sex covers itself with all the beauteous arts of culture in order to conceal its endless futility, the magnificent bridal gown radiates splendor to distract from the filth it means; it is a shroud. Men strive for truth and its forms to blind themselves against their own ignorance, and seek the blandishments of honor and ambition to hide from themselves their own littleness. Culture itself is carrion vested in cloth of gold.

The object within which tragedy creates itself is thus the truth of life. In pointing to this fact there is no intention to provide an emollient for what is called pessimism, nor to offer an emetic against optimism. These psychological attitudes are not arguable, are mere states of mind, and their meaning is exhausted in their existence. They belong, therefore, along with those beauteous states of mind the theorists find beauty in, in the graveyard of ignorance. They have no substance, no stuff, their duration is complete in their occurrence, and whatever one may or may not like is irrelevant to the fact and often irreverent to truth. Our account is merely saying what candor demands be said when looking upon the facts, and whether we bloat with delight or quail with fear or simper with disgust or tremble with rage is all the same. Life does not ask us whether we enjoy its ministrations; feeling, for life, is imperturable under all the twistings and wrenchings through which life undertakes to force it into the jagged interstices of

existence, and when it becomes articulate from the process it cries out in tragic beauty inexorable, but never in the weakness of fear or joy.

The element of negativity appears in all the categories which determine the object tragedy. The double meaning of each sustains a contradiction which is never overcome, the literal element of existence in each is never quite equated with the figurative or value element. The identity of aspects is never complete, however sharply the analogy be drawn, and the effort to unite them in life is futile. Analogical identity is not logical identity. The identity of existence and value is perfect, or may be, in those arts which do not depict life in its actuality or its biological fundamentals, and where only the psychological aspect of the primordium is the material of the art form. In painting and music therefore existence is immediately felt, and this judgment, existence is felt, or, better, existence feels itself, is the form in which reality and experience are identified. This is the archetype or prototype of the aesthetic judgment; every aesthetic judgment is a variation of this form, and its individuality depends upon the direction of categorial emphasis. It is to be noticed that the judgment can only be expressed in the passive or the reflexive verb, since no meaning can be defined for the judgment when a subject is asserted to feel or to be feeling existence. This forever disposes of subjectivist individualism in aesthetics; the individuality incorporated in the aesthetic judgment is the universality of the object, and not the particularity of the subject. Beauty never *is* for the individual. In the assertion "experience feels existence," there is manifest tautology where there is any sense at all, and this is the mechanical identity of reflective logic. No genuine analogy, or perfect identity with real discrimination, can be expressed in a judgment whose subject is active, for such a judgment itself expresses an act, and an act is never complete; and in the case of the relation between feeling and existence there is no act, since the relation is prior to any experience, and the judgment must describe and objectify a passive condition. That the act can never be complete in an object is the burden of ethical theory. The act must destroy itself for perfect expression, and this can be effected only in the passivity of the aesthetic object. If we undertake to individuate the subject as, "I feel existence," the judgment may be true and genuine, but it is no longer an

expression of the objective fact of feeling in relation to existence, but becomes immediately an expression of a mere subjective attitude. I am describing my private state of mind. The only way then in which objectivity may be achieved in a judgment expressing the relation between feeling and existence is through the passive verb; but as this expresses pure being or a state of being, it cannot represent life, and the identity of feeling with existence is demonstrated impossible so long as the relation is referred to life as defining the universe of discourse.

It is not legitimate to try to prove the incompatibility of life with realized value by citing historical facts, since the cogency of the historical fact and its relation to reality are themselves under suspicion of the same weakness that vitiates the proposition they are invoked to support. It is to no avail therefore that we make appeal to the great religions, or in special to Christianity. It is true that the great religions are always compelled to defer the realization of value to some region beyond the sphere of life, and thus to recognize the fact that existence and value cannot be identified under the conditions of life. But the mere fact that this proposition has been held or believed, by howsoever many human or any other beings, already removes the question beyond the pale of argument or valid judgment, for the act of belief, by virtue of the fact that it is an *act*, presupposes the condition it is professing to prove. It has been noted that the idea of an act is self-contradictory except when a non-existent condition is pre-figured as realizable in a future time, that is to say, in a time future to the time in which the act is completed and therefore no longer in existence. For the idea of an act implies that the act come to an end at the moment its object is in existence in the form defined by the movement-motives of the act, since the act *as act* is completed by becoming congealed as the structure of its object. The act brings about its own cessation by the "set" of its own substance in its object, and the object is created by this "freezing" of the act in the form that is given to it by forcing its whole duration into a single moment. An act therefore transcends time, but in so doing is itself annihilated by becoming the static structure of the object whose position determines the time itself to be. But the point we must not lose sight of is the fact that whenever a real object comes into being the act, or life element, by which its being is

supported, goes out of being, and there is no point where the life element in the act is coexistent with the object which the act creates. Whatever therefore may be the beliefs of men, or however many men may hold a belief about the relation of value to existence as conditioned upon time as duration, the belief is not an argument, for the reason that a belief is an act and no act can ever come into contact with the object that would make it real. When the object is there life is not; when life is there, the object is not; the object will forever remain lifeless, and life will remain eternally objectless. And tragedy is the eternal object which expresses the eternal objectlessness of life as sentient being. The play's the thing.

Every act, therefore, and life is an act, is tragic, and its object tragedy. Tragedy is then the object-form of life, since to give to life an object in the reality marks the point where life ceases. The tree dies when the object for which it has lived is accomplished in ideal form in the seed. The mother gives her life to bear and support and realize her child—and so on, and on, and on. . . . Where there is life there is only hope—the reality lies beyond. Where the form is perfect and the design complete, is death, and beauty, and eternity.

Tragedy then is that aesthetic object which expresses the cosmic incompatibility of value and existence within the conditions of life. The conditions under which life might effect a unity of value with existence cannot *be*. Hamlet is King, but dead. As an aesthetic object, tragedy is determined by the aesthetic categories, and the aesthetic categories are those by which an object is determined to beauty. All these categories are present in their perfection in tragedy, but in their very perfection lie the seeds of their failure. It is to be understood that when failure is mentioned as the essence of tragedy it is not the failure *of* tragedy as an art form, nor is it the failure of *tragedy* to express perfect beauty. Tragedy does not fail, it succeeds in becoming perfect art with a content of perfect beauty, and effects a harmonic synthesis of all art-forms in very much the same fashion that dancing expresses the synthesis of music and painting. But its content stuff is failure, which failure it creates an object in accordance with aesthetic law. The "still life" of the painting and the raw rhythmic movement life of music fuse perfectly, or almost so, in dancing, just as the dance may be eternalized in the pose of sculpture or vivified and universalized in the movement forms

of pageantry. All art forms are present in the tragic drama, every scheme and every trick and every device known to life is made use of by life in the attempt to find for itself a content which will represent a fusion of existence with value. From the point of view of inclusiveness of aesthetic elements the tragedy is the perfection of art and the highest meaning that can be incorporated in an object that can exist. Tragedy therefore does not fail; it is life that fails in its moral or metaphysical characteristic act; but when life plays, and represents, and imitates, performs its characteristic act, the reality which life is is quite transcended in the reality that it feels to be possible under conditions which it represents to itself through imaginative intellect in the symbols of art. In this way art is the means by which life transcends itself, finds for itself a form of being which is not limited to mere existence, and in which its truest motives find a degree of objectification that borders closer onto the reality than can be done either in moral action or in pure logical thought. And it is just because tragedy makes use of every art form and every aesthetic device that it becomes the expression-form of life, and that life finds its truth and highest being in tragedy.

In coming to the part played by the separate categories in tragedy there need be no emphasis upon the color-tone-rhythm-feeling as the stuff to which the tragic form gives structure. It is possible that the "stuff of life" appears here in tragic art with cleaner outline than in real life itself, where the contour of the life-stuff is often blurred and confused by the miscellany of lifeless things. It is for this reason that the beautiful is vivid and emphatic and compelling where the good is only vague and uncertain and appealing, that goodness must get on its knees to us where beauty can flirt and coquette with us in perfect assurance. The mere abundance of life as represented in color-tone is what gives to tragedy (the drama generally, I am taking tragedy as the essence of all dramatic form) its profound effect, and it is in the working of this life-stuff into its myriad forms that the complex structure of the tragedy is determined. And when we think of the structure of tragedy in its relation to the color-tone or life-stuff, we have the conditions upon which the "deduction" of the category of line depends. For it is just as distinctions are conceived to be made within the life-stuff that it can take on structure, and the instrument of the discrimination becomes line.

The direction of a movement in the play, or of the stress-tendency of the tone melodies in the music, or as these movement and tone characters may be represented together in a pose, these are the lines along which the contours of objects run, and thus the conditions upon which structural relations are determined. And at this point of perfect art the elementary ambiguity of existential and value elements in the aesthetic category have been so nearly superseded in the appropriateness of diverse elements to each other, that the distinction of literal line from figurative line hardly needs to be made. Also, at this point of perfect art, the principles which we were obliged to discuss and describe separately in order to exhibit their several parts in the determination of the aesthetic object now appear as so perfectly blended that they may be regarded as one law. Ambiguity with its omnipresent suggestion of bipolarity now makes terms of harmony with the law of appropriateness, and the complex law may be rechristened the law of proportion. For it is in the modification and mollification of the harshness of the ambiguous and contradictory that appropriateness has its function, and it is just in the idea of an object of perfect balance having been completed that proportion has any concrete meaning. And all of these relations are easily seen to summarize in the general principle of analogy, which becomes the premise from which the other laws of ambiguity, cumulation and appropriateness depend.

In a similar way it is the summation of all the particular value details that gives the tragic mass its weight. And the summation is accomplished here, as in the case just mentioned, by the confluence of the laws expressing the relations between the essential concepts of value. It is a characteristic difference between the laws of value and the laws of existence that whereas the latter are related to each other around the principle of contradiction, which gives the laws a negative trend; the laws of value are related about the principle of identity, where they by virtue of their existential negativity acquire a positive urgency to conform to each other in the final principle of analogical identity. The laws of morality show a similar trait in their tendency to conflict (especially true of civil and political law), which arises from the fact that they derive their system from their all centering about the fact of opposition, which becomes the principle of action. An act is necessarily formulated with reference to an obstacle to be over-

come, and from this fact the laws of morality tend to the negative in form and implication. It is thus that we see the mass element in tragic art as the synthesis of all particular significance into one total thrust of ponderosity, which often has the overwhelming effect of the sublime. And at those points in the tragic structure which rest heavily on mass, as at the critical moments of the life movement where character is being put to the test or destiny is asserting its prerogative, the effect of sublimity may be more pronounced than in the case of the typically sublime object. In literary structure the cumulative mass of particular value units may mount to the point where a few simple words will fall "like a thousand brick," expressing the total meaning of the entire structure. Caesar's "Et tu, Brute," speaks in avalanches and whirlwinds of the act that represents a reversal of a human character or the tragic alternative which destiny may thrust between friendship and duty. It is in such junctures that the ultimate recalcitrancy of value and existence takes its vengeance upon life for presuming the impossible, and assumes the omnipotence of divine destiny. It is the mass element in the aesthetic object that makes these titanic effects possible, and it is mass in these effects that gives to the object its first suggestion of the wholeness which is to be shaped into individuality by form and design.

The categories of form and design in the "high" art form of tragedy are familiar enough. It is, however, perhaps worth while to note certain misinterpretations these two concepts are likely to get. In speaking of form in connection with the tragedy we do not mean the *model* by which the tragedy is constructed, nor the relations which divide the tragedy into "parts." Tragic form is not form *of* tragedy, but autonomous form *in* the tragedy so affecting every element of its content as to determine the inner principle of its structure. It is not thus, except in the most literal sense, the maxim of the construction of the tragedy, does not determine the "build" of the tragedy, but its *idea*, its ideal or logical plan. In this sense the design which form initiates in an object becomes the act or play by which the object creates itself, the inner urgency which results from, or rather expresses the inherent structure of, the object, and constitutes its will to be. In this sense the tragic design is neither the "cut" or "build" of the object nor the "spiritual purpose" so often attributed to it and from

which the "moral" of the piece is extracted. Both these are mistakes, the one the mistake which seems indigenous to the art critic, and the other of the professor of literature who must point a moral to adorn every tale. What is meant here by form and design, and the synthesis of harmonic law has by now almost identified them, is that there is a law *of things*, a meaning which expresses the nature of things, and that this law or meaning *is* the object by whose instrumentation it is expressed or has its being. The form or design of the Tragic object, and this is its highest form, then means that meaning has being and dwells among men; and that meaning is not merely the inclination of the subjectivity which happens to be near when meaning asserts its being by taking form in which to manifest design, but has its being in itself and independently of the observer, in the primordium of feeling, as the void out of which the cultural universe is created.

Tragedy has within it all the forms and elements of beauty, but is not itself beauty. Nor is it beautiful, since the adjective belongs only to the harmonies in it, which are represented in complete objects. But the tragedy is an object, it is not a state of anybody's mind. It is that object that life creates in its effort to fuse value and existence into the substance of its own being. And the description of tragedy is a theory about the possibility of combining existence with value in life while life is a real object. But the object that tragedy creates is not life, but art. And art and life are not congenial, and the object in which their essential incompatibility is given being is tragedy.

CHAPTER XIX

COMEDY

COMEDY is the attitudinal response which man makes to the inevitability of the tragedy which is life. Life's failure is inexorable, and man thumbs his nose as his comment. Life goes on its way through an infinite oblivion of futility, blind to the present maze in which it wanders, unmindful of the past in which it has demonstrated its futility, unconscious of the future which is ever and can only be its frustration. But man looks before and after, and feels the poignant present as the dead past bursting into future possibility. And while his future must remain to the end a mere or abstract possibility, and his past a concrete ended actuality that can never be recovered, his present becomes a small plot where the primordium blossoms out into his sentience as a rose that can laugh at the dunghill of pastness out of which it grows and can twit the nebulous future with the reminder that as yet its color is fresh and vivid even while it awaits the doom which futurity holds inevitable. Man can then laugh, and thus can thrust into the oblivious past the pain of the tragedy that life is, even where destiny is heaping upon his head the accumulated futility of all that lives and moves and has being.

Or pray. Or sing. Or dance or swear or crack the joke that bumpkin Existence makes when he proposes union with the blushing form of Worth. Life in the concrete, that is, can be sublimated in symbolism, can give up its craving urge toward the flesh and body of worth and content itself with her form and spirit; can even deceive itself with deliberation and convince itself that the form of worth is worth's own very substance. The irrationality of sex can be laughed away in the antics of merry wives or in the rotund jocularly of drinking husbands. Its foul futility can be hidden from view in the tinsel with which we furbish it up, thus refusing to see the joke that life is playing upon us until it is too late to do anything but laugh at it. It is thus that the sex union is indissoluble, and tragedy takes its toll of those who try it twice by relieving them of the wit by which its hollowness is recognized. The wise man remains in the sex union, and learns how to joke, or out of it, and remains to pray. The man who re-

mains out is stifled in a pall of seriousness which can only be escaped in the grotesque, where life bursts its sides and laughs its head off at the prank that destiny is playing on itself.

It is in these forms of symbolism that comedy has its being. Reality can be represented in objects that are known to be contentless, and the evanescent urgency of life can be identified with their vacuity. It is the very emptiness of ceremony that makes it real, and the emptier the forms the closer they identify with the life-motives they abstractly embody. It is thus that we emphasize the "spirit" of an object at the expense of its structure, forgetting, or overlooking, the fact that the spirit can be nothing but the intentional design whose literal framework is the structure. It is thus that the forms and conventions of culture are real. We produce an Apollo, and have the laugh on existing man. We build a cathedral, and put to shame the puny efforts at grace and stability which nature muddles itself with. From the point of view of our cultural self-respect, that is, our subjectivist egoism, all art is "idealization" of existence, a set of symbols of what might be. We call it imaginative imitation, or reconstruction, or expression, by way of taking credit for its creation; whereas it was the necessity within the universe that reason put together what blunderdom had put asunder that brought the imagination itself into being. Art is then a product of the same cosmic activities that produce the imagination, the name for those of the activities of life which have their being in the effort to bring to unity the spheres of existence and value. In order to effect this unity, genius shows life how it might have been had there been a contemplative intuition involved in the activity; and to penetrate the stupidity of life, genius illustrates with color-toned forms, as a teacher uses blocks of wood to transgress the barrier of stupidity in a backward child. These color-toned forms are the eternal species of beauty, aesthetic objects; eternal in that they are necessitated in the conditions set by the inherent incompatibility of existence and value. These type forms of color-tone are the eternal objects of the culture world. Objects are thus primordials, and objects of art Platonic ideas that are co-eternal with the Idea that creates them. This is difficult only for those who insist on confusing existence with being, who imagine that only that can be which has first got the consent of existence to acceptance of its form.

Comedy then is the effort by which intelligence as con-

templative intuition undertakes to repair the shortcomings of life, and to atone for its failure to perfect the continuity between existence and value. All the structures created by intelligence, and this means the total structure of human culture, are thus creatures of the comic purpose. Man invents and perfects politics in the effort to harmonize the productive will with the conditions laid down in the principles of order. Existence as represented in production is irrational, crude, inhuman, brutal; unless it can be tamed by form to the conditions of order which are fundamental to value, life will find its efforts all negated. Life has everywhere and at all times, where there is any degree of intelligence, appealed to political organization to find that order which would tie it to value, and the "game" of politics is the result of that appeal. The political state is thus the great arch-type of the comic object; men in social groupings laugh at the fumbblings of life, and proceed to create and put into her hands objects which pattern in perfection the mistakes and misfits which life finds between existence and worth. These objects are the elementary institutions, the motive in the creation of which is the aesthetic. And a similar statement is true of religion, only, the objects which the aesthetic impulse (life guided by intelligence) creates to the religious purpose are less immediately practical, more remote from the crude facts of life and designed to pattern principles and universals which bring to the facts of life the larger and more comprehensive forms of order. Thus the ritual and the liturgy are perfect art, perfect instances where the comic intelligence has created a more perfect objective relation between existence and value than can be realized in life, and which must be referred to an ideally perfect higher life beyond. It is the imperfection that becomes the content of the object, the tragedy in nature that sets the problem solution of which has called into existence both the comic object and the comic spirit by which the irrational is overcome. It is this comic spirit that we call pure intelligence in some of its higher manifestations, such e. g., as theoretic science, philosophy, and theology. What is called a "problem" for the intelligence is precisely this failure of life to knit its existence to its values; a recent instance of which failure has been beautifully caricatured in the pragmatic "situation" as a plaything for bright little philosophers who aspire to become practical men.

It is thus that comedy does not differ in essentials from tragedy. The contents of the objects in both cases are negation, that is, it is a case or instance of a fault in the stratification of life's activity that becomes the stuff of which the objects both of comedy and of tragedy are built. The characteristic difference appears to lie in the fact that in tragedy the creative effort of the aesthetic impulse is in the direction of making an object of beauty from the negation without modifying or changing any of its fundamental attributes or relations; the negation is taken in its sheer truth and just as it factually is, and the aesthetic expression of it is perfect in the extent to which it expresses this cold and formal truth with precision as to detail, leaving the negation with the appearance that its qualities are all universal and hence not subject to variation which might modify the form of the object. It was in this sense that we found the essence of tragedy in its faithful objectification of the truth of life. It is this cold truth as a universal contentless form that the tragic drama makes into art, and it seems to do this by imaginative representation of the relations in which the elementary negation stands within the total sphere which life cuts out of the whole real. But just as the truth requirement forbids the changing, i. e., the misrepresentation, of the qualities of the negation, so the same prohibition stands over any tendency to change its relations. Consequently the tragedy presents the relations in their ideal perfection and in the perfection of order which they necessitate in the logical determination of their object, with the result for experience that the object must be apprehended as perfect in spite of the fact that its content is negative, rather must be apprehended as perfection because of the negation, since the negation is the medium through which the apprehension is effected. It is the utter and unutterable denial that is the aesthetic object in *Hamlet*, and it is because of and through the very negation in the denial that the object is manifest to us. It is nonsense to argue that the "art" of tragedy, or its aesthetic significance, lies in our "transcending" or "overcoming" the denial, since in this case the "overcoming" could only be effected by discovery that the negation were illusory, and the whole structure would fall to pieces. It is precisely in the fact that there is no overcoming the negation involved in the incompatibility of value and existence that tragedy is the reality for life, and to assume that the negation

is to be overcome or transcended is to leave out the condition upon which alone life itself is real. The essence of tragedy then lies in its absolute faithfulness to the truth of life, and, as this truth has only a negative form, the difficulty of finding an adequate formulation of the theory of tragedy lies in the fact that it involves a reversal of, or a departure from, the reflective logical processes, which are adapted exclusively to affirmative statement and imply a reality which is wholly positive in nature. This is exemplified in the fact that the reflective logic cannot find a method of dealing with negation in its normal judgmental form, and resorts to one trick or another to convert the negative judgment into the affirmative.

But tragedy as an aesthetic object exemplifies a reality that is negative to the core. It is this feature which enables us to point out the distinction between tragedy and comedy, which is the topic we are now discussing. Tragedy, we say, expresses the eternal truth of life, and expresses it as it is without change or modification. Comedy also expresses the truth of life, as it is, and then represents it as it might be while life as fact is still held before our eyes. Life is pictured to us in comedy both as it is and as it might be, and at the same time. This it does by making a different use of elementary aesthetic forms from the use made of them by tragedy. In tragedy the elementary aesthetic forms are used as direct instruments of expression of the fact of life. In comedy the forms are used to embellish the tragic expression, as decorative matter upon a plain background of truth. We must try to illustrate and explain this distinction, and this will call for a rediscussion of some familiar detail. The elementary aesthetic forms we have in mind here fetch us up once more to examine the aesthetic categories in some of their applications.

We have noticed that tragedy makes use of the "kinds of beauty" in a simple and direct way as expressions of fact situations. A fact situation is symbolized in an aesthetic form in which the dominant categorial character is peculiarly appropriate to give expression to that fact. Certain forms of movement are embodiments of the rhythm that expresses fear; another form of movement embodies a rhythm of a "tempo" appropriate to express joy; arrangement of persons on the stage in one order will express directly a given life-fact; arrangements of the same persons in another order will express directly an opposite fact or fact of opposite nature. A situa-

tion of deep gravity will be represented by emphasis upon the categorial character of mass; situations less ponderous will be represented in the delicacy and grace expressed by line; the mass is at the same time figured into form by lines which anticipate design; and design will cumulatively individuate the whole as a corporate individual object whose intent will express the essence of life. It is in this way that in tragedy the facts of life are directly represented in categorial symbols more or less literally expressive of those facts, and the symbols have the function of stating the facts as they are, and are appropriate symbols because of the truthfulness of their representation. Now this direct and literal representation is also present at the basis of comedy. But it is not the use which comedy characteristically makes of the representative forms. The use which comedy makes of the "kinds of beauty" presupposes their direct and literal use in tragedy, but in the former the "kinds of beauty" are used figuratively with a great variety of decorative embellishments in accordance with the principle of ambiguity. To the movement in which there is embodied the rhythm that expresses solemnity there can be added elements which set the solemnity in a medium of festive joy, so that the solemnity is not changed in quality or increased or decreased in quantity, but nevertheless has relations to an environment which balances the solemnity in a whole that approaches perfection where the solemnity by itself would be a heavy fragment. Thus a wedding march may be of sombre gravity in its tragic basis, and at the same time be so lightened by musical tone and color as to constitute a total object in which the very gravity has been made more grave by the lightness within which it is environed.

It is then the peculiar function of comedy to make the tragedy of life bearable in experience. It is in this sense that we said above that the whole structure of culture is a product of the comic spirit. We created astronomy that there might be not the ghosts of fear but music in the spheres, and mathematics in order that the physical aspects of our world might show a degree of order. But the music of the spheres and the order of the physical world were *there*, inherent ghostly wraiths in the spheres and in the physical world, and it was their necessity for embodiment that was the primary reason for the existence of the experience which "feels" them. Their necessity, then, creates experience and life, and life creates art

to make them rational. We create political society as a system of comic symbols to decorate the tragedy of human conflict, just as we dress the dead in magnificence and bury them with pomp and pageantry to belie the state the beautiful raiment and gorgeous formality represent. And what we call culture was called into existence for just this purpose, to hang a wreath of posies upon the misfits within the tragedy which is life.

This use of the categorial characters of the various "kinds of beauty" to lighten the more sombre effects of tragedy is the ground of humor. It is to be remarked at the outset that by humor we do not mean what is ordinarily termed "funny," although the funny may be a further refinement (or degradation) of the same thing. By humor we mean nothing more nor less than the comic quality considered as an instrument to the organization of aesthetic elements represented in the aesthetic categories. Humor is the recognition of the relation of analogical identity between existence and value, in those aspects of the relation in which the failure of life to realize the identity appears with most sharpness and suddenness. It represents, that is, a recognition of the futility of the efforts which life makes toward the realization of value. What in pure comedy is mere vicariousness of expression through figurative or symbolic forms, becomes, in some of the efforts of life, extravagant pretense and elaborate self-deceit, with the consequence that life's purposes collapse into petty futility and break on the hard rocks of reality into a ripple of jolly folly. But this is comedy degenerated to the plane of 'the merely funny. The comic spirit is no less serious than the tragic, and where it may sink to the level of the merely funny, the sublimity of tragedy may tumble headlong into the ridiculous. But real humor is the instrument by which comedy undertakes to rationalize and make tolerable to experience the harshness of the tragic failure of life to attain unity of existence and value within its own substance. And whereas tragedy represents the failure in its aspect of cosmic principle and in instances taken from the higher phases of life, as e. g., in love, sex, politics, religion, etc., comedy undertakes to find appropriate embodiment of the failure in the common facts and relations of actual every day experience. These simple and common failures, which are the regular and normal conditions of life, (the successes of life are em-

bodied in other aesthetic forms with which we are not concerned here) comedy covers over with humor in the effort to make the failure accept a degree of unity and wholeness such that life can be made tolerable in play representation. The husband and wife who have lost their only child can thus picture their future in terms of ideal hopes in spite of the fact that they know that the loss is irreparable and the future blank. This muffling of the failure is accomplished by shifting the emphasis among the categorial relations that determine the object in a given case. Thus the gravity of the failure may be mitigated by a choral song which becomes its environing setting; and in general this is the purpose of all the special tricks of the dramatist's method, and often gives more text of "stage directions" than is given of the body of the drama.

In comedy then the tragic failure of life is represented in the normal and trivial relations of experience. By its special technique, which consists of methods of handling the categorial characters in their relations, the tragic consequences are anticipated, and so far superseded. But they are not removed from the reality, and the comic method merely adds significance to the tragedy in the given facts. The comic situation is not funny or laughable, may be and ordinarily is serious; but the effects of failure are toned down in that they are shown not to be denials of *life*, but denials of the end which life sets up as its goal. Life is therefore not weakened or discredited, but merely shown not capable of attaining its end in the synthesis of its value aspects with its existential aspects. Life is then an object of aesthetic significance even though it is condemned to an infinite struggle against hopeless odds, with its end recognized as forever unattainable. And not only is it an object of aesthetic significance, but it is the aesthetic object *par excellence* in the sense that it is in its substance (feeling) that all aesthetic and indeed all value objects have their content. Its fulfillment lies thus in the eternal effort toward unity of value with existence, which, if it should succeed in accomplishing, would be the denial of its own reality. Life would come to its end in the fulfillment or attainment of its end, the ultimate reflective contradiction which is exemplified in tragedy. It is humor as the instrument of comedy that saves the day for life, and makes it possible for life partially to realize its purpose while still retaining its power and its reason for existence. This fact is so universally recognized

that it has taken the form of a proverb—it is the sense of humor that is the solution for the distractions of life.

Both tragedy and comedy are thus objectifications of failure and negation, and their “triumph” consists in the pure act of creation to which they are forced to resort—the making of something real out of the materiality of nothingness. The tragic and the comic objects are thus instances of pure form realized in pure intentional design within the matter which is pure universality—the nothing that is being. And the objects are aesthetically good. Tragedy is the aesthetic objectification of the failure of life to effect a harmony of value with existence. Comedy is the objectification of the inevitable effort which life makes to overcome the failure. It fails, but the failure makes life good aesthetically, and so a success. Both make use of all the “beauties,” music, picture, pageantry, with all the categorial forms, line, mass, form, design, in the ubiquitous substance of color-tone, with the “light touch” of humor marshalling the elements into individuality. Humor then becomes the technique by which the life-will accepts defeat with dignity and grace. Here life transcends its limitations by accepting them and making the very most of it by creating its nothingness in beautiful forms.

CHAPTER XX

THE GROTESQUE

WE HAVE seen that the aesthetic object and the aesthetic experience are complete in beauty, and have indicated the system of categories by which the experience of beauty is identified with the object of beauty. This essential object beauty then becomes the principle with reference to which all aesthetic experience and all types of aesthetic objects are judged. As different kinds of aesthetic experience will correspond to the different types of aesthetic objects, we have been able to ignore the psychology of aesthetic experience and to confine our attention to the various types of aesthetic objects. By calling beauty a principle we mean that its concept is a synthesis of a system of categories all interrelated according to the methodological principles. Beauty then is the criterion or objective standard pattern which formulates the point of view from which all other aesthetic objects get their characters. Beauty is then an objective principle. Hence all other forms of aesthetic object are what they are by virtue of the degree and kind of variation, within their structure, from the principled structure of beauty; that is, all other aesthetic forms represent departures, of varying degree and kind, from the standard beauty. The variation is in the categorial structure of the objects, so that the variation itself, as generalized, becomes a principle representing a system of categories. This objective principle of variation is the Ugly. Since Beauty and the Ugly are principles of aesthetic logic, no merely *perceptual* object, or object determined in space and time alone, can completely identify with them, and we say that objective Beauty and the objective Ugly cannot *exist*. They are pure cultural objects, and their identity with objects of existence is not possible in life and experience, but only in idea or the realm of the finally real. God and Satan can get along in heaven only so long as they are pure spirits; when existence enters Paradise is lost to both, and eternity becomes a struggle that can never be composed. Value and existence are harmonized only in reality; in actuality they are negated by the breach that lies between them as a segment of the reality they can neither of them ever be.

Within this doom that hangs forever over life and experience the principle of the ugly becomes of most practical importance, since life and experience are cast within the ambit of the actual. By the principle of the ugly then life is sublime, and tragic, and comic, and grotesque. It is sublime in its massive enormity, this term understood in both its characteristic senses, as the huge and the monstrous. The sublime is the vast in mass, and is beyond the comprehension of the mind that apprehends it; and it is monstrous in that it will come under none of the rules by which objects are determined, refuses conformity to any law that would make it whole. Hence we are powerless in its presence, its design to us is inconceivable and we can only stand in awe and exultant fear. Its mass has overcome its form by breaking the lines through which design might give it individuality, and it appears to us in experience as purposeless with any purpose we can understand; it has a purpose to be governed by no purpose, and to no end. The failure of its categorial structure to effect a harmony between existence and value is significant to us through its impressiveness, and its mass appears as its dominant characteristic.

The principle of the ugly, as the principle of all aesthetic objects in actuality (life and experience), is evident in all the major aesthetic forms. The tragic object is the form of life in the pervasiveness of the failure of its categorial structure, just as the sublime is the vastness or massiveness of that failure. The tragic object demonstrates that life can be perfect in none of its categorial forms; it can never be designed with lines that indicate a perfect form for the mass of its substance, cannot be an individual. As a consequence every major purpose of life must fail of fulfillment, since if and when fulfilled it contradicts itself by transforming itself into its opposite. A life purpose can thus only be completed in ideal reality, where its tragic sublimity gives way to beauty, and life as actual is no more. Our motive to safety, as ideal in the concept of peace, the beauty of perfect repose, merely means that we die in insecurity and fear, since the instruments we purpose to our safety turn upon us in war and we perish. We concentrate upon the necessities and build the economic state, and all die of destitution. We seek fulfillment of our subjective nature in love and sex, and as a consequence perish because of degeneration of emotion in a loveless world of suspicion and greed. We pursue the unity of peace in a political state, and are harried

to death by oppression and confusion. We seek a haven of joy in religion, and schism drives us to despair with the scourge of fanaticism. We seek dignity through ambition, and are humbled in the dust of debasement. In every phase of life and actuality individuality fails because of the rupture of its categorial structure at some point. Its lines are distorted, its masses out of hand, sublime though it may be; its forms are misshapen or perverse, ill-shaped *and* perverse; and its designs muddled in obscurity or sharpened by a blinding clearness, nothing in proportion, all confusion. But life is tragic mainly in the whole, as an objective universal it can never individuate, there is no end for it that contains and sublimates its beginning, no middle which balances against its dominant and merciless extremities. As a whole then it is a jumble of extremes, and design can never give it form.

But if life is tragic confusion and awful beauty in the whole, it is perfect enough in its parts, that is, imperfect enough to satisfy the most fastidious worldling that life and experience can produce worth out of the subsoil of confusion, which we know as unprecipitate value murking darkly within a muddy existence. That is to say, life is comedy. Bits of life, selected 'most anywhere from the tragic muddle of the whole, are not only bearably beautiful, but may be gems of perfection lying in a sea of gloom whose very darkness furnishes them a reflecting background for their effulgence. Beauty snatches a snatch here and there, and if you do not look at the foul wound where it was torn away, its loveliness will lift you out of the current dullness of life for a moment which is complete and individual, even if it has no connection anywhere but hangs suspended as a moment in the thin air of time. As tragedy is distortion in every category, the distortion is largely a matter of the proportionality relations among the categories in its system, while any simple constituent categorial structure may be internally relatively perfect. The hesitant simplicity of Tess in accepting the proffers of Clare is a marvel of beauteous sincerity and nobility, but this very simplicity rages horrendous in the cold determination with which she faces the consequences of her murder of Alex. The tragedy is built up of individual "beauties," each of which is consistent with the general principle of proportion in its internal structure, but all together constituting a whole in which distortion itself is the principle. It is this distortion that becomes the

substance of the tragic object, the color-tone-feeling of life is rent and torn into fragments which individually a blind destiny polishes with the lustre of a rare gem, even where the setting in which it is placed is confused with distraction.

It is the human comic spirit, the will to culture, that we have to identify with this blind destiny. Hence comedy dresses the tragedy of life in bright colors, and hides its defects with jewels of great price. The raw filth that life becomes, the *Urschleim* that it is, in mere existence, cannot be transformed into value, its substance is too flabby and its laws of cohesion too weak to support it as a whole. But bits of it can be hardened in the crucible of experience to the point where its solidier portions will take form, and the flaws which prevent a unity of these portions can be covered with ornamental beauties. And while the structure thus erected is fragile in the extreme, it is the substance of such culture as the god of comedy is able to create out of the nothing that is life.

But there is a type of aesthetic object where even comedy fails, where life evades all the efforts which sublimity and tragedy and comedy make to subject it to form; and while the lineaments of form are traceable in its structure, life in this object persists in reversion to its proto-type in the passive formlessness of pure feeling. This is the grotesque. It is feeling recalcitrant and incorrigible except to the heavier strokes of design, strokes almost so brutal as to destroy it, and it accepts form only under duress and on the condition that form make concessions. These concessions of form to the passive inertia of feeling, the substance of the aesthetic object, are objectified in the categorial features of the grotesque, where they appear as extreme variations of the aesthetic categories, with the more pronounced distortions in the shape and proportion elements of which form is more directly composed. But the distortion of form determines that the dominant character of the grotesque is its designlessness. And the designlessness is so deeply negative that the grotesque appears as an instance of design in reverse; not, of course, a positive ill-design, or design in reverse direction and away from ends, not the aggressive will to confusion which determines the evil object; but an instance where the design of comedy gives up its seriousness to become imaginative playfulness toying carelessly and idly with the purposelessness which is the essence of feeling. Design itself operates without design, and the

grotesque approaches the purposiveness without purpose which makes the ridiculous akin to the sublime.

By the term grotesque we mean, then, to refer to those aesthetic objects that represent the widest variations from the normal categorial forms, and that are yet determined by aesthetic categories. We have seen that in the case of the sublime, with its variation in the character of mass, there is still enough of total harmony to give individuality of design to the whole. And in the tragic object, although representing a variation in design at the point of each of the categorial characters, there is still left enough of individuality to give to its substance-life a very real continuity of purpose and a suggestion of unity of value with existence. Also in comedy, which discloses the same variation in structure as tragedy, but with emphasis on "each kind of artistic ornament," as Aristotle says, individuality is conserved through the principle of humor, with the result that the system of cultural objects and institutions is more or less permanently and firmly established within and upon a basis of the system of nature. It is this system of comic objects that constitutes civilization, the institutions of which represent each its peculiar type of comic purpose.

Now the grotesque manifests all of these variations at once, the sublime, the tragic, the comic are all present in the same object in bewildering confusion. And yet the object is quite distinctly an aesthetic object, since there are no categories adequate to its determination except those we have named as the aesthetic categories. It is possible to apprehend a grotesque only in terms of line, mass, form and design, with their attempted synthesis in individuality. No other kind of interpretation will make it an intelligible object at all. If one looks at a grotesque made to fill an irregular triangular space on a building as anything but an expression of an aesthetic purpose, it is impossible even to see, as an object, the figure representing in its upper parts the form of a man and in its lower parts trailing off in the tail of a fish or in a "bunch of leaves." Perceived otherwise than in aesthetic terms it is a mere decorative line with all sorts of contortions, but is not an object. And to apprehend such an object it is necessary to approach it in the attitudes that are dictated by line, mass, form, and design. This is true of many of the objects of primitive and ancient culture; they are unintelligible except in and through interpretation in terms of the aesthetic categories.

And it is the same principle that saves much of our contemporary "art." It is only as instances of the grotesque, the comic dissolved in comicality, that we can make intelligible much of the popular "music" that one is forced to hear, thanks to the "miracles of science" and the "overcoming of space and time" (and sense) in the radio. Most commercial building, and all building is at present commercial, is endurable at all only because of the universality of the principles of line, mass, form, and design, even if these are present only as remnants; and it is strong evidence of their universality that they have not yet fallen prey to the progress of the modern "spirit" as represented in our stove-foundry architecture. A building that impresses one as merely a horrendous gob of pure hog can be apprehended as *that* only through the categorial forms its brainlessness seeks to violate, and the vacuous vastness and pertinacious plainness of endless stretches of bald concrete and blaring glass are the damnable things they are only through the aesthetic norms they prostitute. Our civilization has whatever claim to notice or note it can claim in its grotesquery; and war and business are doing what they can to destroy even that.

Just as comedy saves the reality of art in life by the principle of humor, the grotesque dissolves art back into the primordial *Urschleim* of life by a perverse extension of the principle of humor. This overemphasis of humor is correlative with the exaggeration of mass in the sublime, and explains the easy transition from the sublime to the ridiculous. This perversion of humor is in two directions; the "noble grotesque" of Ruskin which approaches the sublime, and the "ignoble grotesque" which approaches the "ghastliness" of bad wit. We shall return to this distinction lower down. We have stated the principle of humor as the sharpness and suddenness of the break or failure in the relation of analogical identity between existence and value. There is no break in the relation in cases of abstract and perfect beauty; in a "good" picture the existence and the value elements are so completely fused that no distinction can be made (except in "criticism" or descriptive analysis) between the two kinds of elements. The picture has its "life," but it is an ideal life, and bears little resemblance to the life that is identical with feeling in the biological or purely natural sphere. Or, the relation between the "life" of the picture, which is purely metaphorical and real,

and the actual biological life of experience, which is purely literal and actual, is that of the universal to its instance in the concrete, where the concrete represents the meaning of the universal only by logical reference. This reference is an analogical identity and is the ground of value inference, but it is never complete in the sense that the differences that are the ground of the analogy are clearly distinguishable so that the correspondences between the two types of life can be indicated. We saw this incompleteness or failure of perfect analogy in the sublime, in tragedy, and in comedy; and we saw that the failure or break is made use of in comedy to emphasize the significance of the separate art-forms that make up the body of comedy. These specific forms are employed to cover or soften and transform the tragic break, and it is in their production that the objects and institutions of culture find their origin and purpose. It is in this constructive use of the various art-forms that we find the principle of humor operative, and it is in the recognition of the break and the efforts toward the creation of specific "beauties" which are designed to compensate for the break that the essence of humor is to be found. It may be necessary to repeat here that humor has nothing to do with the merely funny, its use and purpose are entirely serious, and are found embodied in the objects which are the substance of culture. Perhaps the best instance of real humor is the creation of religious symbols by the comic purpose. It is humor that creates political systems to compose the chaos of natural life; that creates religion to objectify the ideal, even if in symbols; that ordains marriage to sanctify the crudity of sex impulse. This humor of course becomes "ignoble grotesque" in the foul joke about sex. It is the constructive or creative principle in culture, and is responsible for the development of intelligence in man and for the fact that man has transcended the merely animal.

The grotesque is the result of the exaggeration and consequent distortion of this principle of humor. In genuine works of culture and objects of art it has its legitimate use in the relief of strained detail in a total form. A space in architecture that is left purely formal, in the mathematical sense, and as a consequence sensuously bare and rigid, may be relieved and livened by the insertion of a figure in itself overdone with life, where a simple decorative device would not produce the effect. As an element of extreme discord it will

thus balance a great mass of plain symmetry, with an effect for the whole that makes for harmony. The huge raw masses of life in a long romance or novel may be relieved by occasional bits of "wit", or a peculiarly strained situation in the most serious tragedy may be balanced and thus enforced by the introduction of a bit of nonsense. But only a little too much of this sort of thing is sufficient to spoil the whole effect of an otherwise good aesthetic object, and there is question as to whether Shakespeare himself may not overdo this device on occasion. But it remains true that Shakespeare's fool on occasion is sublime, and the tragic structure which he erects would often lack cohesion if the fool and his folly were left out.

As it is in the cases where the grotesque is used over-much that its character appears most clearly, we may turn to some examples. Unfortunately in contemporary life these examples are only too common, and the pointing out of instances will make our account look somewhat like a critique of the civilization of the time. But the purpose is merely to show as clearly as possible and by examples what is the nature of the grotesque as a consequence of the perversion of the principle of humor, where humor is regarded as the constitutional principle of culture and life.

Perhaps the novel is not and cannot be a genuine aesthetic object. It may be significant that this form of literature came into existence with the blundersome confusion of "freedom" and individualism with its excessive emphasis upon the sheer raw stuff of "experience" and feeling. As a consequence it represents the confusion and chaos which have been characteristic of a period altogether lacking in balance and orderly form. The period has produced no great art with the possible exception of music, and there is a serious question whether music itself is ever an instance of perfect individuality as required in a work of beauty. But these are questions to be discussed by those who know. Certain it is that our age is "rich" in the profusion of the grotesque, and this is our topic here. The age is replete with life, but it may be that it is the superabundance of life with a dearth of form that is characteristic of it. It is just this chaos of life which apparently the novel undertakes to give some degree of form to, and as any art-form has the same problem of reducing the recalcitrancy of life to form, it would appear that the novel has as good a

claim to aesthetic individuality as, say, poetry or drama. But there is a difference. Every genuine art-form deals with life only in the individual. It does not undertake to provide form and design, or formed design, to the mere massiveness of life on the whole and in the large. And while it will strive for universality, while universality is the end at which it aims, it is universality only as symbolized or realized in the individual that it seeks, and it seeks it in the individual because all the instruments that it has to use, or are available to it, are instruments that are instrumental only to the process and end of individuation. That is, line, mass, form, design, are instruments of the aesthetic purpose because, and only because, they are adapted by their own structure and nature to the determination of an object, an object is predetermined in the very being of the instrument, and no other use is even conceivable except as resulting in bad grotesquery. A determinate object that is individual then is a logically necessary implicate of every aesthetic category or every aesthetic device, and what is not individually an object cannot be the criterion of any art-form.

But there appears to be no such object possible for the novel. What it seems to undertake to individuate by objectification is the concept of "life" in general. It seeks to portray life as it *is*, failing to see that life *is* not. And that it should fail to see this fact is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it is just this failure of life to come to individuality that constitutes the object in tragedy, sublimity, comedy, and the grotesque. Then if the novel has an object in life in general and on the whole, tragedy, sublimity, comedy and grotesquery have no object at all, since it is just the failure of life to come to on-the-wholeness that is the object to be realized in these forms. And it would be somewhat gratuitous to argue that the sublime, the tragic, the comic, have no genuine object, whatever one may want to think of the grotesque. The novel may then be regarded as an instance of bad grotesquery in that the concept which it undertakes to make its purpose is self-contradictory, and not a self-determined object created out of contradiction, as in tragedy, sublimity, and the comic. In the novel the contradiction is in the principle, not in the matter, as in the other forms, and this prevents the novel from having a form or purpose. The concept of life on the whole cannot be made the object of any aesthetic form,

and if the novel undertakes such an irrational purpose it merely negates itself as an aesthetic form. Life is not capable of individuation, and this is proved by the failure that becomes the object of all art-forms that deal with the fact of life. An art-form can be perfect only as it succeeds in finding a material that is capable of representation in pure value; it can come to terms with existence only by giving up its claim to perfection. And there is an art form which succeeds in finding this material; beauty is constituted of pure color-tone-rhythm-feeling, and as such has the universality of principle but is not limited by the particularity of existence.

But perhaps this judgment upon the novel is due only to bad definition. Perhaps the novel does attempt to objectify the universal, but fails like the other aesthetic forms. But the other aesthetic forms do not fail; they create their objects out of failure, but *they* do not fail. And the novel does. Or, where it does not fail it is not a novel, as in the case of *Tess* or *War and Peace*. There is a sense in which it is true that *Tess* is a real objectification of life in its universal form, and that *War and Peace* objectifies life as a universal. But it is the universal form of the individual human that is realized in *Tess*, and the universality is created in the process, not taken as an existing and ready made object, for such an object cannot exist. To assume otherwise is to confuse objectification with universality. And this overlooks the fact that universality cannot be an object, but has its connection with the object through the particular. The object only comes into being when the universal and the particular unite under certain laws, and the result is an individual in which both particularity and universality are characteristics but not independent substances. Then if *Tess* or *War and Peace* attempt to objectify the universal they both fail, and if they are art-forms it is because of their relation to this failure.

In this way then *Tess* may be regarded as a genuine work of art, but no longer regarded as a novel. As an objectification of the failure of life in the individual, *Tess* is tragedy. And it is none the less tragedy, and none the less poetic tragedy, in that its medium of expression happens to be prose; the universality of poetry can make its way through prose when the prose is such as to speak in universal terms; and an instance which shows the complexity of the relations of the various art-forms, as well as the different media of expres-

sion, is the description of the gargoyle on Weatherbury church. *Tess* is then genuine tragedy, and to class the work in the same type with the million works ordinarily called novels is to make grotesque mockery of classification as a way of distinguishing art-forms. So also *War and Peace*, if and so far as it is art, is an objective expression not of life in the universal, not of life as a universalized object, but an objectification of the *failure* of life to become universal in the human species. The life of the human species is already an object in so far as any universal can be an object. But it is not an object as a work of art contemplates an object. For the work of art the object *is* not and cannot *be* until it has been made flesh and dwells among us; the abstract universal becomes objective only in the individual which the aesthetic impulse creates through particularizing it so that it can find its place in existence. The eternal round of birth, growth, decay, death is the eternally endless struggle through which life passes in the attempt to become real in man; and the failure which is objectified when it is expressed perfectly in aesthetic categories is that most perfect of tragedy which is sublime—the everlasting massiveness of it prevents its ever coming to form, and will forever prevent it because the substantial quality of life is formlessness. The eternal round of the wheel cannot be encompassed, and the reality which is possible to it is to become the value element in an existential form forged for it out of the materials of feeling by the categorial energies of aesthetic purpose. The God can become the man Jesus, or the Man Jesus become God, but to do so must give up his life.

When the novel is a work of art it is not a novel, but must accept the character of the tragic or the sublime. Otherwise it will become an instance of the "ignoble grotesque," in which category most novels belong. Because of the instability of its purported subject-matter, life, the ordinary novel is so expanded and stretched and complicated in its efforts to possess itself of its object that it fails altogether to individuate in any form. It represents life in its floundering actuality, always failing to come to determination, and it is perhaps for this reason that it is now so widely popular; its structurelessness is as near a picture of the actuality of contemporary life as the confusion of that life will permit it to understand. What is called the novel is therefore an instance of the grotesque in the arts of language, and a grotesque which approaches the

ghastly and the ludicrous which Ruskin has so accurately described.

It would be interesting at this point to describe the grotesque in some of the other art forms. It is most often thought of as a characteristic of architecture, and it is in this field that its purest instances occur. The grotesque is a peculiar product of the Northern mind, and got its most perfect expression in Gothic architecture. But it is also a characteristic element in all of the phases of culture that show a distinct Northern influence, and this holds of those aspects of culture which are not normally regarded as aesthetic in nature. What has come to be called Individualism has large factors of the grotesque in it, and many of them are not of the "noble" type. Democracy is in a peculiar sense grotesquery in political and social relations, and Protestantism is grotesque in many of its fundamental features. Industrialism is in most of its manifestations pure grotesquery of the impure or "ignoble" type; Mr. George F. Babbitt represents its approach to individuation. And so far as these cultural expressions have had any characteristic arts, they are grotesque to the core.

Perhaps a word should be added concerning wit and the funny and the ludicrous. These "forms" represent the total collapse of the principle of humor in its effort to compose the breach between existence and reality in the tragedy of life. They are the ultimate "categories" of confusion, and show the aesthetic categories in their utter failure. They lie about life like the remnants of a shattered vase, and their only claim to aesthetic quality lies in the bodiless color of the fragments and their forlorn shapelessness. Here the failures of the principle of humor are catastrophic, they represent grotesquery as itself become grotesque, the grotesque reduced to absurdity. This is the proper sphere of the funny and the laughable. In the presence of wit one can only laugh, and laughter is the only comment possible "in the premises." Laughter is the attitude that recognizes the total collapse of the aesthetic, the one and only proper reaction to what is not only formless but destined to remain so. Where wit is appropriate confusion is confounded, and it represents the total helplessness of life in its last aesthetic extremity. But there is, after all, something that can be called "good clean wit." In the presence of the major tragic situations in life one can only laugh, or resort to some of the common variations of laughter like adoration or

profanity or crying. And while no object is involved further than is suggested in the hopelessness of the possibility of an object, the only formulation of the experience of that hopelessness is in terms of aesthetic categories, the object being vaguely adumbrated in their failure. It is probably the function of wit and laughter and fun to qualify negatively the tragic, and thus enable the practitioner to avoid or evade the consequences of the tragic by lapsing into a sort of aesthetic oblivion.

The grotesque is a genuine aesthetic type. Its essence lies in the attempt at the objectification of the efforts of life when art struggles to push the aesthetic categories to the last extremity of their flexibility in the hope of overcoming the incorrigible passivity of the primordial feeling. These efforts all fail. But the *failure* itself is realized in an object in which the very incorrigibility of feeling in its relation to existence is the determining character. The object is thus determined by the aesthetic categories, and is a genuine and true aesthetic object. Primordial feeling in the shapelessness of life intrudes in every actuality, and its formlessness resists every effort of design to reduce it to form. The existence of the grotesque proves that no effort can overcome the break between value and existence. The grotesque then expresses the primordial feeling in its inertia and passivity, and manifests that feeling as metaphysical reality. The imp of Lincoln grins forever in the angel choir because he belongs there; it is where his being lies, and in persisting there proves himself an element in the angelic nature.